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Abstract
Wireless Sensor Networks (WSNs) have recently attracted much interest in the research
community because of their wide range of applications. One emerging application for
WSNs involves their use in healthcare where they are generally termed Wireless Medi-
cal Sensor Networks (WMSNs). In a hospital, fitting patients with tiny, wearable, wireless
vital sign sensors would allow doctors, nurses and others to continuously monitor the state
of those in their care. In the healthcare industry, patients are expected to be treated in rea-
sonable time and any loss in data availability can result in further decline in the patient’s
condition or can even lead to death. Therefore, the availability of data is more important
than security concerns. The overwhelming priority is to take care of the patient, but the
privacy and confidentiality of that patient’s medical records cannot be neglected. In cur-
rent healthcare applications, there are many problems concerning security policy violations
such as unauthorised denial of use, unauthorised information modification and unauthorised
information release of medical data in the real world environment. Current WSN access
control models used the traditional Role-Based Access Control (RBAC) or cryptographic
methods for data access control but the systems still need to predefine attributes, roles and
policies before deployment. It is, however, difficult to determine in advance all the possible
needs for access in real world applications because there may be unanticipated situations at
any time.
This research proceeds to study possible approaches to address the above issues and to
develop a new access control model to fill the gaps in work done by the WSN research
community. Firstly, the adaptive access control model is proposed and developed based on
the concept of discretionary overriding to address the data availability issue. In the health-
care industry, there are many problems concerning unauthorised information release. So,
we extended the adaptive access control model with a prevention and detection mechanism
to detect security policy violations, and added the concept of obligation to take a course of
action when a restricted access is granted or denied. However, this approach does not con-
sider privacy of patients’ information because data availability is prioritised. To address the
viii
conflict between data availability and data privacy, this research proposed the Trust-based
Adaptive Access Control (T BA2C) model that integrates the concept of trust into the pre-
vious model. A simple user behaviour trust model is developed to calculate the behaviour
trust value which measures the trustworthiness of the users and that is used as one of the
defined thresholds to override access policy for data availability purpose, but the framework
of the T BA2C model can be adapted with other trust models in the research community. The
trust model can also protect data privacy because only a user who satisfies the relevant trust
threshold can get restricted access in emergency and unanticipated situations. Moreover, the
introduction of trust values in the enforcement of authorisation decisions can detect abnor-
mal data access even from authorised users.
Ponder2 is used to develop the T BA2C model gradually, starting from a simple access
control model to the full T BA2C. In Ponder2, a Self-Managed Cell (SMC) simulates a
sensor node with the T BA2C engine inside it. Additionally, to enable a full comparison
with the proposed TBA2C model, the Break-The-Glass Role Based Access Control (BTG-
RBAC) model is redesigned and developed in the same platform (Ponder2). The proposed
T BA2C model is the first to realise a flexible access control engine and to address the con-
flict between data availability and data privacy by combining the concepts of discretionary
overriding, the user behaviour trust model, and the prevention and detection mechanism.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
1.1 Introduction
Wireless Sensor Networks (WSNs) have attracted much interest in the research community
because of their wide range of applications. An emerging application for WSNs involves
their use in healthcare where they are generally termed as Wireless Medical Sensor Net-
works (WMSNs). In a hospital, outfitting patients with tiny, wearable, wireless vital sign
sensors would allow doctors, nurses and other caregivers to monitor continuously the state
of their patients. More importantly in an emergency scenario, the same technology would
enable medics to care more effectively for large numbers of casualties. Moreover, unlike
many sensor network applications, the healthcare application cannot make use of traditional
in-network aggregation1 [33] since it is not generally meaningful to combine data from mul-
tiple patients. In such a scenario, centralised data management cannot be effected.
Security policy violations in multi-user systems were categorised by Anderson [13] into
three categories: unauthorised information release, unauthorised information modification
and unauthorised denial of use. It is difficult to address the above violations in an access
control policy for the healthcare application because an overly “loose” policy might permit
access to inappropriate users, but an overly “tight” policy might prevent access from the
appropriate users. To solve the problem of defining a flexible policy, we need a flexible
approach in the access control engines to address all the possible access conditions.
The aim of this thesis is to present new ways to provide a flexible approach to access
1In-network aggregation deals with the distributed processing of data within the network. Data aggregation
techniques are tightly coupled with how data is gathered at the sensor nodes.
2 Introduction
control engine in WSNs and WMSNs.
The other main issues we study concern the enforcement of access permissions dynam-
ically across healthcare organisations. They are:
• Who is designated to get access in emergency situations?
• What happens after a restricted access2 is granted or not granted?
Let us consider the following example from a healthcare application to clarify the issues
we aim to address in this dissertation. Alice is a doctor who takes care of a patient named
Bob. Alice can access Bob’s medical record but when she is away from work for some
particular reason, such as sickness or on holiday, who has the right to access Bob’s medi-
cal records in order to evaluate and treat him appropriately? Data availability is important:
another doctor may need to access Bob’s medical records to evaluate and treat his sick-
ness. The healthcare system can provide data availability without security considerations
but when patients are celebrities or high-profile people, how can we control and manage
the privacy of these patients? The assumption is made that Bob is a celebrity who is in an
emergency situation and Alice is not available at that time. The problem is who else has a
designated access to Bob’s medical records to give an effective treatment? Can other doc-
tors or nurses from the emergency ward access Bob’s medical record? If we consider the
sickness of the patient, data availability is needed to give timely treatment, but what about
the privacy of patient’s medical record and information? In the healthcare industry, the as-
sumption cannot be made that all the users are trustworthy enough to access data even in
emergency situations because security breaches can happen at any time due to inappropriate
usage. Additionally, a prevention and detection mechanism is needed to detect security pol-
icy violations and to take courses of action for any access especially when a restricted access
is granted or not granted. The question is, how can we design an access control model to
provide privacy, confidentiality and availability at the same time?
In this dissertation, new frameworks are developed to address the access control related
issues such as how to provide a flexible approach in an access control engine for both de-
fined and unanticipated situations, how to detect security violations, and how to address the
conflict between data availability and data privacy.
2A restricted access means a data access request to sensitive or confidential data
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1.2 Motivation and Problem Statement
In the healthcare industry, security is the degree of protection against danger, loss, dam-
age and criminal activity. There are many problems concerning unauthorised information
release of medical data in the real world environment. Based on the Health Insurance Porta-
bility and Accountability Act (HIPAA) enforcement report [140], unauthorised information
release is the second highest (35 percent) cause of large security breaches in the healthcare
industry. Another six percent is caused by hacking and IT incidents. There were several
high-profile breaches of users’ privacy and data confidentiality when the California Health
Department reported on incidents involving patient medical records at UCLA medical Cen-
tre. It found that more than 100 hospital workers had been accessing the medical records of
1,041 patients. Some hospital workers were passing information of hospitalised celebrities
to the tabloid media and in some cases to insurance companies.
According to another report [55], 1,754 separate Parkland Hospital employees viewed
the medical record of a famous person whilst staying in Parkland Hospital. It is unknown
how many of the hospital staff had a legitimate reason to view that patient’s record but it
would not be more than a few dozen. Wang et al. [137] mention that security breaches may
be detrimental to patient health or even life threatening. At the same time, there is a need to
access all the patient information in order to accurately evaluate patient health and provide
better treatment. Normally, healthcare professionals want to meet emergency needs without
security concerns; however, security must be addressed and included for a solution to be
completed. Aside from the obvious security considerations with sensitive patient data, both
data availability and data privacy need to be addressed.
In current healthcare applications [52], there is a lack of security incident responses and
reports, and a lack of access control models. Ferreira et al. [12] reviewed a decade (2002-
2012) of published literature on access control models for the medical industry. There are
more than three dozen papers published on access control models for the healthcare indus-
try; however, only a few of the proposed models have been implemented in practice. There
are no well-considered threat models for the access control models that reside in both pa-
per and electronic medical record systems for healthcare applications. Wang et al. [137]
mentioned that, in theory, access control solved the problems of which users can or cannot
access medical records. In practice, some large organisations still face problems when pol-
icy becomes unmanageable and consequently users circumvent controls.
4 Introduction
In the healthcare industry, patients are expected to be treated in reasonable time. There-
fore, an access control model should provide real-time access to comprehensive medical
records. In emergency situations, a doctor or nurse needs to access data immediately. Any
loss in data availability can result in further decline in the patient’s condition or can even
lead to death. Therefore, the availability of data is more important than security concerns.
The overwhelming urgency is to take care of the patient; however, the privacy and confi-
dentiality of that patient’s medical records cannot be neglected. Thus, careful consideration
in defining flexible policy is required to solve the conflict between data privacy and data
availability in this real world application. Additionally, it should also detect unauthorised
information release of patient medical records from both authorised and unauthorised users
because security breaches can happen at any time.
Based on the above discussion, the question that motivates this research work to be car-
ried out in WSNs and WMSNs is as follows:
How can the current access control framework be improved to provide a flexible ap-
proach in access control engine in order to make decisions effectively and help to address
the conflict between data availability and data privacy for both defined and unanticipated
situations?
To address the above research question, this research work developed new frameworks
for access control engines to fill the needs and requirements of WSNs and WMSNs. The
first part of the dissertation discusses an adaptive access control model that implements a
discretionary overriding concept to address data availability issues in emergency situations.
The second part presents an adaptive access control framework with a prevention and detec-
tion mechanism to control how security policy violations are handled and detected, and what
the courses of action are when a restricted access is granted or denied. The third part of the
dissertation integrates these concepts with a simple user behaviour trust model to provide a
flexible approach in access control engines as well as to address the conflict between data
availability and data privacy. The last part of the dissertation develops an existing access
control model called Break-the-Glass Role-Based Access Control (BTG-RBAC) [38] in the
same platform to enable a comparison with the proposed models. The evaluation criteria
based on characteristics and features to compare with current WSN access control models
are also studied.
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1.3 Structure of this Dissertation
This section provides an overview of the subsequent chapters of this dissertation.
Chapter 2 gives an overview of the related work laying out the background to this re-
search. This chapter primarily reviews research in the field of WSN access control models.
The current ones are specifically categorised into three groups: role-based, cryptography-
based and privacy preserving-based.
Chapter 3 gives an overview of the research that is presented in this dissertation. Firstly,
the research gaps are identified based on the previous literature review of current WSN ac-
cess control models, followed by a research question being posed for this dissertation. This
chapter also introduces an overview discussion for the development of new frameworks in
WSNs.
Chapter 4 discusses a simple access control model in Ponder2, which is a popular pol-
icy language to use in WSNs. This model is developed based on an existing authorisation
policy in Ponder2 for enforcement of access decisions. Additionally, a medical scenario is
developed and implemented to evaluate and validate the simple access control model.
Chapter 5 presents an adaptive access control model that extends the model in the pre-
vious chapter with an additional concept to make and adjust decisions regarding data access
in WSNs for data availability purposes. To address the data availability issue in WSNs, the
discretionary overriding concept is introduced for emergency and unanticipated situations.
Development details are presented in this chapter with diagrams and figures. The proposed
model is evaluated based on a medical scenario that is implemented and developed in Pon-
der2.
Chapter 6 adds a prevention and detection mechanism and introduces an obligation pol-
icy to the adaptive access control model proposed in the previous chapter. This enhancement
addresses how security policy violations can be handled and detected, and what the courses
of action are for a restricted access in emergency and unanticipated situations. The devel-
opment details of this model in Ponder2 are discussed with figures and diagrams, followed
by an evaluation of the proposed model with a medical scenario.
6 Introduction
Chapter 7 introduces a simple behaviour trust model to define and calculate the total
behaviour trust value of the user because we cannot assume that all the users are trustworthy
enough to use the overriding facilities (introduced in the previous chapters 5 and 6) at any
time. The main objective of developing the trust algorithm is to measure the trustworthi-
ness of users based on information about their behaviour. Additionally, the trust value is
considered for using with access control engines to make access decisions effectively and
dynamically. Matlab is used to evaluate the proposed trust algorithm to show that how a
user’s behaviour information such as role, location, time, etc. can affect the calculation of
behaviour trust value for each person.
Chapter 8 gives a description of the proposed Trust-Based Adaptive Access Control
model (T BA2C), which is an extended version of the model proposed in chapter 6, incorpo-
rating the simple user behaviour trust model from chapter 7. The main objective is to define
a flexible access control policy based on behaviour trust values to make access decisions
effectively in both defined and unanticipated situations. It also helps to address the conflict
between data availability and data privacy in healthcare applications. In addition, the use
of the trust value for authorisation decisions can detect an abnormal data access from au-
thorised users by adding an extra condition in the authorisation policy. The development
details of this model in Ponder2 are discussed with figures and diagrams, followed by an
evaluation of the proposed model with a medical scenario.
Chapter 9 explains the step-by-step development of the Break-The-Glass Role-Based
Access Control (BTG-RBAC) model in Ponder2 to enable a meaningful comparison with
the proposed T BA2C when both models are developed and implemented in the same plat-
form. The redesigned BTG-RBAC model for medical data in WSNs is named the Break-
The-Glass Access Control (BT G− AC) model. The development details of BT G− AC
in Ponder2 are discussed with figures and diagrams. Additionally, an evaluation of the
BT G−AC model is done based on the medical scenario for WSNs.
Chapter 10 compares Trust-Based Adaptive Access Control (T BA2C) and Break-The-
Glass Access Control (BT G−AC). These two models have similar structure but the main
differences are that human interactions are still involved in the decision-making process and
an additional policy is needed to define BTG operation in the BT G−AC model. Addition-
ally, T BA2C can help to solve the conflict between data availability and data privacy in some
situations. The comparison is made based on the network architecture model, concepts and
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approaches, decision outcomes, access control policies, data confidentiality, data privacy
and data availability.
Chapter 11 concludes this dissertation and reviews the contributions to the WSN re-
search community. It also discusses some possible modifications based on the proposed
concepts that could be applied to T BA2C and outlines the corresponding future directions of
research. Also, further concepts and extensions to apply in T BA2C that could be beneficial
for the research community are considered.

Chapter 2
Literature Review of Current WSN
Access Control Models
2.1 Introduction
A Wireless Sensor Network (WSN) consists of hundreds or even thousands of distributed,
autonomous, low power, low cost and small-sized devices, each with sensing, processing
and communication capabilities to monitor the real world environment and collect informa-
tion through infrastructureless ad-hoc wireless networks. Sensor networks are envisioned to
play an important role in a wide variety of areas ranging from critical military surveillance
applications to forest fire monitoring. From 2008, WSN technologies have been of interest
to researchers and scientists in many areas because of their potential to change our way of
life, with applications in entertainment, travel, retail, industry, medicine, care of dependent
people, emergency management and many other areas.
Nowadays, a sensor node can capture pictures and multimedia data. The sensor node
has the capability of sensing data from environments and storing data locally in a distributed
fashion or in a centralised approach, transmitting to central storage. Stored data from sensor
nodes are vulnerable and should be kept secret. In addition, access to the sensed and stored
data needs to be protected through security measures against security policy violations from
both authorised and unauthorised users. Data access control is a critical requirement for
security-oriented applications such as healthcare and military in WSNs. In this section,
security vulnerabilities and security requirements in WSNs are discussed. In addition, the
published literature of current access control models for WSNs is reviewed and the state of
art survey on these models is discussed.
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2.2 Security Vulnerabilities in WSNs
A nature of WSN makes them vulnerable to various kinds of attacks. Vella [130] men-
tioned that data obtained by sensing nodes need to keep as private and confidential. Without
security mechanisms or security primitives, the malicious users could intercept the private
information or send false messages to the neighbour nodes in WSNs. Security attacks can
be categorised into two; passive and active.
2.2.1 Passive Attack
The listening and monitoring over the communication channels by the unauthorised and
the malicious users are named as passive attack. Sensor nodes can sense and collect data
from the environments in WSNs; as a result the network becomes vulnerable to potential
abuse of these data resources. Since collected data are stored in the sensor nodes without
tamper-proof or tamper-evident equipment, the privacy and confidentiality of data become
important issues to protect from the passive attacks. The malicious users can gather in-
formation by using passive monitoring and listening in anonymous manner. Some of the
common passive attacks [120] in WSNs are explained as follows:
• Eavesdropping and Passive Monitoring
One of the most common forms of attack on privacy of data is eavesdropping and
passive monitoring. If data messages are not encrypted, the adversary can easily
understand their content and obtain information.
• Traffic Analysis
Traffic analysis can be performed to intersect data messages in order to analyse in-
formation from the pattern in a communication channel, even if these messages are
encrypted with cryptographic keys. The greater the number of data messages has been
observed and intercepted by a malicious user, the more he can infer from the traffic.
Eavesdropping is more effective when it is combined with traffic analysis.
2.2.2 Active Attack
The monitoring, listening and modifying the data stream or message in the communication
channel is known as active attack. In active attack, an adversary can maliciously disturb the
communication channels between the sensors nodes. In harmful active attacks, the adver-
sary can alter and spoof the data packets and messages. In addition, it can even interfere
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with the wireless signals to jam the network. Ng et al [100] argued that even if the infor-
mation is protected from eavesdropping by means of encryption, the attacker may blindly
modify that encrypted information and turn the information into meaningless information.
The following active attacks [135] are most common in WSNs.
• Camouflage
A malicious user may try to compromise a sensor node and then use that masquer-
aded node as a normal sensor node in WSNs to advertise false routing information.
The camouflage node tries to attract other sensor nodes regarding packets forwarding.
After data packets start receiving at the camouflaged node, it will forward to other
powerful sensor nodes to analyse systematically.
• Sybil Attack
A particular harmful attack against sensor and ad hoc network is known as Sybil
attack [99], where a node illegitimately claims to multiple identities. In Sybil attack,
a malicious node presents multiple identities and sends incorrect information such
as routing information, resource allocation, etc. to neighbour nodes in WSN. This
means that a malicious user uses an identity of multiple nodes and routes multiple
paths through a single malicious node. The sensor node authentication and encryption
scheme can help to prevent that kind of attack in WSN [102].
• Wormhole Attack
Since the sensor nodes use a radio transmission medium to send information, the ma-
licious users can eavesdrop the packets, tunnel them to another location and retransmit
them in WSNs [73]. This kind of attack can make false information that the original
sender of the packets is in the neighbourhood of the remote location. There are two
proposed countermeasures to detect wormhole attack in WSNs called MDS-VOW
[135] and Wormhole Attack Defence Mechanism (WODEM) [147].
• Replay Attack
A malicious user might use an old data message and attempt to send it at a later time
for data access. When the sensor nodes receive that data message, they believe that
it is an original message from the authorised user. Therefore, the malicious user can
access to that data resource by using the old message. Freshness can be used in the
query and request message to prevent replay attacks in WSN.
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• Hello Flood Attack
Hello Flood attack is introduced in WSNs by Karlof and Wagner [63]. In Hello flood
attack, an attacker (laptop class user) uses high-power transmitter and advertises Hello
message, which contains high quality route to the destination node or base station, to
their neighbour nodes. It may cause a large number of sensor nodes to use that faulty
routing information because the sensor nodes which receive Hello message, might
attempt to transmit via that attacker node. In reality, the attacker nodes are out of
the radio range of sensor network and far away from these neighbour nodes but the
attackers use high-power transmitter to pretend that they are nearby.
• Sinkhole Attack
A malicious node attempts to attract all the traffic from a particular area to go through
it. A malicious node might use incorrect routing tables to attract all the traffic from
neighbouring nodes or nodes from specific area. The result is that these nodes are
chosen a malicious node as next hop node to route their data packets through. This
type of attack makes a selective forwarding message and all the traffic in the sensor
network should flow through a single malicious node [120].
• Daniel of Service Attack
In WSNs, the attacks on availability of communication channels and data resources
are referred to as Daniel of Service (DoS). WSNs are vulnerable for DoS attack due to
resource limited and energy constrained. In DoS attack, an adversary usually attempts
to disrupt, corrupt or destroy a network. Wood and Stankovic [141] discussed that
DoS attack acts like an event that attempts to reduce a network’s capacity, to perform
its expected function. In the published literatures, most of the defence mechanisms for
DoS attacks need high computational overhead. This means that the defence mech-
anisms from other wireless technologies are not suitable to apply in resource limited
WSNs. There are several common techniques in the published literatures to cope with
some of the common DoS attacks but the development of defence mechanism against
DoS attack is still an open research issue in WSNs.
• Node Replication Attack
In node replication attack, an attacker tries to add a new sensor node in the existing
network in order to do that it replicates and copies node identity of current sensor
node [120]. Node replication attack can cause several disruptions in the communica-
tion channels by forwarding and corrupting the data packets over incorrect routes. If a
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malicious user gains physical access to a sensor node, it is possible for him to copy or
replicate and use cryptography keys from that replicated node for message communi-
cation. The attacker can also place the replicated node in strategic locations in WSNs.
Therefore, he could easily manipulate a specific segment of the sensor network.
Based on the above discussion, a WSN is vulnerable to a considerable number of attacks
in all layers of TCP/IP protocol stack. Perrig [104] suggested that there might be other types
of attacks that are not yet identified in WSNs. Securing WSNs against all the attacks and
threats are the most challenging tasks for the WSN researchers.
2.3 Security Requirements in WSNs
A WSN is considered as highly distributed and ad-hoc manner because of that security re-
quirements and goals should be well studied and provided. An aim of security is to protect
the right thing in the right way. Gligor [49] discussed that “A system without an adver-
sary definition cannot be insecure. It can only be astonishing”. WSNs are vulnerable to
many attacks because of its constraints such as limited resource, low computation capa-
bility, broadcast nature of transmission link and unprotected environments. Therefore, a
careful consideration is needed for what things need to be protected against what threats,
and how these attacks and threats can be detected and prevented. The security goals for
WSNs are similar with other network technologies which are explained as below:
• Confidentiality: Sensed and collected data need to be stored and kept secretly from the
unauthorised users. In WSNs, an issue of confidentiality should address the following
requirements.
– Key distribution should be extremely robust.
– Public information such as sensor identities and public keys of the sensor nodes
should be encrypted to protect against traffic analysis attacks.
• Integrity: The data should be genuine. An access control method should provide in-
tegrity protection of the user requests and query commands, otherwise a malicious
user may try to modify these requests and commands which are constructed by autho-
rised users.
• Availability: Whenever an authorised user tries to request data access, data should be
always available in the sensor network. Therefore, the services of network should be
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always available even if the sensor nodes are attacked by internal or external threats
such as Daniel of Service (DoS).
• Access Control: Sensed and collected data from a sensor node should be accessible
only to the authorise users. Access control should allow access to the authorised users
and deny access to the illegitimate users.
• Authorisation: Authorisation ensures that only authorised sensors can be involved
in order to provide information to the network services. On the other hand, only
authorised users can access to data resources in WSNs.
• Authentication: Authentication checks the accuracy of message to identify its origin.
A verification of user authentication is needed before data access is granted to that
user.
• Freshness: Freshness ensures that a message is fresh and it prevents that no old mes-
sages have been replayed in the network. Sensor nodes may have capabilities of
checking freshness in any user request and query command to prevent replay attack
from a malicious user.
• Secure Localisation: Securing sensor node localisation is another security issue which
needs to be considered in WSNs. If the attackers know the location of sensor nodes,
a physical attack can be occurred at any time. Therefore, privacy of source location is
important to provide in WSNs.
In WSNs, there are two additional requirements which need to be investigated for the
security of sensor networks because there may be situations like new sensor nodes are joined
or deployed and old sensor nodes are failed to operate in the networks. Based on these
requirements, Wang et al [136] suggested that forward and backward secrecy need to be
considered in WSNs.
• Forward Secrecy: An old sensor node should not be able to read any message after it
leaves the sensor network.
• Backward Secrecy: A new sensor node should not be able to read any previous mes-
sage from before it joins the sensor network.
Based on the above discussion, security services are required to provide in WSNs. There
are several attacks and threats which try to violate above security services in WSNs. These
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Security Properties Security Threats Possible Solutions
Confidentiality Message Disclosure Encryption, Access
Control
Integrity Message Modification Digital Signature, Secure
Hash Function
Availability DoS, Wormhole, Sink-
hole, Hello Flood
Intrusion Detection, Pair-
wise Authentication
Access Control, Authori-
sation
Unauthorised and Unau-
thenticated Access
Access Control, Key Dis-
tribution, Encryption
Authentication Message Modification,
Sybil Attack, Replay and
Spoofing Attack
Random Key Distribu-
tion, Digital Signature
Freshness Replay and Spoofing at-
tack
Time-stamp, One Way
Secure Hash Function
Secure Localization Node Capture and Note
Replication Attack
Temper-proof and
Temper-evident Equip-
ment
Forward and Backward
Secrecy
Message Disclosure Key Distribution
Table 2.1 WSNs security properties, security attacks and possible solutions[73] ,[9], [103],
[108],[100]
kinds of attacks and threats should be protected by using the security defence mechanisms.
Table 2.1 lists the security attacks and threats which can violate security services, and the
possible solutions to defences against them. The next section will discuss about access con-
trol mechanism which is one of the security mechanisms to protect from the unauthorised
information release in WSNs.
2.4 Traditional Access Control Model
There are two types of access control model in information systems in use, which are
Mandatory Access Control (MAC) [35] and Discretionary Access Control (DAC) [117].
MAC manages access control levels through an administrator in the organisation. It uses a
hierarchical approach to control access to the objects, which represent data resource here.
The administrator defines an access control policy that cannot be modified by the subjects.
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Subjects mean users here. MAC is mostly used in systems where priority is placed on
confidentiality, such as in military applications. In the DAC model, an owner of the object
controls access to that object. It means that he or she has the power to create the permissions
for data access. By default, subjects without permission cannot access the objects.
The concept of an access control matrix which defines the relationships between sub-
jects, objects, and the actions that the subjects want to perform on the objects was introduced
by Butler Lampson [67]. The subjects’ identities are placed in rows and the objects’ identi-
ties in columns. Each action, which a subject wants to perform on an object is placed in the
intersection of the corresponding row and column. The size of the access control matrix is
directly proportional to the number of subjects and objects. Samarati and Vimercati [115]
suggest that there are three possible approaches to implement the access control matrix in
electronic systems: authorisation table, access control list (ACL) and capabilities. Among
these, ACL and capabilities are commonly used in the access control schemes. The three
approaches of representing the access control matrix are explained as follows:
Fig. 2.1 Difference between ACL and Capabilities
• Authorisation Table
An authorisation table is a three columns table: corresponding to subjects, actions and
objects. Each tuple in the table corresponds with an authorisation.
• Access Control List (ACL)
Each ACL contains the list of subjects and their access permission to the objects.
When a subject tries to access an object, the ACL is used to verify the request from
the subject. If the subject is in the ACL list, access will be granted. Otherwise access
will be denied. In the ACL approach, the lists of subject and action pair are stored for
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each object. The ACL is represented by columns in the access control matrix, as seen
in Figure 2.1. In this figure, “r, w and x” stand for read, write and executable.
• Capabilities
Capabilities are different from ACL for each object. Pairs of actions and objects are
stored in a capability. In the capabilities approach, the subject can gain access to
the object, when he presents his capabilities to the system. The subject’s capabilities
represents a row in the access control matrix.
The difference between ACL and capabilities can be seen in Figure 2.1. One of the
drawbacks of using an access control matrix is when there are a large number of subjects and
objects in the system, the administration of those subjects and objects becomes very difficult
to handle. The Role-Based Access Control (RBAC) model [152] has been developed to
model access control permissions in an organisation in a more manageable way than the
access control matrix does. Detailed information of RBAC, and different types of access
control models in WSNs, based on their architecture model, strengths and weaknesses will
be explained in the next section.
2.5 Access Control Models in WSNs
A considerable number of access control models have been proposed for use in WSNs,
though some of them are not yet implemented. In this section, those models are presented
before the comparison is made in next section. The proposed access control models are
grouped into three main categories based on the nature of their architecture: Role-Based
Access Control (RBAC), Cryptography-Based Access Control (CBAC) and Users’ Privacy
Preserving Access Control (UPPAC).
2.5.1 Role-Based Access Control (RBAC) Model
Most of the access control models in WSNs and WMSNs are based on traditional RBAC,
which has been widely accepted as a policy-based access control model. Applications based
on RBAC have been implemented and deployed in commercial companies and education in-
dustries. The principle of the RBAC model is defined as an intermediary concept relating a
group of subjects to a set of access permissions. Any member from the subject group role
has all the permissions that are associated with that role. When a new subject is assigned to
a group, he receives all the associated access permissions but these permissions are revoked
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when the subject leaves the group or is removed from the system. The same procedure is
used to add and remove permissions from the roles. When a permission is added to a role,
all the members of the associated subject group will receive that permission. The permis-
sion will be revoked when it is deleted from the role. This feature helps to simplify system
administration when there are many thousands of subjects and objects in an organisation.
In RBAC, the access decision is a choice between two outcomes: permitted access or
denied access. The following access control models are proposed based on the RBAC model
with different extensions to provide further security properties in WSNs.
• Zhu’s Model [2009]
Zhu et al. [155] proposed a light weight policy-based access control model, which
used authorisation and obligation policies1 to perform actions and make access de-
cisions at the sensor nodes in a WMSN. The main idea of the proposed approach is
to support sensor-level access control policy. A light weight policy system, which
is known as Fingers [154], enables policy enforcement and interpretation on the dis-
tributed sensors to provide fine-grained access control. Each sensor manages its own
policies to implement both Policy Decision Point (PDP) and Policy Enforcement Point
(PEP). A PDP interprets policies and makes policy decisions while a PEP enforces
the policy by permitting and denying permission for subjects to perform requested
actions. A controller (perhaps a PDA) uses Diffie-Hellman (DH) key agreement to
share keys with the sensor nodes. The sensor nodes can communicate between each
other in a WMSN by using secret keys from the controller. An authentication process
is used to prevent malicious nodes and users from joining the network. Only sensor
nodes which have keys from the same controller, can communicate with each other.
If a user has access to the network controller, he or she can request it to perform some
actions at the sensor nodes. As an application, this approach can be used in WMSNs
to prevent unauthorised access to actuators, such as insulin or other drug pumps that
may harm patients.
• Context-Aware Role-Based Access Control (CA-RBAC) [2010]
Garci-Morchon and Wehrle [43] proposed the Context-Aware Role-Based Access
Control (CA-RBAC) model based on a modular context structure for WMSNs. The
aim of the model is to provide context awareness and adapt its security properties to
1An obligation policy specifies the event, the action and the condition under which the action must be
performed.
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ensure the users’ safety in WMSNs. Wehrle et al. [97] points out that the RBAC
model is not good enough to use in a WSN because in the traditional RBAC model,
the roles and policies must be predefined. In the proposed model, the decision mak-
ing process is divided into three modular context situations: critical, emergency and
normal condition. Based on these situations, access privileges to sensed data will be
different. The access control decision will be made based on contextual information
such as time and location and access control policies of the three different modules.
In a WMSN, sensor nodes are attached to the human body to sense and check medical
information for a healthcare service. In normal cases, an authorised doctor needs to
verify his or her access control role in order to access the medical data of a patient, but
a nurse may not have the same level of privilege. When the system declares a critical
or emergency case based on the modular context information, the doctor or nurse can
perform any action and can access data even though they may not be able to access
data at normal condition. One of the disadvantages of this model is that there is no
prevention or detection mechanism as well as no verification process to check user’s
data access, when the critical situation occurs.
• Break-the-Glass Role-Based Access Control (BTG-RBAC) [2011]
Ferreria et al. [38] proposed the Break-the-Glass Role-Based Access Control (BTG-
RBAC) model based on the RBAC model. The main idea of this model is to gather
necessary information from end users with their collaboration for a usable access
control policy that can perform BTG action in emergency situations. The Break-The-
Glass (BTG) rule allows users to have emergency and urgent access to the system
when a normal authentication does not perform or work properly. Ferreria et al. intro-
duced BTG rules in order to override access policy whilst providing non-repudiation
mechanisms for its usage. In a real environment, unanticipated situations may occur
because it is impossible to predict all access permissions in advance for all situations.
BTG extension is used for emergency and important cases whenever a user wants to
access data urgently and immediately. When the user tries to perform BTG actions,
the system will ask him or her if he or she actually wants to perform that action on
a specific object. If the user answers affirmatively, the system will activate the BTG
operation and trigger the associated obligations such as alarms and log file. The BTG-
RBAC model has made the system much more flexible than normal RBAC but one
of the disadvantages is that human processes are needed in order to define additional
role and policy regarding BTG actions.
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• Trust and Centrality degree-Based Access Control (TC-BAC) [2013]
TC-BAC is proposed by Duan et al. [32] to allow access of a trusted node to a net-
work. This model utilises trust to ensure that only legitimate nodes are permitted to
join a WSN and then centrality degree2 to assess continually for risk of access. The
concept of centrality degree is used to analyse the relations among the sensor nodes
in the network for evaluation of risk. The trust records of other nodes’ behaviour
are stored in each node for a local trust evaluation along with a centrality degree that
represents its importance in the network. In the proposed model, the risk function
mainly depends on the node’s centrality degree and average trust degree in the net-
work. The main contribution of this model is the introduction of trust and centrality
degree attributes into RBAC engine to grant access control.
• Maerien’s Model [2013]
Maerien et al. [79] proposed an access control infrastructure based on RBAC for
multi-party WSNs. In this model, an authorisation proxy acts as both the Policy
Enforcement Point (PEP) and the Policy Decision Point (PDP). The proxy retrieves
the user’s current roles from the small database on sensor nodes to check and verify
whether the user’s role is sufficient for the access requests. The advantage of this
model is that the proxy also monitors the behaviour of the users in the system to
detect potential intrusion attempts and keeps a log for sensor node usage caused by
the users. There is a lack of flexibility in the proposed infrastructure because the
defined roles on sensor nodes only allow for certain evaluation of access rights.
• Gaurkar’s Model [2013]
Gaurkar et al. [45] proposed an access control model with intrusion detection for
security in WSNs. They proposed a new framework for low-level intrusion detection
at sensor nodes with access control. The main contribution of the proposed model
is that it prevents a malicious node from joining the sensor network. The proposed
model extends traditional access control to consider the problem of authorisation not
only at the time of access to a resource. The concept of Reference Monitor (RM)
is used to enforce data access but there is no detailed information of how the access
control is performed in the proposed model.
2A node’s centrality degree in the network is composed of the rank of the access roles and the number of
the node’s neighbours.
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2.5.2 Cryptography-Based Access Control (CBAC) Model
Cryptography-Based Access Control (CBAC) is another form of access control model for
information systems. Ghani et al. [48] mentioned that CBAC mechanism is designed for
untrusted environments, where lack of global knowledge and control are defining charac-
teristics. It absolutely relies on cryptography to control data access and to ensure data
confidentiality and integrity. The main idea is to use a unique key for each data resource.
Users who are allowed to access that data resource are assigned the key for data access
[7]. Cryptography methods in WSNs should meet the constraints of sensor nodes such as
limited power, limited resources and memory shortage. As a result, choosing a suitable
cryptography method is important in WSNs. There are two types of cryptographic method:
asymmetric encryption, known as Public Key Cryptography (PKC), and symmetric encryp-
tion, known as Symmetric Key Cryptography (SKC). PKC based schemes provide better
data access security than SKC in the open multi-user environment [144]. The nature of
PKC is the use of two keys: one for encryption and one for decryption. In PKC, the data
encryption is usually targeted to only one recipient or one group. Any message encrypted
by using a public key, can be decrypted only with the corresponding private key.
Many researchers considered that PKC schemes, such as Rivest-Shamir-Adleman (RSA)
[111] and DH key agreement scheme [80], were unsuitable for applications in WSNs be-
cause of large code size, message and data, long processing time and high power consump-
tion. Sen [120] suggests that public key algorithms are computationally intensive and usu-
ally execute many multiplication instructions to perform a single-security operation. There-
fore, one-to-one encryption is not efficient to be used in WSNs because the overhead of
encryption and size of cipher text are directly proportional to the total number of autho-
rised users. Broadcast encryption [22] is an alternative solution to providing a one-to-many
encryption method but it requires the users to present their keys and other information indi-
vidually. However, recent studies [53], [44], [132] argue that it is feasible to employ PKC
in WSNs by using the right selection of algorithms and associated optimisation, parameters,
and low power methods.
Many researchers in WSNs are interested in SKC schemes because of its lower compu-
tation overhead. SKC uses the same key for both encryption and decryption between two
communicating hosts who share the secret key. SKC seems to be suitable for low-end de-
vices such as sensor nodes because of the low overhead [153]. One major issue of using
the SKC methods is how to securely distribute the key between communication nodes. It is
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a major problem of using SKC because pre-distribution of keys is not always feasible and
reliable in WSNs. Key management in WSNs has received much attention from researchers.
Key management is an essential mechanism to ensure security in network services and ap-
plications when cryptographic schemes are applied in the sensor networks. The main idea is
to establish keys between nodes, trusted authorities, and users in a secure and reliable man-
ner. There are three different tasks in key management: key establishment, key revocation,
and key update. Key management is a significant challenge in WSNs because the sensor
nodes can be deployed in any location and they know nothing about their neighbour nodes
before deployment.
Choosing a suitable cryptography method is important in WSNs. In this section, two dif-
ferent types of CBAC models will be explained: Attribute-Based Encryption (ABE) based
fine-grained access control and Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC) based access control.
Attribute-Based Encryption (ABE) based Fine-Grained Access Control
Sahai and Waters [50] proposed the ABE scheme to model and design a scalable and flexible
access control system. ABE is a public key cryptography primitive generalising Identity-
based Encryption (IBE) [47] that is associated with user identity in a single user message. In
ABE, a group of users is described by the combination of several descriptive attributes and
access structures, which is also called an attribute policy. In ABE, the public key encryption
is based on one-to-many encryption. There are two different types of ABE, which are pro-
posed by Sahai and Waters [50]: Key-Policy ABE (KP-ABE) and Ciphertext-Policy ABE
(CP-ABE). In KP-ABE, data which is sensed and stored in the sensor node is encrypted with
a set of attributes: the user’s private key is associated with an access structure that specifies
which types of ciphertext the key can decrypt. Only the users that have the right access
structure and the key can access and decrypt the sensed data. In CP-ABE, the ciphertext is
associated with an access structure. The user’s private key is associated with the attributes
that specify which type of the ciphertext the key can decrypt. Some ABE-based fine-grained
access control models use ECC for key management and distribution.
The ABE [20] method is commonly used in access control models for data encryption
and storage in WSNs. Li et al. [71] suggests that ABE is a highly promising approach to
realise scalability and fine-grained access control, where the flexible access permissions and
rights are assigned to each individual user. Fine-grained access control facilitates different
kinds of access permissions to a number of users. The sensors may collect information that
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belongs to different security levels. Fine-grained access control is a security requirement to
protect sensitive information from unauthorised access. One alternative method of providing
fine-grained access control in WSNs is using an ABE scheme. Three access control models
which use ABE-based encryption to provide fine-grained access control are discussed next.
• Fine-grained Distributed Data Access Control (FDAC) [2011]
Yu et al. [144] proposed the Fine-grained Distributed Data Access Control (FDAC)
model based on ABE. The main idea of their approach is to provide a distributed data
access control which is able to support fine-grained access control over sensor data
and is resilient against attacks such as user collusion3 and node compromise4. A net-
work controller which stores access structures, acts as a central distribution centre and
distributes keys to users in FDAC. Only users with the right access structure and the
right key can access data at the sensor nodes. The access structures will be different
for each user depending on the access privileges of users.
Regarding a battlefield example from the paper, the sensor nodes may be responsible
for collecting different types of data such as vibration, smoke, etc in different loca-
tions (village, forest). Therefore, attributes such as - location = village; data type =
vibration, smoke; owner = explosion experts, officers - are used to specify data ac-
cess privileges of users. Based on the above example, the access structure of a user is
designated as “(location is village) AND (type is vibration)” which allows the user to
obtain the vibration data within the village area. More sophisticated access structures
can be defined based on the application requirements. If the network controller is
compromised by a malicious user, there will be no security provisioning in the sys-
tem anymore. User revocation can be done by updating the master secret key that is
embedded in the user secret key via broadcasting. User revocation may be one of the
following: the service subscription is expired, the user changes group intentionally,
or the user or group key is compromised. In this approach, CP-ABE based selective
broadcast is used for user revocation but there are no details on how to use it.
• Distributed Fine-grained Access Control (DFAC) [2011]
Ruj et al. [113] proposed a fully Distributed Fine-grained Access Control (DFAC)
scheme using multi-authority ABE [26] to prevent a single point of failure. Instead
3Unauthorised users may collude to compromise the encrypted data.
4Sensor node could be compromised by a malicious user due to lack of compromise-resistant hardware.
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of using one authority as FDAC does, several Distribution Centres (DCs) are used
to store and distribute different access structures, sets of attributes and cryptographic
keys to users and sensor nodes. All DCs are disjoint from each other. Each DC has
its own access subtree, which contains attributes at the leaf nodes of that subtree, for
each sensor node. Users who want to access data at the sensor node need to activate
their ID with each DC to obtain access structures, access subtrees and keys. All the
subtrees from each DC are ANDed together to build a complete access structure for a
single user but the user has to store all the access structures in order to access different
types of data from the sensor network. This model facilitates modification and secret
key distribution when the access rights of a user are changed but the communication
overhead of the user’s revocation process is higher than with FDAC.
• Distributed Fine-grained Data Access Control for Distributed Sensor Networks
(DFG-AC) [2011]
Hur [56] proposed an access control model called Distributed Fine-grained Data Ac-
cess Control (DFG-AC). It uses both a network controller and a data aggregator for
central key management and central storage. The collected data from sensor nodes
are transferred to the data aggregator by using a distributed sensor data collection
protocol such as Two-Tier Data Dissemination Protocol (TTDDP) [143]. The main
idea of using the data aggregator as central storage is to allow more complex data
encryption. Additionally, the users can obtain all the information by accessing the
data aggregator. The data aggregator is more powerful than the sensor nodes and it
can use complex encryption methods. The advantage of the proposed model is that
it considers the stateless receiver problem5. To solve this problem, key revocation is
done with a stateless group key distribution mechanism using a binary tree. One of the
disadvantages is that transmitting data from sensor nodes to data aggregator consumes
considerable battery power and energy. In addition, there might be a single point of
failure because of the centralised data storage. This model provides user revocation
by using a KP-ABE scheme with the attributes for distributed WSNs.
Elliptic Curve Cryptography-Based Access Control (EC-CBAC)
Elliptic Curve Cryptography-Based Access Control (EC-CBAC) models [133], [153], [8]
use ECC to authorise and grant users access to data. They prevent malicious nodes from
5Practically, users may miss a key update message. Therefore, they cannot keep their key states up-to-date.
This problem is known as the stateless receiver problem.
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joining the sensor network. ECC has became popular as the solution for WSN due to low
computational overhead and small key size. The similarity of the proposed models is simply
that they use ECC-based encryption.
• Wang, Sheng and Li Model [2006]
Wang et al. [133] proposed an access control model based on ECC. The main objec-
tive of the proposed model is to use an ECC scheme for granting user access rights
to the collected data. Different users may have different levels of data access due to
restrictions of access implied by the data confidentiality and privacy. ECC is used in
key distribution and sharing information between the users and in a Key Distribution
Centre (KDC). In this approach, the KDC is responsible for generating all security
primitives such as random numbers, access lists and hash functions, and maintains a
user list with associated user identifications. The users have to request access per-
mission from the KDC. Access lists, which comprise user identity, group identity and
user privilege mask, define the user’s access privileges. The user access privilege
mask consists of a number of bits and each bit represents a specific information or
service. Therefore, users who possess the same mask and access privileges are put in
the same group.
• Zhou, Zhang and Fang Model [2007]
Zhou et al. [153] proposed an access control protocol based on ECC to accomplish
node authentication and key establishment for new nodes whenever they join a sensor
network. The proposed access control model uses node identity and node bootstrap-
ping time for the node authentication procedure. They introduced node bootstrapping
time into authentication procedures to differentiate malicious nodes from legitimate
new nodes. In this model, the authors are mostly looking at node deployment to pre-
vent malicious nodes from joining the network. A Certification Authority (CA) is
used to generate a certificate, which includes ID information and bootstrapping time,
to authenticate the identity of a new node. Also the node certificate is signed with
the CA’s private key. Because of this, adversaries cannot alter ID and bootstrapping
time. When a new node is deployed in a WSN, it shows its certificate to the neighbour
nodes in order to verify its identity via the CA’s public key. This access control pro-
tocol enforces to control sensor node deployment and prevents malicious nodes from
joining sensor networks.
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• Al-Mahmud and Morogan Model [2012]
Al-Mahmud and Morogan [8] proposed an identity-based authentication and access
control model in WSNs. The main idea of the proposed model is to use Identity-Based
Signature (IBS) [122] for providing both user authentication and data access control in
WSNs. This protocol is based on an IBS scheme where ECC-based Digital Signature
Algorithm (DSA) [61] is used to sign and verify a message. A Base Station (BS)
is responsible for generating the private keys of both users and sensor nodes in the
network. For the key distribution, a one-pass key establishment protocol [138] is used
to share session keys between sensor nodes and users. Users are required to register
with the BS. Based on the access request from the users, the BS generates a private
key and access structure for each user. The sensor nodes are preloaded with the hash
value of user identities and the private key, which will be used for the authentication
process. After the authentication process, the sensor node will check whether the user
is authorised to access the data.
• Chatterjee, Das and Sing Model [2013]
Chatterjee et al. [27] proposed a user access control scheme for Wireless Body Area
Network (WBAN). This schemes is used an ECC based crypto system to ensure that
a particular legitimate user can only access the information for which he/she is au-
thorised. This model uses an access list composed of a user identity, a user access
privilege mask and a group identity for each user regarding data access. A user access
privilege mask is a binary number where each bit represents specific information or
services that can be accessed by an authorised user. The group identity represents a
unique number to identify a particular access group. This model is similar to Wang,
Sheng and Li Model [133]. The main difference is that ECC based crypto system is
used in this proposed model.
2.5.3 Users’ Privacy-Preserving Access Control (UPPAC) Model
Most of the access control models in WSNs are to provide data privacy and data confi-
dentiality. Privacy of users and sensor nodes in WSNs is different from data privacy and
has received less attention in the literature. In user privacy, users aim to hide their ID and
other information. Therefore, no one in the network knows the real ID of a user except the
network authority and the user himself. Recently, there are two schemes proposed for the
privacy-preservation of users’ information in WSNs: Distributed Privacy Preserving Access
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Control (DP2AC) [150] and Distributed PRIvacy-preserving aCCESS control (PRICCESS)
[54]. The PRICCESS model is related to the RBAC model. The main reason the PRICCESS
model is presented under UPPAC is that it provides user privacy preserving distributed ac-
cess control in WSNs.
• Distributed Privacy Preserving Access Control (DP2AC) [2009]
Zhang et al. [150] proposed a Distributed Privacy Preserving Access Control (DP2AC)
scheme. The owner of the sensor network generates the token by using a blind sig-
nature [107]. Users need to buy tokens from the network owner before entering the
sensor network. The tokens can be verified by any sensor node in the network but no
one can tell the identity of the token holder including the network owner. There is
no relationship between user identities and tokens, so privacy preservation for users
is achieved. Once the token is validated by a sensor node, it provides the user with a
certain amount of requested data which is equivalent to the denomination of the to-
ken. The main objective of the proposed DP2AC model is that the network owner can
prevent unauthorised access to sensed data, while users can protect their data access
privacy.
However, a recent study [72] points out that DP2AC is not a fine-grained access con-
trol because each anonymous user has the same access privileges. Furthermore, the
network user cannot sign a query command because of the blind signature. As a
result, an adversary can easily intercept tokens and impersonate authorised users to
access data at the sensor nodes. A disadvantage of using tokens in a WSN is that
the sensor nodes need more storage for the token detection mechanism. Additionally,
all the used tokens have to be recorded and stored in the sensor nodes to prevent the
tokens being reused by malicious and unauthorised users.
• Distributed PRIvacy-preserving aCCESS control (PRICCESS) [2011]
He et al. [54] proposed the PRICCESS protocol for WSNs. The main contribution to
the research community of this protocol is that it provides user privacy preserving dis-
tributed access control in a single-owner multi-user sensor network. A ring signature
[18] is used to protect the anonymity of users by using a group ID and a group sig-
nature. Each group of users has different access privileges, ID, and key for signature.
Users have to activate their information with a network controller to receive group ID
and keys for data access. Users with the same access privileges are likely to be put
in the same group by the network controller. The PRICCESS model uses an ACL
28 Literature Review of Current WSN Access Control Models
approach to store the access list of the group for data access control in the network
controller. Any user from the group can use a group key when he or she signs the
message for a data access request. The network controller verifies that the message
has been signed by one of the group members without knowing who the actual signer
is. Therefore, the use of ring signature can preserve the user’s privacy and at the same
time the network controller is satisfied that the singer is an authorised user.
2.6 Comparison of WSN Access Control Models
To make meaningful comparisons of the current access control models in WSNs, the evalu-
ation framework is defined to compare and contrast current access control models by using
the following features and characteristics [48], [90], [114], [85].
1. Support Data Privacy
The need for data privacy is growing among all the real world applications in WSNs.
Data privacy becomes more and more important in WSNs, when data are to be re-
leased to only authorised and legitimate users. The more data being disclosed, the
more the owner of that data loses his own privacy.
2. Support User Privacy
The need for user privacy is important in some applications. Sometimes a user, who
tries to access data from the network, does not want to share his detailed information
with other users in the network. It means that the users’ privacy preservation is needed
to protect the privacy of user information in the network.
3. Flexibility
No matter how perfect an access control system is, if it does not support accommoda-
tion to changes, such as insertion and deletion of new application systems, the access
control model is not feasible to use in the real world. In WSNs, the user characteris-
tics and the access context are changing continuously. Therefore, the access control
decisions must be synchronised with continuously changing security conditions. It is
desirable for the access control model to handle the dynamism of users and environ-
ments. Therefore, the access control model needs to be flexible enough to support
changes and synchronise with the access control decisions.
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Access Control
Models
Support
Data
Privacy
Support
User
Privacy
Flexibility Support
For
Emergency
Access
Context
Sensitivity
Granularity
Zhu’s Model
[155]
Yes No No No No Coarse-Grained
CA-RBAC [43] Yes No Yes Yes Yes Fine-Grained
TC-BAC [32] Yes No Yes No No Coarse-Grained
Maerien’s Model
[79]
Yes No No No No Coarse-Grained
Gaurkar’s Model
[45]
Yes No No No No Coarse-Grained
BT G−AC [84] Yes No Yes Yes No Coarse-Grained
FDAC [144] Yes No Yes No Yes Fine-Grained
DFAC [113] Yes No Yes No Yes Fine-Grained
DFG-AC [56] Yes No No No Yes Fine-Grained
Wang, Sheng and
Li Model [133]
Yes No No No No Coarse-Grained
Zhou, Zhang
and Fang Model
[153]
Yes No No No No Coarse-Grained
Al-Mahmud and
Morogan Model
[8]
Yes No No No No Coarse-Grained
Chatterjee, Das
and Sing Model
[27]
Yes No No No No Fine-Grained
DP2AC [150] Yes Yes No No No Coarse-Grained
PRICCESS [54] Yes Yes No No No Coarse-Grained
T BA2C Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Fine-Grained
Table 2.2 Comparison of Access Control Models based on Features in WSNs
4. Support Emergency Data Access
An ideal access control model needs to support data access not only in normal situ-
ations but also in an emergency situation. Many applications will benefit from such
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provision.
5. Context Sensitivity
An access control model is context sensitive when context information plays a role
in making the appropriate access decision. It means that the contextual information
(such as location and time) is used in defining policies for making access control
decision dynamically.
6. Granularity
There are two different types of granularity in access control, which are fine-grained
and coarse-grained. Fine-grained means that the access control systems facilitate
granting differential access rights to a set of users and allow flexibility in specify-
ing the access rights of individual users [51]. Coarse-grained means that groups of
users and collections of objects often share the same access control requirements.
The access control system should then offer support for authorisation specific to the
groups of users, objects and possibly actions.
These six supporting features listed above are used to evaluate the current access control
models in WSNs. Table 2.2 shows a comparison of current access control models based on
these features and characteristics. The first row of the table describes evaluation criteria and
the first column lists access control models. Each cell in the table shows whether the model
of that row has the feature of that column.
All the access control models in WSNs provide data confidentiality and data privacy in
normal condition but users’ privacy preservation is only supported in DP2AC and PRIC-
CESS. The access control models which use ABE and contextual information to make ac-
cess decisions, provide flexibility in the system. Based on Table 2.2, all the access control
models in WSNs support authorisation decisions and allow for changes like roles, users,
policy, etc. Among them, CA-RBAC and BT G−AC support emergency and immediate
data access. There are few access control models that make authorisation decisions based
on context information. Approximately equal numbers of access control models support
coarse-grained and fine-grained. As a summary, the authorisation policy for each scheme
is different, that means all models are proposed to solve different problems and look from
different point of view to address the issues in WSNs area. As a summary, the authorisation
policy for each scheme is different, that means all models are proposed to solve different
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problems and look from different point of view to address the issues in WSNs area.
Regarding Table 2.1, the role-based access control models in WSNs are aimed to protect
a message disclosure and an unauthorised information release. Cryptography-base access
control models are not only to protect a message disclosure and unauthorised information
release but also to provide data confidentiality and data integrity by using different cryp-
tographic methods. For the proposed Trust-Based Adaptive Access Control (T BA2C), we
only consider a message disclosure and unauthorised information but additionally, we ad-
dress the conflict between data availability and data privacy in WSNs.
The proposed T BA2C model introduces a user behaviour trust model with an adaptive
access control engine to address the conflict between data availability and data privacy. In
the adaptive access control engine, an overriding policy is introduced to override an access
permission with role, contextual information and behaviour trust value when the system
needs for emergency and unexpected situation. Unlike other WSN access control models,
the proposed T BA2C is considered to address the conflict between data availability and data
privacy that is an essential issue to be provided in any application or system. Therefore,
the proposed T BA2C is only access control model that considers and addresses the conflict
between data availability and data privacy in WSNs. The step-by-step development of a
T BA2C model will explain in later chapters.
2.7 Conclusion
Overall, this section has categorised and briefly discussed a range of WSN access control
models. A more comprehensive comparison between current WSN access control models
can be seen in a work of Maw et al. [85]. The details of WSN applications, access control
roles and policies for Healthcare Professionals (HCPs), and deployment tools such as sim-
ulators and emulators are explained in Appendix B of this dissertation. Based on the above
discussion, it becomes clear that access control has been neglected by the WSN research
community. There are potential research issues that need to be addressed regarding data
access control in WSNs. None of the current WSN access control models addresses the
conflict between data availability and data privacy. In the next chapter, the research gaps
are identified based on the state-of-art survey of WSN access control models in this chapter.
This is followed by a brief discussion of the proposed frameworks to address these gaps.

Chapter 3
An Overview of the Research Problem
3.1 Introduction
Most of the current WSN access control models are based on a traditional Role-Based Ac-
cess Control (RBAC) [152] model to control data access based on roles. The decision is
binary: deny or permit access. The RBAC model has been widely accepted as a policy-
based access control model and it is suitable for most commercial applications but roles
and policies need to be predefined before the system can make decisions. Some WSN ac-
cess control models used cryptographic methods for data storage and data access control
but the systems still need to predefine attributes, roles and policies before deployment. It
is, however, difficult to determine in advance all the possible needs for access in real world
applications because there may be unanticipated situations at any time.
Many potential situations cannot be predefined in traditional RBAC or cryptography-
based systems. For example, the roles and policies for emergency and unexpected situations
cannot be defined in advance. When the system faces these kinds of situations, what will
the system do? Does the system wait until the authorised user comes and logs in? Alterna-
tively, in the medical scenario, does a nurse wait for a doctor who takes care of a patient, in
order to retrieve that patient’s medical record? In most of the emergency and unanticipated
situations, the users cannot wait until someone else comes in order to retrieve the necessary
data. Given this, what are the possible methods to provide a flexible approach in the access
control engine? For real world applications, the system needs to be flexible enough to make
decisions regarding data access based on unusual situations in addition to normally defined
situations. Using the RBAC model often cannot fulfil the requirements of real world ap-
plications in WSNs. Therefore, a new access control model is needed for WSNs that will
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provide a flexible policy to make access decisions dynamically in both defined and unantic-
ipated situations.
The structure of this chapter is as follows: Firstly, the identified research gaps are pre-
sented followed by a statement of the research question that is addressed in this dissertation.
Finally, the step-by-step development of the research is briefly discussed.
3.2 Research Gaps
Based on the survey and analysis of WSN access control models from the previous chapter,
the following research gaps are identified.
• Lack of Flexibility
Current WSN access control models use predefined policies and roles to make ac-
cess decisions on user requests. However, it is impossible to predict in advance all
the possible policies and roles that may be needed for unexpected and unanticipated
events. Some access control models proposed for sensor nodes to perform some ac-
tions but there is a lack of capability to make decisions regarding data access locally
at the sensor nodes for emergency and unexpected situations. Current WSN access
control models need much more flexibility to make access decisions on unanticipated
events. In the WSN content, flexibility is important in an access control engine to
make decisions on user requests quickly and efficiently, when unanticipated situa-
tions occur. Therefore, a flexible access control model is important and desirable in
terms of providing efficient, accountable and immediate data access for emergency
and unanticipated situations.
• Conflict between Data Availability and Data Privacy
Current WSN access control models suffer from a conflict between data availability
and data privacy, especially in emergencies. There is a lack of data availability when
data privacy is the first priority. Conversely, data privacy is easily breached when
data availability is the first consideration. There are two WSN access control models
that consider decision-making processes in emergency situations. The Context-Aware
Role-Based Access Control (CA-RBAC) model [43] was proposed to provide an ef-
fective access control decision when the users need to access data in emergency sit-
uations. The CA-RBAC model tried to reduce communication time for emergencies.
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In it, the encryption, decryption, and verification of the digital certificates are not in-
volved in emergency situations. In CA-RBAC, it is assumed that immediate patient
welfare is more important than privacy and confidentiality of patient information and
medical records in emergency situations. There might be some cases, however where
privacy is of primary importance. For example, a user does not want to give access to
his or her medical record to other doctors and nurses apart from his or her personal or
private doctor and nurse. Generally, privacy and confidentiality of data still needs to
be maintained even in emergency situations.
Ferreira introduced the Break-The-Glass Role-Based Access Control (BTG-RBAC)
[38] model to make access decisions for emergency situations based on the BTG role;
however, there is no provision to defect security policy violations. This means that
both CA-RBAC and BTG-RBAC are considered to provide data availability when the
users need data access for emergency situations but there is no prevention or detec-
tion mechanism and no verification process to check the user’s data access such as
identification, contextual information, etc. Therefore, data privacy and confidentiality
of patients’ information and medical record can be circumvented easily. This con-
flict between data availability and data privacy is a central issue to address, whenever
a new access control model and security mechanism is proposed and developed for
security-oriented applications such as medical and military. The question is how an
access control model and security mechanism can provide both data availability and
data privacy at the same time.
• Prevention and Detection Mechanism
One of the proposed access control models [43] in Wireless Medical Sensor Networks
(WMSNs) used RBAC with modular context information for medical applications. In
that approach, when a patient is in emergency or critical situations, anyone in the
system can access the patient’s medical record without involving any authentication
process. From a user’s aspect, the system needs to provide some kind of prevention
and detection mechanism to protect the privacy of patient information and confiden-
tiality of medical records even in emergency situations. As well, current WSN access
control models do not check any recorded or log files to see who has tried to access
sensed and collected data with or without authorised access and when or where this
situation has happened. Auditing of data usage and data access have been neglected
by researchers in WSNs. Therefore, a prevention and detection mechanism to keep
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records of access requests needs to be introduced for auditing purposes in WSNs.
• User Behaviour Monitoring and Trust
In current WSN access control models, users with access privileges can access data
at any time. The assumption that all users are trustworthy to access needed data at
any time, however, is unsupported by experience. It is impossible to predict a user’s
intention for accessing data at a particular time. For example, in a medical scenario,
a doctor can be a researcher at an organisation. He or she may try to access his or
her patient’s data at different times and locations for research purposes or his or her
benefit. Normally, WSN access control models will allow doctors to access data be-
cause of their access right and privilege. However, when doctors misuse patient data
for their own benefit, how can those situations be detected? How can such situations
be prevented?
One method of preventing this kind of situation is to apply a user behaviour-monitoring
model to check user actions, location, time, etc., whenever a user attempts to ac-
cess data. In addition, trust management can be applied with the users’ behaviour-
monitoring model to provide a flexible approach and to monitor the user behaviour
patterns. Therefore, the user behaviour trust model can be another important research
aspect in WSNs. Using a behaviour trust value in decision-making processes re-
garding data access is new in WSNs and other wireless technologies and will be a
challenge.
• User Privacy and Sensor Node Privacy
Among current WSN access control models, few address user privacy and sensor node
privacy. There is no access control model that provides both user privacy and data
confidentiality in WSNs. The privacy of users is important to provide in WSNs be-
cause of their broadcast and distributed nature. In some cases, users may want to hide
their identity and information because they do not want to share it with other users in
the network. Some privacy-preserving access control models such as Distributed Pri-
vacy Preserving Access Control (DP2AC) [150] and distributed PRIvacy-preserving
aCCESS control (PRICCESS) [54] used blind or ring signatures to provide privacy
of user ID and information. DP2AC provides privacy preserving for users but there
might be problems in a WSN storing all used tokens for the token detection mecha-
nism because of limited resources and storage.
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The location privacy of a sensor node is another research issue in WSNs because sen-
sor nodes are deployed in a great variety of locations with neither tamper-evident nor
tamper-proof equipment. If a malicious user can capture the location of sensor nodes,
he or she can physically attack those nodes. Consequently, all possible problems and
solutions for user and sensor node privacy need to be considered when being designed
for WSNs.
The discussion reveals that there is much research work needed in WSNs especially on
access control related issues. Most of the current WSN access control models are focused
on the authentication process, neglecting authorisation and policy management. Therefore,
we focus on how a flexible approach can be provided in access control engines to handle
both defined and unanticipated situations based on policy management. In this dissertation,
we address all the above research gaps except for sensor node privacy. A possible solution
to provide sensor node privacy in WSNs is using Attribute-Based Encryption (ABE).
3.3 Research Question
A research question that motivates us to carry out this research work is:
How can the current framework be improved to provide a flexible approach in the access
control engine to make decisions effectively and help to address the conflict between data
availability and data privacy for both defined and unanticipated situations?
3.4 Research Agenda
To address the above research question, this dissertation is divided into four parts to show
the step-by-step development of our proposed new access control framework and how it is
improved in each part. These four parts of the dissertation are briefly explained here.
The first part of the dissertation (Chapter 5) is focused on the following questions:
• How can data availability be provided in emergency and unanticipated situations?
• How can the concept of discretionary overriding be used to improve the decision-
making process in an access control engine?
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To address the data availability issue, a discretionary overriding concept [110] is intro-
duced for WSNs. Many applications in WSNs are designed for medical or military scenarios
where emergency and unanticipated situations can occur at any time. The question is, how
can access decisions be made efficiently and immediately when an access control engine at
the sensor node faces unanticipated events. The discretionary overriding process can make
access control engine much more flexible than normal access control models because it may
have the capability to override decisions regarding data access in emergency and unantic-
ipated situations. Therefore, we shall investigate the extent to which the introduction of
the discretionary overriding concept in WSNs can achieve the flexibility of access control
engine providing data availability issue in emergency and unanticipated situations.
Following on from the work on the above-mentioned questions, the second part of the
dissertation (Chapter 6) addresses the following questions:
• How can security policy violations be detected and handled?
• What are the courses of action for restricted access in emergency and unanticipated
situations?
To address the above questions, the prevention and detection mechanism and the obli-
gation policy are applied and extended in the access control framework in chapter 5. Firoz-
abadi et al. [41] mentioned that a preventative control mechanism prevents a user from
violating the policies, whereas a detective control mechanism does not guarantee that vio-
lations are prevented, but will ensure that a violation is detected in a reasonable time. In
this model, the prevention and detection mechanism is applied to keep a track record of
the user’s requested information in an audit log to detect security policy violations but an
administration process needs to be involved for checking the log. Alongside with the pre-
vention and detection mechanism, the obligation policy [39] is introduced to deal with what
are the courses of action when a restricted access is granted or denied.
The third part of the dissertation (Chapters 7 and 8) investigates potential ways to im-
prove the previous access control frameworks by studying the following questions.
• How can a flexible policy be defined that is not too permissive or too strict, to make
access decisions effectively and efficiently?
• How can access control model be improved in decision-making processes regarding
data access by using a behaviour trust value?
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• What kind of algorithm should be used to calculate and evaluate user behaviour trust
value?
• To what extent can this approach be used to address the conflict between data avail-
ability and data privacy in WSNs be addressed?
To address the above questions, a simple user behaviour trust model based on weighted-
running average [14] and geometric mean [88] is applied in the proposed access control
framework to make and adjust access decisions dynamically. The main issue we study is
that there is no way to predefine all the access policies regarding data access in the real
world application for unanticipated and emergency situations. The introduction of a user
behaviour trust model can make an access control engine much more flexible as it can mon-
itor the user behaviour patterns to detect security policy violations from both authorised
and unauthorised users. Additionally, the behaviour trust value is used as one of the de-
fined thresholds to override access policy for data availability purpose and it can protect
data privacy because only the user who satisfies these thresholds including trust value, can
get a restricted access in emergency and unanticipated situations. Therefore, the proposed
Trust-based Adaptive Access Control (T BA2C) model integrates the concepts that have been
introduced so far with a simple user behaviour trust model to provide a flexible approach
in access control engines and help to address the conflict between data availability and data
privacy.
The final part of the dissertation (Chapters 9 and 10) develops in Ponder2 the Break-
The-Glass Access Control (BT G−AC) framework that was originally proposed by Ferreira
[38], but a few modifications have been made to better fit in WSNs. This model has similar
structure to the T BA2C framework. This part of the dissertation compares the T BA2C and
BT G−AC models based on evaluation criteria and results from the healthcare application.
The main advantage of the proposed T BA2C over BT G− AC is that no human effort is
needed to override policy for emergency and unanticipated situations. Additionally, the
conflict between data availability and data privacy can be solved in some situations unless
the trusted users become untrustworthy in the system.
3.5 Conclusion
In this chapter, an overview of the research problems is given and the research question
that motivates this research work is set out. The step-by-step development of the proposed
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framework is briefly summarised; however, detailed information will be explained in later
chapters. In the next chapter, a simple access control model for WSNs based on the existing
features of Ponder2 is presented with its development details.
Chapter 4
A Simple Access Control Model
4.1 Introduction
Access control is one of the essential requirements in Wireless Sensor Networks (WSNs).
To develop a lightweight access control model for WSNs, careful consideration of suitable
development tools is essential. In this chapter, a simple framework based on the National
Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) [116] standard access control model with an
existing authorisation policy in the Ponder2 [29] is developed and explained to act as a start-
ing point before we address the research issues for WSNs in later chapters. In this way, the
reader can clearly see the step-by-step improvement of the access control model from the
beginning until all of the research issues have been addressed by the end of this dissertation.
Firstly, the Ponder2 policy language is briefly discussed, then detailed information of the
simple access control model in Ponder2 is presented with figures and diagrams. In addition,
a healthcare application is developed in Ponder2 to evaluate and verify the proposed model.
Finally, this chapter concludes with suggestions to address the data availability issue in
WSNs as the next stage of development.
4.2 Ponder2
There are a variety of development tools for WSNs available in the current WSN research
community. Two policy languages, Ponder2 [29] and WSN Authorisation Specification
Language (WASL) [82], are designed specifically for resource and memory limited devices
like sensor nodes. Ponder2 is a popular policy language to use in Body Sensor Networks
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(BSNs) and much published literature on WSNs is based on Ponder2. It comprises a self-
contained, stand-alone, general-purpose object management system with message passing
between objects, incorporates an awareness of events and policies, and implements a policy
execution framework.
Ponder2 has a high-level configuration and control language called PonderTalk and user-
extensible managed objects that are programmed in Java. Ponder2 is implemented as Self-
Managed Cell (SMC) [78], which is a set of hardware and software components forming an
administrative domain. Figure 4.1 illustrates the architecture pattern of a SMC that manages
a set of heterogenous components (i.e., managed resources) such as those in BSN, WSN or
even a large-scale distributed application. Resource adapters are instantiated to provide a
unified view for interaction with the resources as they may use different interfaces or com-
munication protocols.
A SMC can load other components and services for detecting context changes, monitor-
ing component behaviours or for security (authentication and access control). However, the
event bus, the policy service, and the discovery service work in conjunction with each other
and form the core functionality of a SMC that must always be present. As most pervasive
system are event-driven, the services of a SMC interact using a common subscribe event
bus, although we do not constrain all communication to be event-based. The event bus can
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be used for both management and application data such as alarms indicating that threshold
have been exceeded. The discovery service is used to discover new components which are
capable of becoming members of the SMC, e.g., other SMCs in the vicinity. The discovery
service also manages the SMC’s membership as it is necessary to cater for transient failures,
which are common in wireless communications and to detect permanent departure (e.g., de-
vice out of range, switched off, or failure).
The policy service implements a local feedback control loop to achieve adaption and
self-management. It caters different types of policies which specify what actions are per-
mitted on which resources and services. The policy management is a main element that
we modify and add extra function to develop a new access control model for BSN and
WSNs. Therefore, Ponder2 is capable of self management. Everything in Ponder2 is a
managed object loaded dynamically into the SMC from a library, thereby producing the
factory managed object (Java class). The proposed model is implemented in the Ponder2
policy language, which is suitable to use in small devices such as sensor node.
4.3 Development Framework
Figure 4.2 shows the high-level design of the proposed simple access control model based
on the NIST standard access control framework in Ponder2. Brief discussion of Policy
Enforcement Point (PEP) and Policy Decision Point (PDP) with its components is presented
here.
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4.3.1 Policy Enforcement Point (PEP)
PEP provides an authentication service between users and sensor nodes. Whenever PEP
receives an access request, it authenticates the user by checking the user information such as
user identity and cryptographic key before it forwards the decision request to the PDP. The
assumption is made that Attribute-Based Encryption (ABE) based authentication service
and key distribution are already provided in the PEP of the proposed model.
4.3.2 Policy Decision Point (PDP)
PDP is a main module in the proposed model inside which the access control module is
implemented, and makes access decisions based on the existing authorisation policy in Pon-
der2. The PDP uses information such as users’ role, action and context along with autho-
risation policy for the decision-making process. After the access control module has made
decisions regarding data access, PDP sends back a response message to the user and for-
wards the decision internally to the targeted object.
Access Control Module
As shown in Figure 4.2, the access control module makes an access decision on a user
request based on authorisation policies that are predefined in that module.
• Authorisation Policy
An authorisation policy is used to force the access control module to check whether
a subject is authorised to execute an action on a target. Based on the existing autho-
risation policy in Ponder2, subject, target, condition and action are used to define the
data access. Subject means a user who is trying to access data from the target that
stores information. Whenever the access control module receives a decision request,
it checks the department that the user is from, which is defined in the condition of the
policy. If the decision request meets the condition, the subject is allowed to perform
the action at the target. The authorisation policy can be changed based on the require-
ments of the application. There may be several authorisation policies based on the
users’ access privileges. An example authorisation policy in Ponder2 is shown below:
Def: Permit-Policy
subject nurse
action read
target ob1
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condition department = Heart
The above permit-policy allows the nurse from “Heart” department to read the medi-
cal record ( ob1) of a patient from the same department.
4.3.3 Outcomes of the Decision-Making Process
In a simple access control model, there are two possible decision outcomes based on existing
authorisation policy.
• Permitted Access: A user access request has been granted, if he or she has the right
privileges to access data at sensor nodes. For example: A nurse has the right to access
medical records of patients from the same department.
• Denied Access: A user access request has been denied. The user is not allowed to
access the resources because he does not have the right to access data. For exam-
ple: A nurse does not have the right to access medical records of patients from other
departments.
4.4 Simulation Test Scenario
In WMSNs, each patient has his or her own BSN that consists of several sensors. Sen-
sor nodes implanted in the patient’s body continuously monitor glucose level, oxygen, etc.
They transmit collected data to a local wireless PDA (data aggregator) or store it locally.
The assumption is made that sensed data are stored in the data aggregator, as the medical
record with other personal information in BSN.
Users such as doctors and nurses try to access medical records of patients via mobile,
personal digital assistant or personal computer. For example, sensors can interact with each
other via IEEE 802.15.4 wireless links and interactions with other mobile phones and per-
sonal digital assistants from users via Wi-Fi or Bluetooth. Each BSN manages its own
policies relating to what kind of actions such as read, write, etc can be performed but for
simplicity only read operation is discussed throughout this dissertation. The department that
where the doctors or nurses are from, is used when the users try to interact with other BSNs
or request to join a patient’s BSN for data access. Figure 4.3 shows the architecture of a
BSN based on the above discussion.
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We assume that all the users in this scenario are in a “Hatfield” hospital, and try to ac-
cess the medical records of the patients. Based on the users’ access privileges, data access
to a patient’s information and medical record will be different. Therefore, access control
policies are different based on the users’ responsibility, role and department. In this test
scenario, the authorisation policies identified to evaluate the proposed simple access control
model based on a medical scenario are shown in Table 4.1.
Policy Role Department Operation Object
1 Doctor Heart read ob1
2 Doctor Heart read ob2
3 Nurse Heart read ob1
4 Nurse Cancer read ob2
Table 4.1 Example of Defined Policy
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In policy 1, the doctors from “Heart” department have the right to access the medical
record of patient (ob1), which stores collected data from implanted sensors and personal
information, from the same department (“Heart”). Policy 2 allows the doctors to access the
medical record of the patient (ob2) from “Cancer” department. Policy 1 and 2 for the doctors
are needed regarding data access to the medical records of patients from both “Cancer” and
“Heart” departments. The policies for nurses are slightly different. In policy 3, the nurses
from “Heart” department can access the medical record of a patient (ob1) who is in their
department. Unlike doctors, the nurses can only access the medical record of the patient
from the same department. Policy 3 and 4 are different. Policy 4 is for the nurses who work
in “Cancer” department to access their patients’ medical records.
Many other circumstances could have been developed and evaluated, but development of
policies is deliberately limited to reduce the experimental results reported in this dissertation
to a manageable number. More policies might be needed to check the consistency and
accountability of the proposed model in WSNs. In general, other circumstances or other
policies may have more or less similarity to the above four policies. However, the above
four policies have the essential properties for the evaluation of the simple access control
model.
4.5 Experimental Results
The evaluation of the proposed simple access control model using the above medical sce-
nario are presented with screen shots. The interface of the users and decision outcomes can
be different based on users’ access privileges such as roles, and departments.
Figure 4.4 shows a user interface and decision outcomes for a doctor. In this interface,
the doctor needs to provide the patient’s path for access to the patient’s medical record.
In this figure, it shows that the doctor “Maw” has the right to access the medical records of
patients from both “Cancer” and “Heart” departments based on decision outcomes. By look-
ing at the path of patients, it shows that these patients are from two different departments:
“Heart” department (/patient/heart/bob) and “Cancer” department (/patient/cancer/alice).
Based on this figure and decision outcomes, policy 1 and 2 are achieved by showing that the
doctor has permission to access medical records of patients from both departments.
A different policy is applied to a nurse. For policies 3 and 4, a user interface for the
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Fig. 4.5 Interface and Decision Outcomes for a Nurse
nurse is developed. As with the interface for the doctor, the nurse needs to provide the
patient’s path or targeted objects for data access. Figure 4.5 shows an example interface and
decision outcomes for the nurse from “Heart” department. Additionally, it shows that the
nurse “Htoo” from “Heart” department can access the medical record of the patient (Bob)
from the same department but he does not have permission to access the medical record of
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the other patient (Alice) in “Cancer” department. Therefore, his data access to that medical
record will be rejected. Policy 4 has the same properties as policy 3. Based on the decision
outcomes from Figure 4.5, it shows that policies 3 and 4 are achieved by applying different
authorisation policies for the user (nurse).
4.6 Conclusion and Next Step
In this chapter, the proposed simple access control model based on the NIST standard with
the existing authorisation policy in Ponder2 is discussed and evaluated using a medical sce-
nario. However, there are limited decision-making processes that rely on predefined autho-
risation policies. This means that the access control engine cannot make decisions regarding
data access for emergency and unanticipated situations because there is a lack of data avail-
ability in the simple access control model. Therefore, a flexible access policy to address
this data availability issue must be provided in the access control engine for emergency and
unanticipated situations. For example, a nurse "Htoo” from “Heart” department may need
to access the medical record of a patient from “Cancer” department in emergency situations.
To address data availability issue in WSNs, the proposed simple access control model is ex-
tended with the discretionary overriding concept, namely an adaptive access control model
for WSNs in the next chapter.

Chapter 5
An Adaptive Access Control Model
5.1 Introduction
In this chapter, the issue of data availability is addressed by introducing a discretionary
overriding concept to the previous simple access control model to evaluate the access deci-
sion dynamically for Wireless Sensor Networks (WSNs). This concept can be used to up-
date access-level permissions but also to provide data availability in emergency situations,
thereby providing a flexible approach in access control engines regarding access decisions.
To address the data availability issue, an adaptive access control model is developed to dy-
namically adjust and evaluate access decisions for emergency and unanticipated situations.
The structure of this chapter is as follows: firstly, the motivations behind the proposed
adaptive access control model are explained, followed by its development details. Addition-
ally, a medical scenario is developed with several defined policies to evaluate the proposed
model. Finally, this chapter concludes with suggestions to address how the security policy
violations need to be handled and detected as further development.
5.2 Motivations
Many manually administrated procedures are flexible enough in allowing people to expand
the roles and alter the rules within the boundary of the special needs. In contrast, access
control models in WSNs do not allow similar flexibility. An inflexible access control can
cause frustration or prevent people from doing their job. In any security-oriented applica-
tions such as healthcare and military, data availability is important to provide for immediate
52 An Adaptive Access Control Model
data access. For example, in a medical scenario, a doctor has the authority to access medical
records of patients from any department but a nurse does not have the same permission be-
cause of data confidentiality and privacy. The nurse can only access the medical records of
patients from his or her department. If the doctor is away or sick, who can access the impor-
tant or confidential medical data? The nurse is unable to access any important information
without approval from doctors or other administrative persons. However, someone who does
not have access privileges to access data must retrieve a confidential medical record for that
patient, who is in an emergency situation. In this case, a nurse might need to override access
policy for emergency data access even though normal access privilege does not allow him
or her to do so. Therefore, the question is how the nurse can obtain a confidential medical
record while a doctor is not available. These kinds of situations need to be considered for
data availability purpose.
A possible method of solving the flexibility problem regarding data availability is to use
delegation [119], [89], [28]. This means that a user who has access privileges to certain
data can delegate the required power and permission [40] to someone else so that another
person can gain necessary access to data. Delegation helps to improve system flexibility to
a certain extent when the users know the situations in advance; however, the system needs
to define extra situations in advance for the delegation to occur. To address the question of
“How can data availability be provided in emergency and unanticipated situations?”, the
discretionary overriding concept is introduced in WSNs to provide a flexible approach in
the access control engine.
5.2.1 Discretionary Overriding
The adaptive access control model is proposed and designed based on the concept of discre-
tionary overriding [110], [109] to address the data availability issue. It is introduced to make
and adjust decisions locally for emergency and unanticipated situations. Another question
that we study in this chapter is “How can the concept of discretionary overriding provide
data availability for emergency situations?”. Overriding of access control is one approach
for handling such hard-to-define and unanticipated situations where data availability is crit-
ical [10].
Rissanen et al. [110] proposed extending the access control model with a possibility-
with-override concept to increase the flexibility in hard-to-define or unanticipated situations.
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They proposed to explicitly distinguish in the security policy between, what it is permitted
to do, what it is forbidden, and what a principal can do. The importance of these distinc-
tions in computer security is argued in [40]. They referred to the solution of intersection
between can and forbidden as possibility-with-override. This means that users may be able
to override the denial of access within predefined access control policies. Rissanen et al.
[110] suggest that there are three possible outcomes to an access request from users: denied
access, permitted access and possible-with-override access. These outcomes are explained
as follows:
• Permit access: Users have permission to access data.
• Denied Access: Users do not have permission to access data.
• Possibility-with-override: The access is denied to a user but the user may request to
override the denial access and gain access to data.
Based on the above three possible outcomes, a system may define the permitted access
and the denied access policies for normal situations and leave the possibility-with-override
for emergency and unusual situations. The discretionary access control is already devel-
oped and implemented in eXtensible Access Control Markup language (XACML) [10],
[11] which is a powerful policy language for distributed systems but it is not suitable to use
in WSNs. Garcia-Morchon and Wehrle [43] state that the composition of the access control
policies in XACML are not efficient due to the high memory requirements of the language
or composition complexity. Therefore, the adaptive access control model is designed to ad-
dress data availability issue for WSNs by introducing the concept of discretionary overriding
in Ponder2.
5.3 Adaptive Access Control Framework
Figure 5.1 shows the high-level design of the proposed adaptive access control model with
its components. Compared with Figure 4.1, the overriding policy is introduced and defined
inside the access control module. Apart from the overriding policy, all the properties such
as Policy Enforcement Point (PEP) and an authorisation policy, work the same as in the
previous model. Therefore, only the details of the overriding policy are presented in this
section.
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5.3.1 Overriding Policy
An overriding policy is introduced into the access control engine to override the access
policy to support flexibility of access control engine and to address the data availability
issue. This means that an access control engine has the capability of overriding a denial
of access for emergency situations. Therefore, a simple overriding policy is introduced
based on users’ role and the contextual information such as department (which department
the users are assigned to) and time for policy overriding in decision-making process at the
access control engine. An example overriding policy is shown below.
Def: Overriding-Policy
subject nurse
action read
target ob1
condition Department = Cancer
and time is between 9am to 15pm
Based on the above overriding policy, the nurse from “Cancer” department is allowed
restricted access to the medical record of a patient from another department (ob1 is for a
patient from “Heart” department) in emergency situations but he needs to satisfy the above
conditions defined for department and time.
5.3.2 Outcomes of the Decision-Making Process
In this model, the policy evaluation for decision-making processes regarding data access re-
lies on both authorisation and overriding policies. The introduction of the discretionary
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overriding process can extend the existing two decision outcomes into three outcomes.
These are permitted access, denied access and permitted access with overriding. Permit-
ted access and denied access were explained in the previous chapter.
• Permitted Access with Overriding: A user does not have an access privilege to ac-
cess the resources but his or her restricted access request will be granted if he or she
overrides access policy within some constraints such as location and time. For ex-
ample: a nurse tries to override access policy based on the contextual information for
emergency data access to the medical record of a patient from another department.
5.4 Access Control Policy
In a medical scenario, data availability is important in both defined and emergency situa-
tions. The loss in data availability can result in further decline in patients’ conditions or can
possibly lead to death. To address data availability issue in emergency and unanticipated
situation, the permitted access with overriding is explained here with example policies. The
details of the medical scenario can be seen in the previous chapter. ob1 is for a patient from
“Heart” department and ob2 is for a patient from “Cancer” department. The policies identi-
fied to evaluated the adaptive access control model are shown in Table 5.1.
Policy Role Department Time Operation Object
1 Doctor Heart Any read ob1
2 Doctor Heart Any read ob2
3 Nurse Heart Any read ob1
4 Nurse Cancer Any read ob2
5 Nurse Cancer 9am < and
< 17pm
overrideread ob1
6 Nurse Heart 9am < and
< 17pm
overrideread ob2
Table 5.1 Example of Defined Policy
Policy 1 to 4 are the same as in the previous model. Policy 5 and 6 that have a similar
property, are related to the overriding policy. Normally, a nurse from one department does
not have permission to access the medical records of patients from departments other than
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his or hers. In the policy 5, the nurse from “Cancer” department can override access pol-
icy to access the medical record of patient from “Heart” department when it is needed for
emergency situations. This means that, he or she can override the access policy based on
the contextual information, such as time and department, for emergency data access. The
same concept is applied to policy 6 for the nurse from “Heart” department. The constraints
we consider in this model are that the department of the user has to be the same as where
he works for and the access is within the working schedule. Otherwise, the restricted access
request will be rejected.
Fig. 5.2 Interface and Decision Outcomes for a Doctor
5.5 Experimental Results
Detailed information of how the proposed adaptive access control model is evaluated by
developing a medical scenario in Ponder2 with the above policies is presented with screen
shots. Although Policy 1 to 4 are the same as the previous model, the interface of the users
is more advanced and more information is required regarding simulation purposes to access
the medical records of patients.
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Fig. 5.3 Interface and Decision Outcomes for a Nurse
Fig. 5.4 Interface and Decision Outcomes for a Nurse
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Figure 5.2 shows a user interface and decision outcomes for a doctor “Oliver”. The pa-
tient’s path and contextual information are required for the purpose of simulation. In the
proposed adaptive access control model, the doctor needs to provide contextual information
such as department and time for data access. Based on the decision outcomes, the doctor has
the right to access medical records of patients from both “Heart” and “Cancer” departments.
This means that, the policy 1 and 2 are achieved in the proposed model.
Figure 5.3 shows how the overriding process can be done in the proposed adaptive ac-
cess control model. Based on the decision outcomes from Figure 5.3, the nurse (Maw) from
“Heart” department can access medical records of patients from his department regarding
policy 3. In the second case, his restricted access has been denied because he did not meet
the time criteria from the overriding policy. In the last case, he tried to override his or her
policy regarding access the medical record of the patient from another department: “Can-
cer”. To override an access policy successfully and for access to be granted, the user needs
to satisfy the defined thresholds such as role, department and time. Therefore, the final result
shows that the nurse can access the medical record from another department by overriding
the denial of access based on policy 5. Policy 6 has the same properties as policy 5 but it is
aimed for nurses in “Cancer” department. Figure 5.4 shows the user interface of the nurse
(Aung) from “Cancer” department but the expressions are the same as Figure 5.3.
Therefore, data availability is provided at some situations in the proposed model. The
decision outcomes in the adaptive access control model are checked for consistency as well
as to verify and test the overriding policy based on the different user interface.
5.6 Conclusion and Next Step
In this section, detailed information of the proposed adaptive access control model is pre-
sented with user interface and decision outcomes. The advantage of the adaptive access
control model over the simple access control model is that it introduced the overriding pol-
icy to provide data availability service in emergency and unanticipated situations. One of
the weaknesses of the proposed adaptive access control model is that there is no facility or
mechanism to detect security policy violations such as unauthorised information release and
unnecessary overriding process1. Therefore, data privacy is lost in security policy violations
initiated by a malicious or unfaithful user. The questions that now arise are how can the sys-
1Unnecessary overriding process means misuse of overriding policy.
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tem handle this kind of situation and what are the courses of action for restricted access in
WSNs. Based on the above weakness in the adaptive access control model, an improved
version of the model with a prevention and detection mechanism will be proposed in the
next chapter.

Chapter 6
Adaptive Access Control Model with a
Prevention and Detection Mechanism
6.1 Introduction
In this chapter, the framework of the previous adaptive access control model is extended
with a prevention and detection mechanism to address how security policy violations are
handled and detected in Wireless Sensor Networks (WSNs). An introduction of the over-
riding policy in the previous model can provide data availability in emergency and unantic-
ipated situations but there is a weakness of applying it. The weakness is that the user may
always try to override access policy whenever he or she desires data access. If there is no
security mechanism to detect the security policy violations, security breaches can occur at
any time. There is no prevention or detection mechanism in current WSN access control
models for auditing purposes to detect the security policy violations. Sandhu and Samarati
[118] mention that the role of auditing is to produce an analysis of data to discover or di-
agnose security violations. Therefore, a prevention and detection mechanism is extended
to the previous adaptive access control model to detect security policy violations and mis-
use of the overriding facility from both authorised and unauthorised users. Additionally, an
obligation policy is introduced to identify the courses of action when a restricted access is
granted or denied in emergency and unanticipated situations.
The structure of this chapter is as follows: Firstly, the adaptive access control model with
a prevention and detection mechanism is presented. Additionally, a medical application
is developed under Ponder2 to evaluate and check whether the proposed adaptive access
control model with the prevention and detection mechanism has achieved its objectives.
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Finally, this chapter concludes with suggestions for the next step.
6.2 Adaptive Access Control model with a Prevention and
Detection Mechanism
The overview diagram of the proposed adaptive access control model with the prevention
and detection mechanism can be seen in Figure 6.1. Based on this figure, all the components
such as PEP, authorisation policy and overriding policy, work the same as in the previous
models. In the access control module, an obligation policy is added to use along with the
authorisation decisions for auditing purpose. Details of the obligation policy and prevention
and detection mechanism are explained below.
Fig. 6.1 An Adaptive Access Control Model with a Prevention and Detection Mechanism
6.2.1 Obligation Policy
Accorsi and Stocker [1] suggest that obligations are used as post conditions that must be
fulfilled after the authorisation decisions. An obligation is introduced to take some courses
of action regarding the issue that relates with the overriding process. This issue is “What
should happen if a restricted access is granted”.
To address the above issue, the obligation policy is used to perform a course of action
that a user is required to take in emergency and unanticipated situations. The obligation
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policy may “Trigger an Alarm”, “Notification Message” and keep an audit log for further
investigations that are related to audit purposes. After the policy has been evaluated, the
specific obligations are sent automatically with the authorisation decisions to the manage-
ment teams. Therefore, the obligation policy is used as post condition after the enforcement
of authorisation decisions. The format of obligation policy is shown below.
Def: Obligation-Policy
condition policy type is override
target Emlog
do write.audit < subject, Time, Target, Department, Decision Outcomes >
and trigger-alarm
and notify-message
The above obligation-policy will activate when the overriding process is invoked. For
example, if restricted access is granted or denied to a nurse based on the overriding policy,
the obligation policy will be activated along with authorisation decisions to perform some
actions.
6.2.2 Prevention and Detection Module
The main idea of introducing a prevention and detection mechanism [21], [19], [112] is to
protect the privacy and confidentiality of data by storing users’ information, actions, etc. as
an audit log for the purpose of detecting security violations. For an audit log to be usable, it
should:
• Be available through a usable interface for the auditors or the administrators.
• Contain sufficiently detailed information to get a picture of what has happened.
Regarding the above facts, the audit log is to record the event and specify 1) when it
occurred, 2) the user information associated with that event and 3) the results of the decision-
making process. An audit log can assist in detecting security violations and flaws in the
system by detecting any suspicious access from users. In the audit log format, the subject
is a user who tries to access a medical record from the targeted object with an authorisation
decision. In the audit log, the contextual information such as time and department are also
recorded. The format of the audit record is shown as follows:
Auditlog := [Subject + Time + Target + Department + Decision Outcomes]
There are two different audit logs in the proposed model. These are:
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• Access Log - every time a medical record is opened an entry is created in the ac-
cess log containing information about the users, the patient and the document being
accessed.
• Emergency Log - an entry is created in this log whenever a restricted access is per-
mitted or denied using the overriding process.
These two logs are stored as Comma Separated Value (CSV) extension, so it can be
easily checked and monitored by system administrators. Therefore, the prevention and
detection module is used in the proposed model to keep a record of all the users’ access
information as an audit log for detecting security policy violations.
6.2.3 Outcomes of the Decision-Making Process
In the proposed adaptive access control model with a prevention and detection mechanism,
the decision-making processes regarding data access are based on the authorisation, over-
riding and obligation policies. There are five possible decision outcomes based on existing
policies, two of which, permitted access and denied access, are already explained in chapter
4. Permitted access with overriding from the previous chapter is replaced with permitted
access with overriding and obligation. Therefore, the remaining two different decision out-
comes and permitted access with overriding, and obligation are discussed as follows.
• Permitted Access with Obligation - A user access request has been granted but the
obligation policy is activated automatically to take some actions when data access is
given to that user especially for important and confidential information.
• Denied Access with Obligation - A user does not have access privilege to the resources
and his or her restricted access has been denied. Additionally, the obligation policy is
activated to take a course of action after the authorisation decision is made.
• Permitted Access with Overriding and Obligation - A user does not have access priv-
ilege to the resources but the restricted access will be granted if he or she overrides
the access policy within some constraints, such as contextual information. Addition-
ally, the obligation policy is activated to detect unnecessary overriding processes by
authorised users when the overriding policy is used for decision evaluation.
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Policy Role Department Time Operation Oblg Object Obligations
1 Doctor Heart Any read N.A. ob1 N.A.
2 Doctor Heart Any read Oblg ob2 Oblg [No-
tification
Message]
3 Nurse Heart Any read N.A. ob1 N.A.
4 Nurse Cancer Any read N.A. ob2 N.A.
5 Nurse Heart 9am <
and <
17pm
overrideread Oblg ob2 Oblg [No-
tification
Message and
Trigger the
Alarm]
6 Nurse Cancer 9am <
and <
17pm
overrideread Oblg ob1 Oblg [No-
tification
Message and
Trigger the
Alarm]
7 Admin Audit Any read N.A. Aclog N.A.
8 Admin Audit Any read N.A. Emlog N.A.
Table 6.1 Example of Defined Policy
6.3 Access Control Policy
Unlike the previous medical scenario, this scenario considers the provision of data avail-
ability with a certain degree of detection to detect security policy violations. In this test
scenario, the following policies in Table 6.1 are identified and developed to evaluate the
proposed model.
The policies 1, 2, 3 and 4 have the same policy definitions as those shown previously
in chapters 4 and 5 but in policy 2, the obligation is added to take a course of action when
the doctor tries to access a medical record of patients from another department. In addition,
policies 5 and 6 are new policies to show that a combination of overriding policy, obliga-
tion policy and a prevention and detection mechanism is beneficial to healthcare application
in WSNs. The policy 5 allows the nurse from “Heart” department to access the medical
record of patient from another department, if he or she satisfies the defined threshold from
the overriding policy but the obligation policy is activated to perform some courses of ac-
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tions. The policy 6 is for the nurses from “Cancer” department to override access policy in
unanticipated situations. Additionally, policy 7 and 8 allow the administrators from “Audit”
department to read both access and emergency log for auditing purpose at any time.
6.4 Experimental Results
The evaluation of the proposed adaptive access control model with a prevention and detec-
tion module with a medical scenario is presented with screen shots. Firstly, user interface
and decision outcomes for a doctor is discussed; followed by a nurse.
Fig. 6.2 Interface and Decision Outcomes for a Doctor
Figure 6.2 presents user interface and decision outcomes of a doctor “Oliver”. Based
on the decision outcome, the doctor can access the normal medical record of the patient
from “Heart” department. When he requests data access to a confidential medical record
of that patient, an obligation policy is activated along with an authorisation decision based
on policy 2. This means that he can have access to both medical records but an obligation
might be performed based on this content are how sensitive.
Figure 6.3 shows the interface of the nurse as well as decision outcomes. The first re-
sult shows that the nurse from “Cancer” department can access the medical record of the
patient from that department. In the second case, access to the medical record of a patient
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Fig. 6.3 Interface and Decision Outcomes for a Nurse
from “Heart” department is denied because the user does not satisfy the defined thresholds
from the overriding policy, but the obligation policy is still activated to take some actions
for auditing purpose. The final result shows that if a nurse satisfies the thresholds from the
overriding policy, access for the normal medical record is granted to that user, but some
obligations are triggered. Based on the decision outcomes and evaluation results shown in
Figure 6.3, the properties of policies 5 to 6 are achieved in the proposed model.
Audit trails are used to detect security policy violations from both authorised and unau-
thorised users. All the users’ requested accesses are kept as a log for auditing purposes. The
access log can be seen in Figure 6.4. This log will keep all the user access information from
all attempts to access data from the targeted objects. Figure 6.5 shows the emergency audit
log that creates an entry of the users who uses the property of the overriding process. The
audit logs are stored in the prevention and detection module.
6.5 Conclusion and Next Step
In this chapter, detailed information of the proposed adaptive access control model with
a prevention and detection mechanism is presented with figures and diagrams. Both ac-
cess and emergency audit logs are stored in the prevention and detection module to detect
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Fig. 6.4 An Interface for the Access Log
Fig. 6.5 An Interface for the Emergency Log
security policy violations. Along with authorisation decisions, the obligation policy is in-
troduced to perform a course of action when the restricted access is granted or denied in
emergency and unanticipated situations. Therefore, the proposed model can detect security
policy violations and detect unnecessary overriding processes by taking courses of action
alongside authorisation decisions. In this model, there is no way to detect an abnormal data
access from authorised users because the normal authorisation policy allows the users to ac-
cess the medical record at any time and from any department. On the other hand, we cannot
assume that all the users are trustworthy enough to override access policy for the restricted
access in unanticipated situations. Therefore, a trust model is considered to be included in
the proposed model to check whether the users are trustworthy or untrustworthy based on
the dynamic changes of their behaviour. Additionally, a trust model can enhance the capa-
bility of making decisions at the access control engine by using trust value as one of the
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defined thresholds in the policy evaluation. To address the above issues in the next chapter,
a simple user behaviour trust model is developed to integrate with the access control model.

Chapter 7
A Simple User Behaviour Trust Model
7.1 Introduction
In the previous chapters, the assumption was made that all the users are trustworthy enough
to perform overriding on a denial of access in emergency and unexpected situations; how-
ever, in reality, users are not always trustworthy enough to give that kind of a flexible access.
Based on that weakness in the previous model, in this chapter a user behaviour trust model
for Wireless Sensor Networks (WSNs) is introduced and developed to evaluate user trust-
worthiness based on the highly dynamic and unpredictable characteristic of each user.
The structure of this chapter is as follows: firstly, trust in WSNs is discussed, followed
by the proposed user behaviour trust model. The data flow diagram and algorithm for the
proposed model are explained next. Additionally, the trust algorithm is evaluated based
on numerical analysis in MATLAB to show the characteristic variations of the total trust
value of the user based on their behaviour information. Finally, this chapter concludes with
suggestions to integrate trust with the adaptive access control model from chapter 6 for
making an effective access decision by providing a flexible approach to define policies that
are not too permissive nor too strict.
7.2 Trust in WSNs
Trust plays an important role in networks and human life environments. In the context
of a network, trust is used to help its components to decide whether another member,
node or device from the same network is being inattentive, uncooperative or compromised.
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Fernandez-Gago [34] states that trust becomes quite important in self-configurable and au-
tonomous systems such as WSNs, Wireless Body Area Networks (WBANs) and Wireless
Medical Sensor Networks (WMSNs). Having different definitions in security related liter-
atures “trust” in this chapter is considered as the trustworthiness of users based on highly
dynamic and unpredictable characteristic of their behaviour.
Trust in WSNs can be classified into different categories based on the needs of the ap-
plication. The classification of trust [123] is explained as follow:
• Direct Trust: Direct trust is the trust that a subject holds of another service provider
without any intermediate service provider or entity.
• Indirect Trust: Indirect trust is the trust that a subject holds of one service provider
through some other service provider or entity.
• Full Trust: A subject is said to have full trust of a service provider if that subject trusts
all the services provided.
• Partial Trust: A subject is said to have partial trust of a service provider, if that subject
trusts some of the services provided.
• Recommended Trust: Recommended trust is the trust of one entity of another that is
recommended by other entities.
• Authentication Trust: Authentication trust is the trust of an entity of the authenticity
based on an identity certificate signed by a certificate authority.
• Communication Trust: Communication trust means that the trust is calculated be-
tween the sensor nodes based on their cooperation of routing messages to other nodes
in the network [95].
• Data Trust: Data trust is the trust that is based on the actually sensed data of the
sensors [92].
Regarding the above categorisation of trust, direct and indirect trust are commonly used
in trust calculations of sensor nodes [94], [92] to check whether the nodes are trustworthy
or not based on Bayesian network [25] and Naive Bayes classification algorithms [145]. For
reputation-based trust calculation [93], [42], trust are used in key management and network
management. Authentication trust is mostly used in policy-based trust management systems
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Trust based Schemes in WSNs
Trust-based Schemes References
Trust-based routing management or pro-
tocol
[128], [16], [2], [75], [96], [142], [98]
Trust-based intrusion detection [14], [15], [16]
Trust-based key management [70], [76], [77], [81]
Trust-based malicious node detection [64], [149], [59], [94]
Group-based trust management [121], [148]
Reputation-based trust management [93], [42], [125]
Table 7.1 A Taxonomy of Trust-Based Schemes in WSNs
[123]. The communication and data trust proposed by Momani [95], is used to calculate trust
between sensor nodes. Therefore, trust can be divided in six groups regarding the aspects of
requirements in WSNs: trust-based routing management or protocol; trust-based intrusion
detection; trust-based key management; trust-based malicious node detection; and group-
based and reputation-based trust management for networks. Table 7.1 shows the taxonomy
of trust-based schemes in the published literatures for WSNs.
Trust can also resolve security related routing issues. Several trust management schemes
[128], [16], [2], [75], [96] are proposed to detect suspicious transmission and identify mali-
cious nodes for disseminating information in the network. For example, trust-based routing
management only allows the trusted sensor nodes to participate in the routing. Direct trust
and indirect trust are mostly used to evaluate each node’s trustworthiness based on trust
metrics (i.e. Quality of Service (QoS) characteristics such as data packets forwarded, con-
trol message forwarded, availability based on beacon or Hello message, etc.) and weight
factors. One of the trust algorithms for routing management calculates the direct trust based
on Geometric Mean [88] of the QoS characteristics. The indirect (second-hand) informa-
tion may be particularly useful when there is no direct interaction, i.e. when the situation is
risky, then the indirect trust plays major role in the formation of trust on any node.
Trust-based intrusion detection schemes such as [14], [15], [16] are used to effectively
deal with selfish or malicious nodes and to improve QoS in WSNs. The trust-based intrusion
detection schemes considered the effect of both social trust (such as honesty 1) and QoS trust
(such as competence, reliability and task completion capability) to detect malicious nodes.
1The honesty trust is the trust that measure through evidences of dishonesty such as false self-reporting
and abnormal trust recommendations.
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Trust-based key management schemes [70], [76], [77] based on cryptographic method
are proposed to provide a secure communication channel in WSNs. Since sensor nodes
collect personal medical data, security and privacy are important services in this kind of
networks. It is aimed to securely and efficiently generate and distribute session keys based
on biometrics (such as electrocardiogram [81]) or identity-based encryption [8] between the
sensor nodes and the base station to secure end-to-end transmission.
The aim of trust-based malicious node detection is to minimise communication and
storage overhead, and to improve reliability in WSNs. Direct and indirect trust are mostly
used in malicious node detection methods to calculate the trust value of each node based on
weighted running average approach [91]. Direct trust method [59] consists of the following
steps:
• Behaviour of the node is monitored periodically.
• In each period the numbers of good and bad behaviour of the node are recorded.
• Based on the numbers of good and bad behaviour, trust is calculated periodically.
Indirect trust is calculated based on recommendation (second hand information) ob-
tained from trustful neighbours. Additionally, the communication and data trust are also
used to detect malicious node based on Bayesian network.
The group-based trust management schemes for clustered WSNs such as [121], [148]
is aimed to detect and prevent selfish, faulty and malicious nodes, to minimise the memory
overhead, and to reduce the communication overhead by making sensor nodes only commu-
nicate with the cluster head. The trust value calculation in cluster head is based on weighted
running average, so that the recent trust value can be given more weight in the overall trust
calculation.
Distributed Reputation-based Beacon Trust System (DRBTS) [125] are aimed at provid-
ing a method by which bacon nodes2 can monitor each other and provide information so that
sensor nodes can choose whom to trust, based on a quorum voting approach [124]. In order
to trust a bacon node’s information, a sensor must get votes for its trustworthiness from at
least half of their common neighbours. Ganeriwal and Srivastava [42] propose a framework
2A beacon node assists other sensor nodes to determine their location.
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where each sensor node maintains reputation metric representing past behaviour of other
nodes, which are then used as an inherent aspect in predicting future behaviour. This ap-
proach is based on a Bayesian formulation, specifically a beta reputation system [62], for
the algorithm steps of reputation representation, updates, integration and trust evolution.
Overall, reputation-based trust management are employed in WSNs to deal with malicious
and unreliable nodes based on first and second hand information from the neighbours.
Based on the above discussion, most of the trust schemes in WSNs are using weight
factors, so that the direct trust or recent trust can be given more weight in the overall trust
calculation. Direct trust, indirect trust and trust that based on QoS characteristics are com-
monly used in trust calculations of sensor nodes to check whether the nodes are trustworthy
or untrustworthy based on Bayesian network, Naive Bayes and geometric mean. Regarding
the above facts, there is no existing trust model that evaluates trust based on users’ behaviour
information. This means that none of the existing trust models can be readily related to the
decision-making process in the access control engine. The evaluation of trust for users based
on their behaviour information is significant in forming a trustworthy network and is a new
research issue in WSNs. Therefore, we propose a user behaviour trust model to use in WSNs
and WMSNs in order to measure behaviour trust of the user from the system perspective to
enhance access decisions. Unlike existing trust models in WSNs, the proposed model is
aimed at calculating the trust value of each user regarding whether the users are trustworthy
or untrustworthy, based on highly dynamic characteristics of their behaviour information.
7.3 A User Behaviour Trust Model
A user behaviour trust model that uses current user behaviour information and previous trust
values to calculate user trustworthiness from the system perspective is proposed and intro-
duced in WSNs. The current trust value is the geometric mean [88] of information obtained
from the user’s current access requests to an object, such as user’s role, location and time.
The main reason of using the geometric mean is that it compares different attributes - find-
ing a single “figure of merit” for these attributes - when each attribute has different numeric
ranges. The concept of using geometric mean to calculate the direct trust based on QoS
characteristics of a sensor node for routing management [124] motivates us to reproduce a
simple calculation for current trust evaluation based on a user’s behaviour information such
as the role and the contextual information from the access request. The user’s behaviour
information can be considered as user’s characteristic and calculated based on geometric
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Fig. 7.1 Overview of the Trust Model
mean formula. The geometric mean equation can be seen as follow:
(
n
∏
i=1
ai)
1
n = n
√
a1 ∗a2 ∗ ......∗an (7.1)
For the previous trust value, the total trust value of the user from the previous transaction
is used. This means that the total trust value of users does not rely completely on the
evaluation of current trust. The traditional weighting approach [91] is used to calculate the
total trust value of a user based on the current trust and the previous trust. The weight
factor is commonly used in the trust calculation, so that the recent behaviour characteristics
can be given more weight in the overall trust calculation. If total behaviour trust value is
higher than the defined threshold, the user is trustworthy enough to perform an action on a
certain object. When it goes under the defined threshold, the user becomes an untrustworthy
person and the system may decline his access to a specific object. An overview of the user
behaviour trust model can be seen in Figure 7.1. There are three sub-modules: current trust,
previous trust and total trust.
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7.3.1 Current Behaviour Trust Value (Tcur)
A user’s behaviour information (such as the role and the contextual information from the
access request) is used to calculate the current trust value of the user. The formula for the
evaluation of current behaviour trust based on geometric mean is shown below:
Tcur = (
n
∏
i=1
ai)
1
n (7.2)
where,
n = Number of Attributes
a = Attribute
Based on the user’s behaviour information (such as location, role and time), the above
equation is substituted as follow:
Tcur= 3
√
T Lo ∗T Ro ∗T Ti (7.3)
where,
Tcur = Current Trust Value
TLo = Trust Value for Location
TRo = Trust Value for User’s Role
TTi = Trust Value for Time Range
Equation 7.3 shows that the current behaviour trust value is evaluated based on three
different attributes: location; user’s role; and user’s time range. Each attribute has a defined
value between 1 and 4 because we consider three different conditions in the proposed model.
The defined value of each attribute is evaluated differently. Based on the geometric mean,
the maximum value of current behaviour trust can be up to 4 and the lowest value can be 1.
In the proposed model, the physical location of a user (location of subject), which de-
partment that user is from (department of subject) and where is the targeted data that the
user tries to access (department of object) are considered as the evaluation criteria for the
location attribute. Table 7.2 represents an example data set to evaluate the trust value of
location for a user.
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Department of Subject Department of Object Location of Subject TLo
A A A 4
A A B 3
A B A 2
A B B 1
Table 7.2 An Evaluation Criteria for Location Attribute
Based on Table 7.2, if the department of the subject, the location of the subject and the
department of the object are the same (in this case “A” department), the trust value of lo-
cation for a user is defined as 4 that is a maximum value. If the user works in department
“A” and tries to access data which stores the same department “A” but his actual location
is from another department (“B”), his trust value is set as 3. If the object is stored in “B”
department but both department of subject and location of subject are from “A” department,
the trust value is defined as 2 because the user tries to access data which is stored in the dif-
ferent department. In last case, the trust value of location for a user is the lowest 1 when the
location of subject and the department of object are different compared to the department of
the subject.
The defined trust value for a user’s role is reflected based on their responsibility and
duty. For the doctor, the trust value for user’s role is set as 4 but for the nurses, it is defined
as 2. The trust value can be different for other roles (such as administration staff, laboratory
staff, etc.) but we only consider doctors’ and nurses’ roles. In general, if the current user’s
time range is within the system defined time frame, the trust value of the time criteria TTi
is set between 1 to 4. In a medical application, some users work in the daytime and some
in the night time. Therefore, the defined trust value for time criteria can change based on
users’ working schedule or time framework. Example conditions for time criteria can be
seen in Table 7.3.
Ti TTi
12 ≤ Ti < 18 4
6 ≤ Ti < 12 3
18 ≤ Ti < 24 2
0 ≤ Ti < 6 1
Table 7.3 An Evaluation Criteria for Time Attribute
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Based on the above discussion, the evaluation for each criterion is considered separately
based on the requirements of the application for the current behaviour trust. The proposed
current trust module can easily be extended with additional attributes for extra criteria for
evaluation of trust.
7.3.2 Previous Trust Value (Tpre)
In the proposed model, the previous trust value is used as one of the supporting factors for
total trust evaluation when the user requests at the next attempt. The user trust values from
the previous transactions are used as the previous trust value of the users. Tpre is equivalent
to the total trust value of users from the previous transactions.
7.3.3 Total Trust Value (Ttotal)
The total behaviour trust value checks whether the user is trustworthy or untrustworthy to
perform some actions based on his or her current and previous behaviour trust values. The
total trust value is a function of current and previous trust values. The proposed model also
uses the traditional weighting approach as in [91], [8] to combine current and previous trust
to form the total trust per relation in the system, as shown in equation 7.4.
Ttotal(n) = ( α * Tcur(n)) + ( β* Tpre(n)) (7.4)
where,
Ttotal(n) = Total Trust Value of the nth Transaction
Tcur(n) = Current Trust Value of the nth Transaction
Tpre(n) = Previous Trust Value of the nth Transaction
α = Constant Weighting Factor ( 0 ≤ α ≤ 1 ) to the current trust
β = Constant Weighting Factor ( 1 - α ) to the previous trust
α is a weighting given to the current trust and β to the previous trust where α+β = 1
and 0 ≤ α , β ≤ 1. Weights can be assigned using different approaches. Depending on the
application, sometimes the current trust may be given more weight and the previous trust
may be given less weight i.e. α > β , and vice-versa. Additionally, the traditional weighting
approach is commonly used in the overall trust calculation in WSNs regarding direct and
indirect trust. If there is no previous behaviour trust, the current behaviour trust value is
used as the total behaviour trust value. Based on the evaluation of the total behaviour trust
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value of a user, the levels of trustworthiness can be expressed as follows:
• A user is trustworthy if Ttotal≥ Tthreshold
• A user is untrustworthy if Ttotal< Tthreshold
Currently, a simple method is used to differentiate whether a user is trustworthy or un-
trustworthy based on the total trust. If the total trust value of the user is higher than or equal
to the defined threshold (Tthreshold) which is 2.5 based on the arithmetic mean3 [31] of previ-
ous trust and current trust, he is a trustworthy person, but when the total trust value is under
the defined threshold, that person is deemed an untrustworthy person. After the evaluation
of total behaviour trust value for that user, that value will be forwarded to the access control
module for decisions regarding data access. Using behaviour trust values can enhance the
decision-making process at the access control module. The behaviour trust module assists
the decision-making process regarding whether the user is trustworthy or un-trustworthy to
perform some actions in the specific targeted objects.
7.4 Data Flow Chart
The data flow chart for the behaviour trust module can be seen in Figure 7.2. When the user
behaviour trust module receives user requested information (Uin f o), the current behaviour
trust module evaluates the current user’s information. After that, the system checks whether
the user has previous interaction by checking his previous behaviour trust value. If it is the
first attempt for that user, where Tpre(n) is inapplicable, the current behaviour trust value is
used as the total behaviour trust value.
If Tpre(n) is greater than zero, both current and previous trust values are forwarded to the
main trust engine to calculate the total behaviour trust based on equation 7.4. The total trust
value will be forwarded to the access control module for decisions regarding data access.
7.5 Evaluation of Trust Algorithm
The user behaviour trust algorithm is evaluated based on numerical analysis in MATLAB
[83] to check and show how the total trust value of users vary given different users’ be-
3The arithmetic mean is used as a good measure of central tendency, compared to α = β = 0.5.
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Fig. 7.2 Flow Chart of the Trust Model
haviour information or attributes. The trust algorithm is calculated with random variables4
that represent the trust value of three different attributes such as trust value for location,
users’ role and time range. Random variables are useful when solving and complex prob-
lems related to probability (whether the users can be trusted or not trusted). The trust algo-
rithm can be seen as follows:
Calculate Total Trust (Ttotal , Tcur, Tpre, TLo, TRo, TTi, α , β )
Uin f o = Current User Information
Ttotal = Total Trust Value
4A random variable is a process that assigns values of an attribute to different cases.
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Tpre = Previous Trust Value
Tcur = Current Trust Value
TLo = Trust Value for Location
TRo = Trust Value for User’s Role
TTi = Trust Value for Time Range
α and β = Constant Weighting Factor (0 ≤ α , β ≤ 1)
For TLo,
TLou= randi(4,1,10);
For TRo,
TRo= randi(4,1,10);
For TTi,
TTi= randi(4,1,10);
For Current Trust (Tcur),
Tcur(n) = 3
√
T Lo ∗T Ro ∗T Ti
For Total Trust (Ttotal),
if Tpre(n) = NA,
Tcur(n) = Ttotal (n)
Return Ttotal(n);
else Tpre(n) = Ttotal(n-1);
Ttotal(n) = ( α * Tcur(n)) + ( β* Tpre(n))
Return Ttotal(n);
Figure 7.3 shows the numerical analysis of trust algorithm based on users’ behaviour
pattern in MATLAB. The green line presents the previous trust value of the user and the
red line represents the total trust value of the users. The blue line represents the current be-
haviour trust of the user; the black lines represent the trust value of three different attributes
such as location; user’s role; and user’s time range. These attributes were simulated by
using the “randi” [83] function based on uniformly distributed pseudo-random integers to
generate the random integers. This function generates different variables that are used as the
defined trust value for location of user, value for location of targeted object, value for user’s
role and value for time range, for the current trust evaluation. “randi(4,1,10)” represents
the numerical number between 4 to 1 for the transactions (10). Therefore, it shows that the
current trust value of a user varies based on the dynamic changes of his or her behaviour
information. Overall, it shows that the trust value of users can be evaluated and calculated
based on highly dynamic characteristics of their behaviour information. Additionally, Fig-
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ure 7.3 demonstrates that the total trust value of a user does not only rely on the current trust
value that evaluate based on the users’ behaviour information from recent transaction but
also depends on the previous trust values.
Fig. 7.3 Behaviour Trust Evaluation
7.6 Conclusion
This chapter discussed a simple user behaviour trust model with figures and diagrams. The
proposed model is developed and designed based on the geometric mean and weighted run-
ning average to calculate the trust value of the user. The results obtained from the evaluation
of trust algorithms based on numerical simulation in MATLAB show that the trust value of
the users can vary based on the current users’ behaviour information and the previous trust
value. The proposed model is developed to cooperate with access control engines and to
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be used as one of the policy evaluation criteria for making access decisions effectively and
dynamically. The proposed model is designed based on the user behaviour information
(such as location, role and time) that can be easily obtained from any data access request.
This means that, there is no essential requirement regarding the behaviour information or
attributes and it can be easily adapted in current access control engines. Additionally, the
introducing of trust model in access control engines can help to address the conflict be-
tween data privacy and data availability because only the trusted users can get the restricted
access in emergency and unanticipated situations. Therefore, we extend the adaptive access
control model with prevention and detection mechanism from chapter 6 with the proposed
behaviour trust model to create the Trust-Based Adaptive Access Control Model (T BA2C)
that will be explained in the following chapter.
Chapter 8
T BA2C: A Trust-Based Adaptive Access
Control Model
8.1 Introduction
In the healthcare industry, patients are expected to be treated in reasonable time and any loss
in data availability can result in further decline in the patient’s condition or can even lead to
death. Therefore, the availability of data is usually more important than security concerns.
The overwhelming priority is to take care of the patient, but the privacy and confidentiality
of that patient’s medical records cannot be neglected. In current healthcare applications,
there are many problems concerning security policy violations in the real world environ-
ment. Additionally, we cannot assume that all the users are trustworthy enough to give a
flexible access in both defined and emergency situations because there is no facility to de-
tect abnormal data access from authorised users in current Wireless Sensor Network (WSN)
access control models. Some WSN access control models address data availability issue for
emergency situations but the privacy of the patients’ information has been neglected.
To address the above issues, Trust-Based Adaptive Access Control (T BA2C) is proposed
which is an extended version of the model proposed in chapter 6 incorporating the simple
user behaviour trust model from chapter 7. T BA2C is aimed at protecting the privacy of the
users’ information and the privacy of the patients’ information allowing only trusted users
to have a restricted access in emergency and unanticipated situations. In addition, the trust
value is used as an extra condition in the authorisation policy to detect abnormal data access
from authorised users. Therefore, T BA2C is an emerging concept that builds on the con-
cepts of fine-grained access control [144], the user behaviour trust model, the prevention
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and detection mechanism, and the possibility-with-override concept to provide a flexible
policy that is not too permissive nor too strict in the access control engine and to adjust the
access decisions effectively based on the user behaviour trust values.
Firstly, the development details of T BA2C model are explained, followed by the simula-
tion test scenario with its threat model. Additionally, a medical application is developed to
evaluate and verify the proposed T BA2C model. Finally, this chapter concludes with further
suggestions.
8.2 A Trust-Based Adaptive Access Control Framework
Trust-Based Adaptive Access Control (T BA2C) integrates the concepts that have been in-
troduced in the previous chapters to provide a flexible approach in the access control engine
and to address the conflict between data availability and data privacy in WSNs. The pro-
posed model has incorporated the concepts of the possibility-with-override [110] into WSNs
for hard-to-define and unanticipated situations. Possibility-with-override means users may
be able to override the denial of access when unanticipated situations occur. It is combined
with the simple user behaviour trust model to enforce access decisions effectively and effi-
ciently at the access control engine. The user behaviour trust model is employed to evaluate
the total behaviour trust value of the users based on their role, department, time, etc. The
trust value is used as one of the policy evaluation criteria in the access control engine.
There are three main modules in T BA2C: Policy Enforcement Point (PEP), Policy Deci-
sion Point (PDP) and the user behaviour trust module. The overview of T BA2C can be seen
in Figure 8.1. In the T BA2C model, PEP has the same properties as the previous models but
the policy definitions in the access control module are different because the trust value is
introduced and used as one of the policy evaluation criteria. A brief discussion of the access
control module and the user behaviour trust module comes next.
8.2.1 Access Control Module
The access control module is the main module in the proposed T BA2C model. All the
defined access policies such as authorisation, obligation and overriding are integrated with
that module. An effective access decision can be made in any circumstances based on the
defined access policies and user behaviour trust value.
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Fig. 8.1 Overview of the T BA2C Model
• Authorisation Policy Authorisation policy is used for normal permitted and denied
access in the proposed model. An example of authorisation policy is shown below:
Def: Permit-Policy
subject nurse
action read
target ob2
condition department = Cancer
and time is between 9am to 17pm
if trust value is < 2.5
call obligation policy
The above permit-policy adds an extra condition (trust criterion) to detect abnormal
data access from authorised users. It defines the nurse from “Cancer” department has
the right to access the medical record of patient from the same department (ob2). Un-
like the previous models, the trustworthiness value of the user is checked as additional
condition in the authorisation policy. The nurse still has an data access even if his trust
value is lower than defined value but the system assumes an abnormal data access and
performs a course of action by activating the obligation policy.
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• Obligation Policy
An obligation policy is used in some situations to perform a course of action alongside
the authorisation decision.
Def: Obligation-Policy
Target Emlog
if policy type is override
do write.audit < subject, Time, Target, Behaviour Trust Value, Department, Decision Outcome >
and Trigger-alarm
and Notification Message
Based on the above policy, if there is an overriding process, the obligation policy be-
comes active and keeps the user information as an audit log and some actions such as
triggering an alarm and sending notification message to administrator are performed.
• Overriding Policy
An overriding policy checks conditions for the decision-making process at the access
control module. To override the denial of access, the subject has to meet the following
policy criteria:
Def: Overriding-Policy
subject nurse
action read
target ob1
condition trust value is ≥ 2.5
and department = Heart
and time is between 9am to 17pm
call Obligation-Policy
Regarding the above policy, a nurse from “Heart” department may access the medical
record of a patient from “Cancer” department (ob1) but he needs to meet conditions
such as trust, department and time to override the denied access. An important factor
is that the user behaviour trust value has to be equal or higher than the defined value
which is 2.5 to override it. Alongside the authorisation decision, the obligation policy
will be activated whether the access has been granted or denied.
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8.2.2 User Behaviour Trust Module
A user behaviour trust model from the previous chapter is used in the T BA2C model. This
module uses current user information and previous trust values to calculate the user trust-
worthiness value from the system perspective. The current trust value is obtained from the
user’s current access request to an object, such as user’s role, department, time and targeted
objects. The total trust value of the user is stored in a log as the previous trust value for the
user’s next attempt. The trust value is not only used in the overriding process but also in the
normal authorisation process to detect abnormal data access from authorised users.
8.3 Simulation Test Scenario
A medical application is developed to show how the proposed model is fit and how the pol-
icy evaluation is done for overriding access based on user behaviour trust value and other
information. The simulation test scenario for this T BA2C is the same as in the previous
chapters. The main difference is that the trust value is used in the decision-making pro-
cesses.
Figure 8.2 expresses the overview diagram of how to apply the T BA2C model in health-
care applications for Body Sensor Networks (BSNs) and WMSNs. Based on Figure 8.2, the
step-by-step process of user access to the targeted object is explained as follows:
1. A user sends an access request to the targeted object in the system.
2. PEP authenticates the user and forwards users’ attributes to a user behaviour trust
module. Simultaneously it sends a decision request to PDP for decisions regarding
data access.
3. The user behaviour trust module calculates the trust value of the user based on current
trust and previous trust. Thereafter, it sends the behaviour trust value to PDP. We
assume that the behaviour trust module is deployed in another sensor node that is
centrally located to calculate the trustworthiness value of the users.
4. PDP calls the access control engine and passes through the details (such as the re-
quested operation, the targeted object, the contextual information and the behaviour
trust value) to make decisions regarding data access.
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Fig. 8.2 Overview of T BA2C with Medical Application in Body Sensor Network
5. The access control engine returns permitted access or permitted access with obligation
or permitted access with overriding and obligation; (or denied access or denied access
with overriding and obligation, in which case a denied message is sent from PDP to
the user and the request terminates here).
6. PDP forwards the decision response to the targeted object.
7. The targeted object returns the results.
8. PDP returns the results to the user.
The following policies in Table 8.1 are identified and developed to evaluate the proposed
model. In table 8.1, “ob1” represents the medical record of a patient from “Heart” depart-
ment and “ob2” is the medical of the patient from “Cancer” department. “Oblg1” performs a
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Policy Role Department Time Condition Operation Oblg Object
1 Doctor Heart Any N.A. read N.A. ob1
2 Doctor Heart Any N.A. read N.A. ob2
3 Nurse Heart Any N.A. read N.A. ob1
4 Nurse Cancer Any N.A. read N.A. ob2
5 Doctor Heart Any (if T < 2.5) read Oblg1 ob1
6 Doctor Heart Any (if T < 2.5) read Oblg2 ob2
7 Nurse Heart Any (if T < 2.5) read Oblg1 ob1
8 Nurse Cancer Any (if T < 2.5) read Oblg1 ob2
9 Nurse Heart 9am ≤
and <
17pm
(if T ≥ 2.5) overrideread Oblg2 ob2
10 Nurse Cancer 9am ≤
and <
17pm
(if T ≥ 2.5) overrideread Oblg2 ob1
11 Admin Audit Any N.A. read N.A. Aclog
12 Admin Audit Any N.A. read N.A. Emlog
Table 8.1 Example of Defined Policy
course of action (Sending Notification Message) but for “Oblg2”, courses of actions (Send-
ing Notification Message and Triggering Alarm) are performed. “T” represents the trust
value of a user. In Table 8.1, policy 1, 2, 3 and 4 have the same definitions as the previous
chapters. In policy 5, 6, 7 and 8, an additional condition (trust criterion) is added in policy
1 to 4 to detect abnormal data access from authorised users. Simultaneously, the obligation
policy is activated when the user trust value is lower than 2.5 but the users can still access
the medical record.
In policy 9, the nurse from “Heart” department is not allowed to access the medical data
(ob2) of patient from another department (Cancer) unless the nurse overrides the access
policy for emergency data access. If his behaviour trust value is higher than or equal to 2.5,
the nurse’s overriding will be successful and the restricted access will be granted to him.
Otherwise, his restricted access will be denied. In either case, the obligation policy will be
activated to take a course of action. Policy 10 is for the nurse from “Cancer” department for
the overriding process. The administrator from “Audit” department can easily check both
access and emergency log to detect security policy violations and abnormal data access
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regarding policy 11 and 12.
8.4 Threat Model
The attacker-centric based threat model [87] is respected and commonly used. Defence
strategy is of course, improved if there is a reasonable understanding of how attackers think.
By thinking like attackers and being aware of their likely tactics, the system can be more
effective when applying countermeasures1. Several threats that can be faced in the appli-
cations can be categorised based on the goals of the attacks. Knowledge of these threats
can help to organise a security strategy and might be able to help plan responses to these
threats. In this section, the threat model is categorised based on STRIDE [86]. We analysed
the STRIDE model in the medical scenario as follows:
• Spoofing: Spoofing is attempting to gain access to a system by using a false identity.
This can be accomplished using stolen user credentials or false information. After
the attacker successfully gains access as a legitimate user, elevation of privileges can
begin. Example: A nurse pretends to be a doctor.
• Tampering: Tampering is the unauthorised modification of data but we did not ad-
dress it explicitly in this dissertation. Same considerations apply to write as to read.
Example: A nurse or doctor edits the medical record of a patient illegitimately.
• Repudiation: Repudiation is the ability of users to deny that they performed specific
actions. Without adequate auditing, repudiation attacks are difficult to prove. The
issue of repudiation is concerned with a user denying that he performed an action.
The defence mechanism is needed in place to ensure that all user activity can be
tracked and recorded. Lack of auditing and logging of changes made to data threatens
the ability to identify when changes were made and who made those changes.
Example: A nurse denies that he has edited the medical record.
• Information disclosure: Information disclosure is the unwanted exposure of private
data. Sensitive data need to be stored securely to prevent a malicious user from gain-
ing access to and reading the data. The disclosure of confidential data can occur when
sensitive data can be viewed by unauthorised users. Only authenticated and autho-
rised users should be able to access the data that is specific to them. Access to data
1A countermeasure is an action or technique that can reduce a threat and an attack by eliminating or
preventing it.
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Threat Countermeasure
Spoofing Strong Authentication (Attribute Based Encryption (ABE))
Tampering Strong Authorisation (ABE and Access Control)
Repudiation Audit Trials (Audit Record or Log)
Information Disclosure ABE and Access Control
Denial of Service Access Control
Elevation of Privilege Access Control
Table 8.2 Possible Threats and Countermeasures
should be restricted to users.
Example: Other staff members from the hospital try to read the medical record.
• Denial of Service: Denial of service is the process of making system resources un-
available.
Example: A common application layer DoS attack will send multiple simultaneous
requests for data access. These requests will most likely put the access control module
under DoS condition and the user will likely be unable to access the medical record.
• Elevation of privileges: Elevation of privilege occurs when a user with limited priv-
ileges uses the identity of a privileged user to gain access to a data resource.
Example: A nurse tries to access restricted data by using the fault identity.
Based on the above discussion, these threats and attacks are trying to violate the security
services such as confidentiality, integrity, authenticity, repudiation, etc. These threats and
attacks should be protected by using security mechanisms or countermeasures. A counter-
measure is a safeguard that addresses a threat and mitigates risk. Table 8.2 lists the security
threats that can violate the security services and the possible countermeasures to defend
against them in the proposed T BA2C model.
8.5 Experimental Results and Discussion
Figure 8.3 shows the interface and decision outcomes of a nurse “Aung", who works as a
day nurse in “Cancer” department, as observed from his path (/cancer/nurse/day/aung). Ad-
ditionally, the location path for the nurse is used as the current location of the users to show
that the trust value of the user can be varied based on the location and time range.
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Fig. 8.3 User Interface and Decision Outcomes of a Nurse
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Fig. 8.4 Authentication Process for Overriding Process
In the first case, the nurse from “Cancer” department tried to access the medical data
of a patient (ob2) from his department within time range. His access was approved and his
trust value was calculated and recorded (2.95) because he satisfied a normal authorisation
policy. In the second case, he tried to access the same data (ob2) but his physical location
is different from where he works and the time range. The total trust value of the user is
slightly decreased (2.53) from the previous case but he can still access the data because of
the normal authorisation policy.
In the third case, the nurse tried to access the medical record of a patient (ob1) from
another department (Heart) but he needed to override the policy to access the data. For the
overriding process, his trust value needs to be higher than 2.5, which is the defined value
in the system. Regardless of these outcomes, the obligations such as the triggering of an
alarm and sending of a notifying message will be activated and performed. If his trust value
is not high enough, the system message will appear in the interfaces as “The nurse does not
have the permission to access the medical record. No overriding access is allowed to that
user”. In this case, his access request is denied but the courses of action are still performed
regarding auditing purpose.
In the final case, the user satisfies the defined thresholds from the overriding policy but
here is an additional phase to provide further security services in the proposed model. This
means that a user needs to re-authenticate to gain access to confidential medical data. The
authentication interface and the confidential medical record interface can be seen in Figures
8.4 and 8.5. Overall, his access has been granted because of his behaviour trust value and
contextual information as well as the authentication phase in the final case.
Figure 8.3 not only shows the interface of the nurse but also explains how the access
decisions are made based on authorisation, obligation and overriding policies with the total
behaviour trust value of the users.
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Fig. 8.5 A Confidential Medical Record
8.6 Conclusion
This chapter proposed the Trust-Based Adaptive Access Control (T BA2C) model in which,
a user behaviour trust model from the previous chapter is applied to use the trust value
as one of the supporting factors for making access decisions in both authorisation policy
and overriding policy. Additionally, the trust value is used in authorisation policy to detect
abnormal data access from authorised users. This means that users still have access to
the medical record but when the trust value is lower than defined threshold, the system
assumes that it is an abnormal data access and activates an obligation policy. Regarding
the decision outcomes, the features of T BA2C model provides a flexible approach in WSNs.
Therefore, the proposed T BA2C model provides flexibility in the access control engine to
enforce access decision dynamically and to address the conflict between data availability
and data privacy in WSNs and WMSNs. To enable a full comparison with the proposed
T BA2C model, the Break-The-Glass Role Based Access Control (BTG-RBAC) [36] model
is redesigned and developed under Ponder2, which is discussed in the next chapter.
Chapter 9
BT G−AC: Break-The-Glass Access
Control Model
9.1 Introduction
In this chapter, a step-by-step development and an evaluation framework of Break-The-
Glass Role-Based Access Control (BTG-RBAC) [36] for Wireless Sensor Networks (WSNs)
is presented in order to make a meaningful comparison with the proposed Trust-Based
Adaptive Access Control (T BA2C) model because the BTG-RBAC model has a similar
structure as the proposed T BA2C model. Both models were developed and implemented in
the Ponder2 package. Firstly, the core RBAC model is discussed; followed by the core Role-
Based Access Control (RBAC) with obligations; and then the BTG-RBAC model. Finally,
the development framework of the BTG-RBAC model for WSNs in Ponder2 is presented.
Some modifications have been made on the BTG-RBAC model to fit the requirements of
WSN applications. The modified model has been named Break-The Glass Access Control
(BT G−AC).
9.2 A Core Role-Based Access Control Model
The American National Standards Institute (ANSI) standard core RBAC model [58] is a
standard access control model. Most of the access control models in information systems
are based on the core RBAC model. Before the details of BTG-RBAC are explained, some
basic information about core RBAC is presented. The BTG-RBAC model is an extended
version of core RBAC with some obligations. The overall picture of the core RBAC model
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can be seen in Figure 9.1.
Fig. 9.1 A Core RBAC Model
The core RBAC model has five basic elements: USERS, ROLES, SESSIONS, OPER-
ATIONS, and OBJECTS, and there are five relations between them. The five relations
between these elements are explained as follows:
• User-Assignment (UA): UA ∈ (belong to) USERS and ROLES, a many to many rela-
tions between users and roles
• User-Sessions (US): US (u : USERS) →nSESSIONS, a mapping of user (u) onto (n)
sessions
• Session-Roles (SR): SR (s : SESSIONS) → sROLES, a mapping of session (s) onto a
set of roles
• Permission-Assignment (PA): PA ⊆ (subset of) Permissions and ROLES, a many to
many relation between permissions and roles
• Permissions (PRMS): PRMS → p(OPERAT IONS)and(OBJECT S), the mapping between
permission and operations which gives a set of operations (ops) associated with the
permission p, (p : PRMS) → (ops ⊆ OPERATIONS) and the mapping between
permission and objects which gives a set of objects associated with permission (p
: PRMS) → (ob ⊆ OBJECTS)
The authorisation decision is made within the core RBAC model based on the inputs
of the current session, the requested operation and the targeted object. A result indicates
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whether the user request is authorised or not and it returns Boolean Value as a return value.
The equation of a decision-making process in core RBAC is explained as follows:
Access : SESSIONSxOPERAT IONSxOBJECT S→ Boolean (9.1)
The Access(s,op,ob) function is equivalent to:
∃r ∈ ROLES : r ∈ SR(s)
∧
((op,ob),r) ∈ PA (9.2)
This means that if a role (r) is mapped from the current session (s), that role (r) is al-
located the permission to perform the operation (op) on a targeted object (ob). If a value
exists in predefined roles, the function will return TRUE for permitted access and FALSE
for denied access as a boolean.
The step-by-step process of user access to the targeted object with the core RBAC model
is explained as follows:
1. A user sends an access request to the targeted object in the system.
2. The system authenticates the user.
3. The authentication service returns the authenticated identity of the user.
4. The system calls the RBAC policy engine and passes through the session details, the
requested operation and targeted object (9.1).
5. The RBAC engine returns GRANT; (or DENY, in which case a denied message is
sent from the system to the user and the request terminates here).
6. The system makes the requested operation to resource in the targeted object.
7. The targeted object returns the results.
8. The system returns the results to the user.
9.3 A Core Role-Based Access Control Model with Obli-
gations
In this model, a new basic element OBLIGATIONS (OBLGS) [151] is introduced to the
core RBAC. All of the basic five elements of the core RBAC function the same as in section
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9.2. There are some changes in the core RBAC model because of the new element OBLGS.
The overall diagram of the core RBAC with obligation model is shown in Figure 9.2.
Fig. 9.2 A Core RBAC with Obligations [151]
The relation and mapping between OPERATIONS and OBJECTS has been replaced
from Permission to Obligation Augmented Permissions (OPRMS), which is defined as fol-
lows:
OPRMS = PRMS x OBLGS
At the same time, the Permission-Assignment (PA) is changed to Permission-Obligations
Assignment (POA) because of the new element OBLGS. The POA definition is expressed
as follows:
POA ⊆ OPRMS x ROLES
oprm ∈ OPRMS is equivalent to oprm = (r, prm, oblgs). This means that if the permis-
sion (prm) is allocated to role (r) through obligation-augmented permission (oprm) which
is exercised by role (r), the obligations (oblgs) will be triggered. The obligations will be
used along with the authorisation decision. Therefore, the decision-making process (Access
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function) will be enhanced to:
Access : SESSIONSxOPERAT IONSxOBJECT S→ BooleanxOBLGS (9.3)
The possible results for the decision-making process (Access function) are explained as
follows:
• (TRUE) → Permitted access to an object.
• (TRUE, OBLGS) → Permitted access to an object and perform the obligation along
with authorisation decision.
• (FALSE) → Denied access to an object.
• (Flase, OBLGS) → Denied access to an object and perform the obligation along with
authorisation decision.
The step-by-step process of user access to the targeted object with the core RBAC with
obligations are the same as with the core RBAC model, which was already discussed in the
previous section. The added process to the core RBAC model is performing and retrieving
the obligations, if they exist in the predefined roles of the system.
9.4 Break-the-Glass Role-Based Access Control
The BTG-RBAC model is an extended version of the core RBAC with obligations by adding
Break-The-Glass (BTG) functionality [37] within the RBAC engine. Ferreira [36] intro-
duced the BTG-RBAC engine to integrate BTG in the core RBAC model. The overview
diagram of the BTG-RBAC model can be seen in Figure 9.3.
Based on Figure 9.3, there is an additional element called BTG. The relations between
elements have changed in the BTG-RBAC model. The Permission Obligation Assignment
(POA) from core RBAC with obligation is modified to POA-BTG in BTG-RBAC. Also there
is another relation between permissions (PRMS) and BTG namely PRMS-BTG = OPRMS
x BTG. A new modified relation (POA-BTG) is expressed as follows:
POA-BTG = PRMS-BTG x ROLES
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Fig. 9.3 A BTG-RBAC Model
Also the relation OPRMS is used in BTG-RBAC model where:
OPRMS⊆ OPRMS−BT G&OPRMS−BT G⊆ PRMSxBT GsxOBLGS (9.4)
The essential property of the BTG-RBAC model is that the BTG state variable of the
permission can be set to “TRUE” or “FALSE” depending on the predefined role, but ini-
tially it starts with a “FALSE” state. The state can be “TRUE” when there is a policy that
allows the user to perform a BTG operation on a targeted object. To perform the BTG oper-
ation, the new roles describing who is allowed to perform the BTG operation on the targeted
object are added. The obligations are added to the BTG operation (OBT G(op)) permission
that allow the administrator to define some actions to perform when the "glass is broken".
BTG state variables require a service that can reset “TRUE” to “FALSE”. It can be done
automatically and manually. Automatic resetting means that the access control engine itself
resets the BTG state variable to “FALSE” after a specified event has occurred but this event
must be specified by the administrator when creating the BTG policy. Based on Table 9.1,
the event could be the expiration of a time period such as 30 minutes or after an access
request has been made while the BTG state was “TRUE”. Automatically resetting the BTG
state to “FALSE” controls availability of a resource once the “the glass has been broken”
before additional access can be granted. Manually resetting means that human intervention
must occur before the BTG state is set from “FALSE” to “TRUE” after the access has been
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granted.
Role Operation Object Condition
r1 Read ob1 30mins
r2 Reset BTG State
Table 9.1 Example of BTG State Variables
Based on the above discussion, the BTG-RBAC model is considered to provide data
availability in emergency situations and it is also aimed at E-Health applications in general
wireless and wired networks. The BTG-RBAC model is implemented in PREMIS [106]
with MySQL [139] database but it is not suitable to use in WSNs because PREMIS must
be supplemented by metadata that can record detailed technical attributes of specific object
types or media and hardware, and it is difficult to automate creation of metadata structures
at present. Therefore, a modified version of BTG-RBAC is developed and implemented in
order to fit in WSNs.
9.5 BT G−AC: A Break-The Glass Access Control Model
in Ponder2
Based on the requirements of WSNs, the framework of the BTG-RBAC model was modified
and redesigned to function in WSNs, we call this Break-The-Glass Access Control (BT G−
AC), but it still has similar functions to those of the BTG-RBAC model. The main difference
is that the BT G−AC model has been developed and implemented within the Ponder2 policy
package.
9.5.1 Limitations in Ponder2
There are some limitations when developing the BT G−AC model in Ponder2.
• There is no BTG state variable in the modified version of BTG-RBAC. Instead, fixed
BTG states such as “TRUE” or “FALSE” are used in the modified version of BTG-
RBAC.
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• The BTG state is set up “TRUE” for some access control policy to perform the BTG
action. Additionally the administrator can change or modify the BTG state for a new
policy or existing policy.
• It is assumed that the authentication process is already provided in PEP because there
is no user log in process in the modified version of BTG-RBAC.
Apart from these limitations, the BTG-RBAC model was developed and implemented in
Ponder2. The decision-making process will be different for each user. Some users may be
able to access data without the BTG option. Some may have the BTG option to access the
data resource but the obligations, which have the same functionality as section 9.3, such as
notifying the manager, triggering an alarm and writing to an audit must be performed when
the users perform the BTG action. Additionally, the prevention and detection mechanism
discussed in chapter 6 is added in the BT G−AC model to detect security policy violations.
An overview of BT G−AC in the Ponder2 framework can be seen in Figure 9.4. There
are two main modules in the BT G−AC model: Policy Enforcement Point (PEP) and Policy
Decision Point (PDP). User requests will go through PEP and all the user information will
be forwarded to PDP for the decision-making processes the same as in the previous models.
The main difference is that the BTG policy is developed in the access control module.
Fig. 9.4 A BT G−AC Model
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9.5.2 Access Control Module
The access control module is used to enforce the policies for the decision-making process.
In the access control module, there are three different policies: authorisation, BTG and
obligation policy. In the BT G−AC model, BTG and the obligation policies are introduced to
make access decisions in normal as well as emergency situations. In normal access control
models, the decision outcomes will be either permitted access or denied access. The existing
decision outcomes are extended in BT G−AC as follows:
• (Permit, /0) → A user has permission to access the targeted object.
• (Permit, OBLGS) → A user is allowed to access the targeted object but an obligation
is performed when the access is given.
• (Deny, /0) → A user request to access the targeted object is denied.
• (Deny, OBLGS) → Alongside a denied access, some obligations are performed.
• (Permit, BTG * OBLGS)→ A user’s request for access has been granted by perform-
ing BTG action and obligations such as "Write to Audit", " Trigger the Alarm" or "A
Notification Message" are performed along with the access decision.
Based on the above decision outcomes, it is clear that the introduction of BTG and
obligation policy is beneficial for healthcare applications in WSNs. The following section
will explain the definition of the BTG policy and the obligation policy. The definition of
authorisation policy is the same as in chapter 6.
Break-the-Glass (BTG) Policy
A BTG policy is used to perform a BTG operation on a targeted object. To perform the
BTG operation, the new policy is added that describes who is allowed to perform a BTG
action for the targeted object, for instance, a confidential medical record of the patient in
an emergency but some obligations will be triggered and performed at the same time. The
administrator defines the BTG policy for each situation where the BTG action is required
by users in an emergency situation. An example BTG policy can be seen as follows:
Def: BTG Policy
subject Nurse
target ob3
action Read
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condition BTG state = TRUE
call Obligation Policy
Based on the above policy, it allows a user to access confidential data (ob1) even if he
does not have the access right but BTG state variable has to be “TRUE”. It is assumed that
the BTG policy is already defined in advance for these kinds of situations to perform BTG
action at the targeted object. If there is no BTG policy for that object, the user request will
not be granted.
Obligation Policy
An obligation policy is used along with authorisation decisions in some situations. It still
has the same property as section 9.3. The example of obligation policy is explained as
follows:
Def: Obligation-Policy
on auditrecord
if BTG action is performed
do write.audit < subject, Time, Target, User Role >
and reset BTG state to FALSE
and notify manager
The above obligation policy is used along with the BTG operation allowing an admin-
istrator to take actions when the "glass is broken". The obligation policy is linked with the
prevention and detection module to store the user information and his access request in an
audit log for detecting security policy violations.
9.5.3 Access Control Policy
A medical scenario is developed under the Ponder2 package to evaluate the BT G− AC
model for Body Sensor Networks (BSNs) and Wireless Medical Sensor Networks (WM-
SNs). In the medical scenario, there are two different types of data for each patient: con-
fidential medical records (ob3) and normal medical records (ob1). The access policies for
users’ access to these medical records will be different based on the access privileges and
roles of the users. Also different security levels are required in these medical records. Tight
policies might be used for confidential medical records to provide data privacy. Never-
theless, the access to even confidential data can be essential in some circumstances. For
example, the doctor should be able to access the confidential medical record of a patient
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when the nurse cannot but the decision can be changed to a positive decision if the nurse
performs the BTG actions.
Policy Role Operation Object BTG State Obligations
1 Doctor read ob1 N.A. N.A.
2 Doctor read ob3 N.A. oblg [Write to Audit]
3 Nurse read ob1 N.A. oblg [Write to Audit]
4 Nurse OBT G(read) ob3 TRUE oblg [Notify Manager;
Write to Audit; Reset
BTG to FALSE]
5 Admin resetBT G ob3 N.A. N.A.
6 Admin read log N.A. N.A.
Table 9.2 Example of BTG-RBAC policy
In Table 9.2, policy 1 states that a doctor is allowed to read object 1 (ob1). As in policy 2,
the doctor is allowed to access the confidential medical record (ob3) but an obligation such
as “Write to Audit" is activated. Policy 3 is allowed a nurse to read ob1 but it will trigger
one obligation that is “write to audit". In policy 4, the nurse is not permitted to access
the confidential data (ob3) unless he performs the BTG action in that object for emergency
data access, but the BTG state variable needs to be “TRUE” meaning that BTG is enabled.
Therefore, an extra BTG policy is needed for the nurse (see policy 5). Additionally, the
system will perform obligations such as “write to audit" and “reset BTG variable to FALSE".
This implies BTG = (TRUE or FALSE). Policy 5 is quite simple. It is allowed to reset the
BTG variable to “FALSE” to “TRUE” or “TRUE” to “FALSE”. Once the BTG operation
is used, the administrator needs to reset the BTG state variable of that user for the next
attempt. The administrator or manager can easily check the audit log to detect any use from
authorised and unauthorised users regarding policy 6.
9.5.4 Evaluation Framework Based on A Medical Scenario
In this section, user interface, BTG interface, the audit log interface for the prevention and
detection module and how the access decision was made based on different access policies
are presented with following screen shots.
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Fig. 9.5 Interface and Decision Outcomes for a Doctor
User Interface and Decision Outcomes
To evaluate the BT G−AC model for medical data in WSNs, the user interfaces were de-
veloped in the Ponder2 package. Based on Figure 9.5, a doctor (Aung) tries to access the
normal medical data of a patient (Alice). His access has been granted without any obliga-
tion. When he requests access to the confidential data, his requested information will be
stored as an audit log to detect any security breaches of that user.
Different access policies are applied for a nurse. Figure 9.6 shows the interface of a
nurse (Htoo). Based on Figure 9.6, the nurse can access the normal medical record of a
patient (Alice) but one obligation action is triggered and activated when the access is given.
The nurse does not have access rights to the confidential medical data unless the BTG policy
is used to make an authorisation decision as in urgent or emergency circumstances. At the
same time, obligations are triggered and activated. The management teams can check the
audit log to prevent and detect security violations.
BTG Interface
Simple interfaces for the BTG action are developed. When a nurse wants to perform a
BTG action to access patients’ confidential data, the BTG interface will appear. The user’s
attempt to gain access will be notified to the user and his management team and necessary
actions will be taken for security purpose. A confirmation message will appear twice before
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Fig. 9.6 Interface and Decision Outcomes for a Nurse
the access is given to the nurse. The interfaces for BTG action are shown in Figure 9.7.
Fig. 9.7 Interfaces for BTG
Audit Log Interface
The interface of an audit log can be seen in Figure 9.8. This Figure shows what kind of
information and data are stored in the audit log. The first audit log shows that the nurse
accessed the normal medical record of Alice. In the second log, the same nurse requested
access to the confidential medical record by performing the BTG action and his access was
granted. A doctor who accessed a confidential medical record was granted access as can
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be seen in the audit log of that patient. All the access requests to the medical records are
recorded based on the user access requests. Based on the audit log, the management teams
can check which users performed the BTG action and who among these were granted access
to the confidential medical records.
Fig. 9.8 An Interface for an Audit Log
9.6 Conclusion
The overall contributions of this chapter are the design and development of the BT G−AC
model for medical data in WSNs so as to allow a meaningful comparison with T BA2C. The
concepts of BTG and obligation policy can provide data availability in emergency situa-
tions. The access control module and prevention and detection module have been found to
cooperate together to make an access decision and record a user’s accountability for unau-
thorised information release from both authorised and unauthorised users. Based on the
decision outcomes with a medical scenario, the BTG-RBAC model proposed by Ferreira
et al. [37] can be applied for medical data in WSNs after some changes within the access
control engine are made. A weakness of BT G−AC is that a human decision is needed to
predefine BTG policy for each object regarding emergency data access, unlike the T BA2C
model. A detailed comparison of T BA2C and BT G−AC is discussed in the next chapter.
Chapter 10
Comparison Between T BA2C and
BT G−AC Models
10.1 Introduction
This chapter recapitulates both Trust-Based Adaptive Access Control (T BA2C) and Break-
The-Glass Access Control (BT G−AC) and makes a comparison based on the evaluation
criteria. Additionally, the evaluation criteria are discussed for both T BA2C and BT G−AC
models.
10.2 Evaluation Based on Features
In this section, the criteria used for the comparison and evaluation of both T BA2C and
BT G−AC models are studied. To make a meaningful comparison, the evaluation criteria
such as the network architecture model, the concepts and approaches, the decision out-
comes, the access control policy and role, the data confidentiality and data privacy, and the
data availability are discussed.
10.2.1 Network Architecture Model
Access control models can be different based on their network architecture model when the
cryptographic keys, roles, policies and attributes are distributed to users from the trusted
authority or controller. The T BA2C model has been developed in Ponder2 [129], which is
implemented as a Self-Managed Cell (SMC). The assumption is made that the SMC is used
as a sensor and the access control engine is developed inside it. This means that each sensor
112 Comparison Between T BA2C and BT G−AC Models
is deployed with the access control engine to make an effective decision within itself based
on the users’ request but the data aggregator is deployed centrally for the trust evaluation to
support in the access control engine. Therefore, the T BA2C model is not fully distributed
but it can make and adjust access decisions dynamically. The BT G−AC model is based on
a centralised approach because each sensor node cannot store all the possibilities of defined
situations and BTG operations to provide the data availability in the system. Therefore, the
assumption is made that one SMC is used as data aggregator to store all the policies to make
the decision effectively and it performs as a centralised access control manager in WSNs.
10.2.2 Concepts and Approaches
Both T BA2C and BT G−AC models use different concepts and approaches to fill the re-
search gaps and the requirements of the application in WSNs. The similarity between these
two WSN access control models is that both aim to provide data availability in emergency
and unanticipated situations. An outline of the concepts and approaches for these two mod-
els can be seen in Table 10.1.
T BA2C
BT G−AC
- Role Based Access Control - Role Based Access Control
- Discretionary Overriding of Access Control - Break-The-Glass concept
- User Behaviour Trust Model
- Prevention and Detection Mechanism
Table 10.1 The Concepts and Approaches for T BA2C and BT G−AC
There is limited local decision-making capability in current WSN access control models
because it is impossible to define in advance the possible denied and permitted access for
all situations, especially in WMSNs and WSNs. T BA2C is based on the concept of the dis-
cretionary overriding by Rissanen et al. [110] to provide flexibility in access control engine
and to adjust access decisions dynamically based on the user behaviour trust value.
Li-qin et al. [74] mentioned that predicting user behaviour is important and significant
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in forming a trustworthy network. Measuring user behaviour is difficult to evaluate and
manage and is a new research issue in WSNs. In the T BA2C model, a simple user behaviour
trust model is proposed based on weighted running average algorithm that evaluate the to-
tal trust value of users based on current users’ information and their previous trust value.
For the current behaviour trust value, the geometric mean is used to evaluate based on user
behaviour information. In addition, the trust values are used in both authorisation and over-
riding policy to check whether the users are trustworthy and untrustworthy to detect security
policy violations by integrating with the prevention and detection mechanism and the obli-
gation policy. Therefore, the T BA2C model is proposed based on the above three concepts to
address the conflict between data availability and data privacy, and to detect security policy
violations.
The BT G− AC model uses core RBAC with obligation and BTG concept to make
decisions regarding access for emergency and unanticipated situations. The authorisation
decision-making process is made within the core RBAC engine based on the inputs of the
current section, the requested operation and the target object. The main idea of the BTG
concept is to allow the users emergency and urgent access to the system when a normal
authentication process does not perform or work perfectly. This means that, if the users
face in emergency and unanticipated situation, they break-the-glass to bypass access control
for urgent data access. Unlike T BA2C, the emergency data access in BT G−AC is based on
predefined BTG state variables (TRUE or FALSE). This means that, the administrator needs
to define BTG state variables for users in advance. This is only for one time use and the
administrator needs to reset the BTG state variable for the next attempt. Therefore, some
kind of user interactions are still involved in BT G−AC and there is no mechanism to detect
abnormal data access from authorised users.
The BTG concept can provide flexibility in access control engines to a certain extent.
The features of the BTG concept can be provided in the T BA2C model by simply changing
and defining BTG state variables. In the BT G−AC, whether the users can perform BTG
action in emergency and unanticipated situations are based on BTG state variables (TRUE
or FALSE). In T BA2C, the condition of trust value from the overriding policy can be used
and changed to boolean values (TRUE for activating BTG action and FALSE for deactivat-
ing BTG action). Instead of using the trust value of users for the overriding process, the
binary values can be used as the condition for whether the users can perform BTG action or
overriding action in unanticipated situations. Therefore, the properties of BT G−AC model
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can be easily applied in the framework of T BA2C.
10.2.3 Access Control Policy
Generally, there are different policies in each access control model. In this subsection,
the way in which the access control policies are defined in both T BA2C and BT G−AC is
presented. Both models address how to provide data availability service in emergency and
unanticipated situations in WSNs. Therefore, the policies that relate to data access for emer-
gency and unanticipated situations are discussed here.
Policy Role Department Time Condition Operation Oblg Object
1 Nurse Cancer 9am ≤
and <
17pm
(if T ≥ 2.5) overrideread Oblg2 ob3
2 Admin Any Any N.A. read N.A. Aclog
3 Nurse Cancer 9am ≤
and <
17pm
T = TRUE overrideread Oblg2 ob3
Table 10.2 Example of T BA2C Policy
Based on Table 10.2, policy “1” in T BA2C allows a nurse from “Cancer” department to
access the confidential data (ob3) in emergency and unanticipated situations but some obli-
gations will be activated. Based on policy “1”, the nurse can override access policy but the
restricted access will be only granted to that user when his behaviour trust value is greater
than or equal to 2.5. The administrator can easily check the audit log to detect security
violations from authorised users based on policy 2. Policy 3 shows that the property of
BT G−AC model can be provided in T BA2C by modifying the condition of trust criterion
to boolean value that uses as BTG state variable (TRUE for activating BTG state and False
for deactivating).
Unlike T BA2C, the BT G−AC model has an additional policy to perform BTG action
for emergency and unanticipated situations. The defined policy of BT G−AC can be seen in
Table 10.3. In policy “1”, the user is not permitted to access the confidential data (ob3) un-
less he performs the BTG action in that object for emergency data access, but the BTG state
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Policy Role Operation Object BTG
State
Obligations
1 Nurse OBT G(read) ob3 TRUE oblg [Notify Manager;
Write to Audit; Reset
BTG to FALSE]
2 Admin resetBT G ob3 N.A. N.A.
3 Admin read log N.A. N.A.
Table 10.3 Example of BT G−AC policy
variable needs to be “TRUE” meaning that BTG is enabled. Therefore, an extra BTG role
is needed for the nurse. Additionally, some obligations will be activated when "the glass
is broken". Policy 2 is quite simple. It is allowed to reset the BTG variable to “FALSE”
to “TRUE” or “TRUE” to “FALSE”. Policy 3 allows the administrator to check the audit log.
Based on the above discussion, the policy definition for both T BA2C and BT G−AC has
a similar structure. The weakness of the BT G−AC model is that an additional policy is
needed for each user to perform BTG operation for emergency access. As a result, the BTG
policy needs to be considered in advance and predefined before the system is running in
real-time.
10.2.4 Decision Outcomes
In T BA2C, the existing decision outcomes in current access control models such as permitted
access and denied access are extended into five different outcomes because of the overriding
policy with the user behaviour trust value and the prevention, and detection mechanism.
This also means that the access decision can be dynamically adjusted by using authorisation,
overriding and obligation policy based on the user behaviour trust value and the contextual
information. These decision outcomes are explained as follows:
• Permitted Access: A user access request has been permitted.
• Denied Access: A user access request has been denied. The user is not allowed to
access the resources.
• Permitted Access with Obligation: A user access request has been permitted but an
obligation is executed when data access is given to that user especially for important
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and confidential information.
• Permitted Access with Overriding and Obligation: A user does not have privilege to
access the resources but his request will be granted if he overrides policy within some
constraints. The obligation policies are activated when access is granted to the user.
• Denied Access with Overriding and Obligation: A user access will be denied, if he
tries to override the policy and does not satisfy some thresholds from that policy. At
the same time, the obligations such as write to audit, etc. will be performed.
Based on the above discussion, it is clear that the introduction of the overriding policy
with the user behaviour trust value can provide flexibility in access control engines and can
make access decisions effectively by extending the existing decision outcomes with certain
degrees of prevention and detection for both defined and unanticipated situations but the
T BA2C model has to set the defined trust value for the overriding process.
In the BT G−AC model, the decision outcomes are extended because of the additional
policies such as BTG policy and obligation policy. The decision outcomes are stated as
follows.
• (Permit, /0) → A user has permission to access the targeted object.
• (Permit, OBLGS) → A user is allowed to access the targeted object but an obligation
is executed when the access is given.
• (Deny, /0) → A user’s request to access the targeted object is denied.
• (Deny, OBLGS) → Alongside a denied access, some obligations are performed.
• (Permit, BTG * OBLGS)→ A user’s request for access has been granted by perform-
ing BTG action and obligations such as "Write to Audit", " Trigger the Alarm" or "A
Notification Message" are performed along with access decision.
Based on the above discussion, it is clear that the introduction of BTG and obligation
policy in BT G−AC is beneficial for WSNs. Unlike T BA2C, the BT G−AC model needs an
additional policy to perform a BTG operation for each user, which requires all the possible
data access to be defined in advance.
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10.2.5 Data Confidentiality and Data Privacy
In T BA2C, the assumption is made that Attribute-Based Encryption (ABE) [20] is used for
data storage as well as authentication services. This means that data confidentiality and
privacy are provided in normal situations. To provide data privacy and confidentiality in
emergency and unanticipated situation, the T BA2C model uses the prevention and detection
mechanism and the user behaviour trust value together. In this model, the user behaviour
trust value is evaluated in each user’s access request. Only trusted users, who satisfy the
thresholds from the system, can have access to requested data in emergency situations. On
the other hand, if someone abuses the system or behaves unacceptably, the risk of damaging
that data is higher than in normal data access. In addition, the prevention and detection
mechanism keeps all the user information from the requested access in an audit log for the
auditing purposes because security breaches can happen at any time. Two audit logs are used
in the T BA2C model: emergency log to detect security policy violations that are related to
the overriding process and access log to detect the abnormal data access from authorised
users. The system will assume as abnormal data access, when the user behaviour trust value
is lower than defined value in the normal authorisation processes but the user can still access
the medical record in these cases.
Unlike T BA2C, BT G−AC is proposed especially for emergency situations but it can be
extended by applying a suitable cryptographic method for data confidentiality. However,
when users perform BTG actions, there is no facility to protect the privacy of users’ infor-
mation. Therefore, a careful consideration of data confidentiality and data privacy is needed
in the BT G−AC model for both normal and emergency situations.
10.2.6 Data Availability
Both T BA2C and BT G−AC models are designed for making access decisions dynamically
in emergency and unanticipated situations. In the T BA2C model, the decisions regarding
access can be evaluated and adjusted effectively, based on policies such as authorisation,
obligation and overriding. Especially in emergency situations, the user behaviour trust
value and the overriding policy are used to make and adjust access decisions effectively
and efficiently. For emergency or urgent data access, the user has to override the denial of
access based on predefined thresholds and the user behaviour trust value. This means that
the decision-making process can be dynamically adjusted and effectively evaluated regard-
ing data access because of the introduction of the overriding policy with the user behaviour
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trust value. No human interaction is needed in order to override access policy for emergency
situations in the T BA2C model apart from the defining trust value in the system.
BT G−AC has similar properties to T BA2C but human interaction is still needed; as
well, the BTG role needs to be predefined in advance for emergency situations. Users need
extra roles (such as defining BTG state variables) for breaking-the-glass in unexpected and
unanticipated situations. BTG policy is designed to provide extra access decisions for users
when they are needed for emergency and urgent data access.
10.3 Conclusion
This chapter recapitulates both T BA2C and BT G−AC models to make a comparison be-
tween them based on the evaluation criteria. Current WSN access control models are not
flexible enough to adjust access decisions dynamically for any situation. The advantage
of both T BA2C and BT G− AC is that data availability is provided in normally defined
situations as well as emergency situations; however, some restrictions and limitations are
applied to the BT G−AC model regarding BTG state variables that need to be predefined.
This means that additional processes are required for the BTG model. As well, an addi-
tional policy is needed to activate the BTG operation for each user. The T BA2C model is
only suitable for high-end sensor devices. In addition, extra storage is required for the user
behaviour trust evaluation. As well, a fixed infrastructure is required for T BA2C to apply
in WSNs because of both discretionary overriding process and user behaviour trust model,
but it address the conflict between data availability and data privacy, and can detect abnor-
mal data access. Based on the previous chapters, the next chapter concludes with research
contributions and possible directions for future work.
Chapter 11
Conclusion
11.1 Introduction
This chapter reviews the contributions made in this dissertation to the Wireless Sensor Net-
work (WSN) research community. The Trust-Based Adaptive Access Control (T BA2C)
model is very generic and due to the flexibility of the decision-making process regarding
data access, there are many more application areas that it could be applied to. Accordingly,
some further developments of T BA2C to provide further security services are discussed.
Finally, the conclusion is drawn.
11.2 Research Summary
At the beginning of this research, gaps were identified on the main problems and weakness
among WSN access control models. These problems constituted the basis for the research
explored during the course of this dissertation. The main objectives of this research work
are to design flexible access control roles and policies that can address the conflict between
data availability and data privacy during emergency and unanticipated situations, and to de-
velop a new access control model that can make and adjust access decisions effectively and
efficiently based on the aforementioned policies. To achieve this, the access control policies
need to integrate both application requirements and user needs. These needs can be very
complex to gather and integrate within an access control policy, but they are crucial never-
theless.
This research proceeded to study the possible approaches to achieve these objectives
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and to develop and design a new decentralised access control model to address the research
issues in the WSN research community. Firstly, the adaptive access control model was de-
veloped based on the concept of discretionary overriding to address the data availability
issue in healthcare applications for WSNs because the lack of data availability can result in
further decline in patients’ conditions. In the healthcare industry, security is the degree of
protection against danger, loss, damage and criminal activity. Therefore, we extended the
adaptive access control model with prevention and detection mechanisms to detect security
policy violations, and the concept of obligation to take a course of action when a restricted
access is granted or denied. However, there is no consideration for privacy of patients’ infor-
mation because data availability is prioritised to the first place in the adaptive access control
model.
To address the conflict between data availability and data privacy, this research proposed
the Trust-based Adaptive Access Control (T BA2C) model that integrates the concept of trust
into the previous model. A simple user behaviour trust model is developed to calculate the
behaviour trust value which is used as one of the defined thresholds to override access policy
for data availability purpose. The trust model can also protect data privacy because only the
user who satisfies the relevant trust threshold, can get a restricted access even in emergency
and unanticipated situations. Notwithstanding, the T BA2C model is easy to adapt with other
trust models in WSNs instead of using a simple behaviour trust model from chapter 7.
Ponder2 was used to develop the T BA2C model gradually, starting from a simple access
control model to the full T BA2C. In Ponder2, a Self-Managed Cell (SMC) simulates a
sensor node with the T BA2C engine inside it. From efforts to find any similar such systems,
this project is confident that the proposed T BA2C model is the first to realise a flexible
access control engine and to address the conflict between data availability and data privacy
by combining the concepts of discretionary overriding, the user behaviour trust model, and
the prevention and detection mechanism together.
11.3 Contribution to Knowledge
The main contribution to the WSN research community that this work makes is the Trust-
Based Adaptive Access Control model (T BA2C) model itself. The T BA2C model is con-
veyed in this dissertation via medical application and comprised the following significant
contributions:
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• The introduction of overriding policy based on a user behaviour trust value and con-
textual information is the main novel element of the proposed T BA2C model. The
discretionary overriding concept to address data availability issue is not a new idea
for wireless networks but it has not been introduced and applied in WSNs before.
The novel usage of the discretionary overriding concept with user behaviour trust in
adjusting decisions regarding data access for emergency and unanticipated situations
is a new concept.
• The combination of the discretionary overriding concept and the behaviour trust model
is a possible solution that helps to address the conflict between data availability and
data privacy by using the behaviour trust value as one of the defined thresholds in the
access policies. Only the trusted user, who satisfies these thresholds including trust
value, can get a restricted access in emergency and unanticipated situations.
• The framework of the proposed T BA2C model provides a flexible approach in access
control engines to make access decisions effectively and immediately in both defined
and unanticipated situations. Additionally, the usage of user behaviour monitoring
and the prevention and detection mechanism can detect security policy violations such
as unauthorised information release, unnecessary overriding process and abnormal
data access from both authorised and unauthorised users. The use of a behaviour trust
value in an authorisation policy is a possible approach to detect abnormal data access
from authorised users.
• The concepts of possibility-with-override and the user behaviour trust model could
become the foundation for further implementation of access control engines in WSNs
as well as other systems requiring access control.
The overall contribution of this research work is that it has successfully designed a novel
decentralised access control model to make and adjust access decisions effectively and effi-
ciently whenever the system faces unexpected and unanticipated situations.
11.4 Research Limitations
Some limitations during the course of this research are worth mentioning. The proposed
T BA2C model is developed in the Ponder2 package using SMC as a sensor, which consists
of a set of hardware and software components that represent an administrative domain, as
122 Conclusion
a sensor node. In future, the proposed T BA2C model is considered for implementation in
actual sensor nodes.
11.5 Recommendations for Future Work
This section outlines some further possible concepts and approaches which can apply in the
T BA2C model to provide further security services.
11.5.1 Attribute Based Encryption (ABE)
In future, ABE based encryption is considered to be applied in T BA2C for user’s authenti-
cation process. Additionally, the ABE approach will use to encrypt the collected and sensed
data at sensor nodes to provide data confidentiality. Sahai and Waters [50] proposed the
ABE scheme to model and design a scalable and flexible access control system. ABE is a
public key cryptography primitive generalising Identity-Based Encryption (IBE) [47] that
is associated with a user’s identity in a single user message. In ABE, a group of users is
described by the combination of several descriptive attributes and access structures, which
is also called an attribute policy. In ABE, the public key encryption is based on one-to-
many encryption. There are two different types of ABE proposed by Sahai and Waters [50],
namely Key-Policy ABE (KP-ABE) and Ciphertext-Policy ABE (CP-ABE). In KP-ABE,
sensed and stored data in the sensor node are encrypted with a set of attributes; the user’s
private key is associated with an access structure that specifies which types of ciphertexts
the key can decrypt. Only the users that have the right access structure and the key can
access and decrypt the encrypted data. In CP-ABE, the ciphertext is associated with the
access structure. The user’s private key is associated with the attributes that specify which
type of ciphertext the key can decrypt. Some ABE-based fine-grained access control models
use ECC for key management and distribution.
The users and sensor nodes need to receive keys, access structure and attributes from
Distributed Centres (DCs). All DCs are disjointed from each other, so the user can only
obtain certain types of attributes and access structure from each DC. Based on the ABE
scheme, a user needs to show his or her identification (ID) to each DC to gain access struc-
tures and secret keys. In this case, the user’s ID can be the Medium Access Control (MAC)
address of his or her Personal Digital Assistant (PDA), personal computer or any other
unique identity. Each user may have different access structures from a DC that depend on
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how much data or what kind of information the user wants to access from a sensor node.
The access privileges and access structure will be different, based on user roles and respon-
sibilities. Sensor nodes are preloaded with attributes and public keys from DCs. A public
key associated with attributes, is used for data encryption in a sensor node.
Fig. 11.1 An Access Structure
For example in a medical scenario, the sensor nodes are usually deployed to collect
medical information from a certain location. Each sensor node may be responsible for
collecting specific types of data such as cardiology information, blood pressure and heart
rate. Sensor nodes may also have their owners, i.e., a person who takes care of them.
Hence, it can be specified that sensor nodes use these attributes such as location = (hospital
or home), data type = (blood pressure, cardiology information, heart rate), action = (read,
write, update, etc.). This further enables data access privileges of users to be specified based
on these attributes. In the above example, the access structure of a user may be designated as
”location is hospital OR home AND data type is cardiology OR blood pressure AND actions
are read OR write OR update”, which allows the users to obtain data within the hospital area.
In addition, other requirements such as a user having to possess at least two or three of these
roles (general physician, physician, doctor, nurse, chemist, etc) can be provided for further
security purposes. An overview diagram of the access structure based on the ABE approach
can be seen in Figure 11.1 for data encryption and authentication purposes.
11.5.2 Re-authentication or Continuous Authentication
In most cases, once a user is initially authenticated, the system or mechanism has no effec-
tive method to verify that the current user is the same authenticated user during real time
system usage. Therefore, user re-authentication is needed as another layer of security and
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the system needs to intelligently identify any changes of the users. Masquerading is an im-
portant factor for identity theft in current authentication systems because there is a lack of
a mechanism to prevent and detect it. There are many proposed re-authentication systems
[23], [66], [65], [24], [60], [30] for wireless networks. Among them, the location based re-
authentication process [66] is suitable for WSNs because the sensor nodes have capability
to capture and record the current user’s location. In location-based re-authentication, the
users’ location information is continuously checked to ensure the users’ claimed location is
the same as their actual location in order to verified to prevent a masquerading attack.
In T BA2C, the location of users is continuously sensed after the users are authenticated.
If a user changes location in that period, the current session that the user already authenti-
cated for is expired, so the user needs to re-authenticate to check and obtain data from the
network. The advantage is that the sensor node can sense and store multi-media informa-
tion. Because of this, the re-authentication process can be easily accomplished in WSNs
and WMSNs.
11.5.3 Predicted Users’ Behaviour Trust
Even the T BA2C model is capable of working with other trust models in WSNs, the pre-
dicted user’s behaviour trust value is considered as another possible factor to extend a sim-
ple behaviour trust model in chapter 7 for the evaluation of the total behaviour trust value.
Li-qin et al. [74] mentioned that predicting user behaviour is important and significant in
forming a trustworthy network. Measuring user behaviour is difficult to evaluate and man-
age and is a new research issue in WSNs. A simple proposed trust model in chapter 7 is
calculated the behaviour trust value based on the current trust value and previous trust value.
In future, the current user information from the recent transaction and previous user infor-
mation from the audit log that is stored in the prevention and detection mechanism can be
used for the evaluation of predicted trust. Bayesian Network [94] and Naive-Bayes clas-
sifier [25] are considered to apply for an evaluation of the predicted trust in the proposed
trust model. Bayesian Network and Naive-Bayes in general are relationship networks that
use statistical methods to represent probability relationships between different entities. It is
a compact representation of a joint probability distribution for reasoning under uncertainty.
Bayesian Network and Naive Bayes provide a flexible method to present differentiated trust
and combine different aspects of trust.
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Yuan et al. [145], [146] introduced a dynamic trust model based on the Naive Bayes
classifier for ubiquitous environments to prevent illegal nodes from joining a network. The
prior probability and past interaction history formula and expression can be applied in the
proposed trust model for evaluation of predicted user behaviour trust value. Prior probabil-
ity reflects the acceptance level based on different user criteria. Past interaction history is
the system’s prior knowledge of acceptance based on the decision-making process.
Fig. 11.2 A New Framework of the User Behaviour Trust Module
Current user information from the requested query and previous user information from
the audit log can be used for both prior probability and past interaction history to evaluate
the predicted behaviour trust value in the proposed model. An overview diagram of the pro-
posed user behaviour trust model can be seen in Figure 11.2. Classification algorithms such
as Bayesian Network and Naive-Bayes, can be applied in T BA2C to evaluate the predicted
trust.
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11.5.4 Risk Assessment
In T BA2C, risk assessment can be applied in the access control module as another key com-
ponent for the decision-making process. The definition of risk can be different, based on
how the risk assessment module is designed and what kind of information is used for the
risk evaluation process. In T BA2C, the risk analysis can be done and identified regarding
current trust value, previous trust value and user information such as role, location and time.
To define a set of risk analysis functions for the risk assessment module, a careful con-
sideration of situations and threats that may lead to risk is needed. In addition, appropriate
functions and methods are needed to evaluate or calculate the risk value based on recog-
nised situations and treats. In the risk assessment module, risk value will be compared with
defined thresholds and then evaluated for the final result. It will be forwarded to the access
control module to use as one of the supporting factors for the decision-making process.
11.6 Conclusion
This chapter has reviewed this thesis’s contributions to the WSN research community and
possible extensions to improve the T BA2C model. The proposed T BA2C model is easy
to adapt with other concepts to provide further security services in WSNs. This chapter
has also discussed possible extensions to modify the proposed model as pathways for future
work. Suggestions are given for further research into features that move beyond the scope of
this work such as the Attribute-Based Encryption (ABE) scheme for the user authentication
process as well as data storage; a complex classification algorithm to evaluate and calculate
the predicted trust value of users; and risk assessment for real-world applications in WSNs
and WMSNs.
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ABSTRACT 
Wireless Sensor Networks (WSNs) have attracted a lot of interest 
in the research community because of their wide range of 
applications. Due to the distributed nature of WSNs and their 
deployment in remote areas, these networks are vulnerable to 
numerous security threats that can adversely affect their proper 
functioning. Access control is a critical security service in WSNs to 
prevent unauthorised access from the users. Current access control 
models in WSNs cannot make access control decisions efficiently 
and effectively when the system faces unexpected and 
unanticipated events because access control decisions are based on 
predefined access policies and roles. Sometimes, users may need to 
access stored data for emergency and immediate data access but the 
system cannot grant access to this kind of users' request. Based on 
the needs of real world requirements, we propose an adaptive 
access control model that builds on the concepts of overriding 
access privileges and user behaviour monitoring to provide a 
flexible approach in the access control model. The proposed access 
control model will adapt to unanticipated events by using privilege 
overriding and adjust its decision based on users' behaviour. The 
proposed approach can make an access control model much 
flexible and also detect abnormal users' request from the authorised 
users. To the best of our knowledge, the proposed access control 
model is the first to realize the flexibility of access control model 
by using the concept of possibility-with-override and users' 
behaviour monitoring in WSNs.   
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1.  INTRODUCTION 
Wireless Sensor Networks (WSNs) consist of hundreds or even 
thousands of distributed, autonomous, low power, low cost and 
small sized devices each with sensing, processing and 
communicating capabilities to monitor the real world environment 
and collect information through infra-structureless ad-hoc wireless 
network. Sensor networks are envisioned to play an important role 
in a wide variety of areas ranging from critical military surveillance 
applications to forest fire monitoring.  
 
Nowadays, a sensor node has a capability of sensing data from 
environments and storing data locally in a distributed fashion or 
transmitting to central storage in a centralised approach. Stored 
data from sensor nodes are vulnerable and should keep secretly. In 
addition, access to the sensed and stored data needs to protect 
against from the unauthorized users. In many applications, data 
sensed by sensor nodes are related to security and privacy issue and 
should be accessible only to the authorised users. Users’ access to 
that valuable data will be different based on access privileges of 
those users. Therefore, data confidentiality and control access to 
that data are two main requirements to provide in WSNs.  
 
This paper focuses on access control in WSNs- i.e., how to prevent 
unauthorised data access from the users. Li and Gong [1] pointed out 
that WSNs suffer from many constraints like limited energy 
resources, memory, and low computation capability that impose 
unique security challenges and make innovative approaches 
desirable. Security techniques and access control models in other 
wireless technologies cannot be applied directly in WSNs because of 
its unique characteristic. As a result, existing security mechanisms 
and access control models are inadequate, ineffcient and new 
security approaches and access control models are desirable for 
WSNs. Towards addressing this challenges, this paper will propose 
an adaptive access control model with privileges overriding and 
behaviour monitoring, specially designed for WSNs.  
 
2. BACKGROUND 
Most of the current access control models in WSNs used traditional 
Role-Base Access Control model (RBAC) [2] to control user data 
access where roles and policies need to be defined in advance 
before the system makes an access decision. The decision is binary: 
denied access or permitted access. RBAC model has been widely 
accepted as a policy based access control model and it is suitable 
for most commercial applications. Some access control models use 
cryptographic methods for data storage and data access control but 
the systems still need to predefine attributes, roles and policies. In 
reality, it is impossible to predefine all the access needs for real 
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world applications because there may be unexpected events 
occurring in any situation and at any time.  
 
There might be many situations, which cannot be defined in 
traditional RBAC model and cryptography based systems. For 
example, the roles and policies for emergency and unexpected 
situations cannot be defined in advance. When the system faces this 
kind of situations, what will the system do? In most of the 
emergency and urgent cases, the users cannot wait until someone 
comes and accesses data to the data sources. For real world 
applications, the system needs to be flexible enough to make access 
decisions based on unusual situations as well as on normal defined 
situations. In WSNs, using RBAC model cannot fulfill the 
requirements of the real world application. Therefore, a new access 
control model needs to introduce and develop for achieving the 
flexibility of access control in WSNs. 
 
3. ADAPTIVE ACCESS CONTROL MODEL   
In this section, a new access control model is proposed and named 
as an adaptive access control model with privileges overriding and 
behaviour monitoring. Adaptive access control model is an 
emerging concept that builds on the concepts of fine-grained access 
control, user behaviour monitoring and overriding access 
permissions to provide a flexible approach in access control. The 
proposed adaptive access control model can dynamically grant, 
deny and override permission based on overriding concept and user 
behaviour monitoring. 
 
The main idea of the proposed approach is giving capabilities to the 
sensor nodes for making access decision and overriding access 
privileges in order to provide flexibility in the access control 
whenever unanticipated events occur at the sensor nodes. Possible, 
permit and deny access policies will be declared in the system, 
apart from that policies the system will use possibility-with-
override [4] policies. In current access control models, all access 
decisions for users' request are depended on the predefined roles 
and policies. Comparing with current models, our proposed access 
control model can make overriding access decisions on any events 
based on user behaviour’s trust value. 
 
In the proposed model, the powerful sensor nodes may check user 
behaviour information whenever the user tries to access data at the 
sensor node. Users' permit access may be overridden to deny access 
by the access control model at sensor nodes because of their 
behaviour, even if the users possess the right access privileges. A 
central server will evaluate and calculate users' behaviour trust 
value and send it to all the base stationa in the sensor network by 
using broadcast communication. The proposed model aims to 
prevent the unauthorized, unusual and abnormal access from the 
users by using users' behaviour trust value. The proposed model is 
trying to achieve flexibility of the access control for making access 
decisions quickly and efficiently at the sensor node. 
 
3.1 Overriding Access Privileges 
In the proposed model, the owner of sensors' node will give an 
institutional power to the sensor node for decision-making process 
in the emergency and unexpected situations. There is a limited 
local decisions making capability in the current access control 
models because it is impossible to define the possibility of denial 
and permit access policies for all the situations. "Overriding of 
access control is one way for handling such hard to define and 
unanticipated situations where availability is critical" 
(J. Alqatawna et al) [3].  
 
The propose model is based on the concept of discretionary 
overriding of access control by Rissanen et al [4]. When the system 
administrators pre-define security policies in an access control 
mechanism, there are different categories based on situation space. 
Rissanen suggested that there are three possible outcomes to an 
access request from users: denied, permitted and possible-with-
override access. Based on these three possible outcomes, there are 
three ways to classify the situation. In this report, only “Define the 
permitted access and the denied access. By default everything else 
is possible"[16], will be used for our model. The system defines 
permitted and denied access policies for normal situations and 
leaves the possibility-with-override for the emergency and unusual 
situations as default. Users' behaviour trust values will be 
considered for overriding access decisions. Users' behaviour trust 
value will explain in next section. 
3.2 Prevention and Detection Mechanism 
Prevention and detection mechanisms will be used in overriding 
process as auditing to prevent the abuse usage of overriding. 
Whenever overriding cases occur at the access control mechanism, 
the system will keep a record of all the overriding processes for 
auditing. If there is no prevention mechanism in the access control 
model, all users might try to request overriding access privileges 
for the data access, whenever they want to access data at the sensor 
nodes. In my point of view, prevention and detection mechanism 
will be needed to protect unauthorised data access from the users.  
 
All overriding operations are recorded as log file and the owner of 
a sensor node can be checked a log file whenever he receives alarm 
and warning message from the sensor nodes. Detection approach 
will be used in the auditing process. Sandhu and Samarati [6] 
mentioned that the role of auditing is an analysis of data to discover 
or diagnose the security violations. Audit data need protection from 
modification by an intruder. For triggering alarm and warning 
message, obligation roles will be used in the access control 
policies. An obligation is a requirement to take some course of 
action, whether legal or moral. Therefore, overriding and obligation 
policies should be defined in Ponder or WASL policy langusge in 
WSNs. 
3.3 User Behaviour Monitoring 
The proposed approach is trying to improve the flexibility in access 
control model by extending with user behaviour model. In current 
access control models, a user with right access privileges can 
access data and there is no way to prevent abnormal and unusual 
data access from the authorised user. User behaviour monitoring 
concept is proposed to check user behaviours and actions in WSNs. 
Whenever the users try to access data at the sensor nodes, the base 
stations will passively monitor user behaviours’ information for the 
behaviour trust model.  
 
The main idea of using base station as passive monitoring 
mechanism between users and sensor nodes is filtering and 
monitoring user behaviours and information like time, location, 
actions, etc. Monitored information by base station will be sent to a 
central server that calculates and evaluates user's behaviour trust 
value. For behaviour trust value, monitored user behaviour 
information will be compared with previous records, predict and 
predefine user behaviour information by using behaviour matrix 
algorithm in the central server.  
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Li-qin et al [5] mentioned that predicting user behaviour is 
important and significant in forming a trustworthy network. 
Measuring user behaviour is quite hard to evaluate and manage and 
it is a new research issue in WSNs. After evaluating and calculating 
trust value, central server will forward trust value to the base 
station. A base station will periodically broadcast to all the sensor 
nodes and update users' behaviour trust value for the overriding 
access decision-making process. User's behaviour trust value is 
important in making access decisions at the sensor nodes, when 
there is an unusual and abnormal data access from the authorised 
users. Users behaviour’ monitoring engine will be designed and 
generated user's behaviour trust value for each user.  
 
4. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK 
The overall contribution of this paper is to design an adaptive 
access control model for WSNs that combines both possible-with-
override and behaviour monitoring concepts together. The adaptive 
access control model is enabling to make access decision quickly 
and efficiently, where the system faces unexpected events and 
abnormal or unusual situations. The adaptive access control model 
will be resided on each sensor node in WSNs. The flexibility of 
access control model is important to provide in WSNs, in term of 
efficiency, reliability, accountability and immediate data access. 
Designing a framework for user behaviour monitoring model is 
another objective to achieve in WSNs. 
 
This paper proposed a new access control model to realise the 
privilege control of sensor networks, to solve the problems that 
users can only access the network at the specific time and the 
specific place and to provide overriding access decision-making 
process at the sensor nodes for emergency data access by achieving 
flexibility in an access control model. Currently we are working on 
the simulation and emulation tools to develop the proposed access 
control model in WSNs. For modelling and developing of the 
proposed access control in WSNs, IRIS version of sensor motes 
and IRIS Processor Radio Modules for based station will be used. 
Lotus motes are considered to use as powerful sensor nodes (base 
station) for passive monitoring. TOSSIM emulator will be used in 
development of the proposed model. Ponder and XACML language 
will be considered to define overriding and obligation policies and 
roles. The user behaviours’ trust engine will be implemented in 
central server by using NS2 (Network Simulation 2) to check and 
evaluate the user behaviours’ trust value. Overall, a new access 
control model is proposed for WSNs to achieve the flexibility in 
access control and prevent unauthorized, abnormal and unusual 
data access from both legitimate and illegitimate users in WSNs. 
To the best of our knowledge, the proposed access control model is 
the first to realize the flexibility of access control model by using 
the concept of possibility-with-override with users' behaviour trust 
value in WSNs. 
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Abstract—Wireless Sensor Networks (WSNs) have recently
attracted a lot of interest in the research community. The
security mechanism with large overhead of computation and
communication, are infeasible to apply in WSNs due to many
constraints such as limited energy, resource and memory, and
low computation capability. Current access control models cannot
make an effective access decision in many events because access
decisions are based on predefined access policies and roles.
Sometimes, users may need to access important data urgently but
apart from those predefined access policies, other user request
will not be granted. An adaptive access control model is proposed
aiming to provide a flexible and an effective access decision on
user access request at any time. The proposed model is developed
in Ponder2 framework with additional extensions to adapt the
unexpected events by using privilege overriding and also adjust
its decision based on users’ behaviour trust value. A medical
scenario is used as an example application to develop and evaluate
the proposed model in Body Sensor Networks (BSNs) and WSNs.
In this paper, detailed design, implementation phase, evaluation
result and policies testing for the proposed adaptive access control
model are presented. Based on an evaluation result, all the
modules in the proposed access control model are cooperated
to make an effective access decision.
I. INTRODUCTION
Wireless Sensor Networks (WSNs) technology has been
the interest of researchers and scientists in many research
areas because of their potential to change the way of living
with applications in retail, medicine, emergency management
and many other areas. WSNs consist of hundreds and even
thousand of low-cost small sized sensor nodes each with sens-
ing, processing and communicating capabilities to monitor the
real world environment and collect information through infra-
structureless ad-hoc wireless networks. Nowadays, a sensor
node can capture multimedia data and store data locally as
the distributed manner or transfer it to a central storage as
the centralized manner. WSNs become popular and play an
essential role in the medical or healthcare domain. Wireless
sensor nodes become smaller and more powerful to use in a
wide range of medical applications such as health monitoring,
chronic disease management and measuring user vital signs.
Garci-Morchon and Wehrle [1] mentioned that user’s medical
data lead to security and privacy concern. Therefore, collected
and stored data are important and it should be kept secretly.
Additionally access to that private data needs to protect unau-
thorized access from both legitimate and illegitimate users.
Using security mechanism can provide the security properties
such as confidentiality, authentication, integrity, etc. and can
prevent abnormal access from the internal and external users.
This paper focuses on an access control model in WSNs
and Body Sensor Network (BSN). There are many constraints
such as limited memory and power, which impose unique
security challenges and make innovative approaches desirable
in WSNs. A new security mechanism and access control
model are needed because existing security mechanisms are
not efficient, adequate and suitable to use and apply in WSNs.
Towards addressing these challenges, this paper discusses an
adaptive access control model and its implementation result
in Ponder2 framework. The remaining structure of this paper
is explained as follows. Section 2 discusses the related work.
Section 3 provides an overview of the proposed access control
model. In section 4, the development and implementation of
an adaptive access control model are discussed. Section 5
represents an evaluation result based on a medical scenario.
Section 6 concludes the paper.
II. RELATED WORK
Access control is a critical security service to prevent
unauthorized access of network resources from the users. In
WSNs, users can enter the sensor field directly to access
data at the sensor nodes. Different users may have different
access privileges to access data at the sensor nodes based on
their roles and policies. Most of the access control models
in WSNs and Wireless Medical Sensor Network (WMSN)
are based on traditional Role-Based Access Control (RBAC),
which has been widely accepted as a policy access control
model. Cryptography-based access control is designed for the
untrusted environment, where the lack of global knowledge
and control is defining characteristics. Cryptography is relied
upon to control data access and to ensure data confidentiality
and integrity. Cryptography methods in WSNs should meet the
constraints of sensor nodes.
Distributed PRIvacy-preserving aCCESS control (PRIC-
CESS) protocol [2] is proposed to provide privacy preserving
distributed access control in WSNs. The PRICCESS model
used Access Control List (ACL) to store the access permission
of the group in the network controller. For ACL, roles need to
be predefined in advance based on RBAC. Garci-Morchon et
al [1] pointed out that RBAC model is not good enough to use
in WSNs because in the traditional RBAC model, the roles and
policies have to be predefined in advance. Based on that point
of view, they proposed the Context-Aware RBAC [1] model
for WMSNs. An access control decision will be based on the
modular contextual information such as normal, emergency
and critical, to ensure the users’ safety. In normal situations,
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a user needs to verify his role to access the medical data of a
healthy patient. The user can perform any action and can access
data, when the system declares as critical and emergency
case. One of the disadvantages of this model is, there is no
prevention or detection mechanism and no verification process
to check user’s data access, when the critical situation occurs.
Ferreria et al [3] proposed the Break-the-Glass Role Based
Access Control (BTG-RBAC). The main idea of this model
is to gather necessary information from end users with their
collaboration for usable access control policy that can perform
BTG action in emergency cases. BTG extension is used for
emergency and important cases whenever a user wants to
access data urgently and immediately. When the user tries to
perform BTG actions, the system will ask him if he really want
to perform that action on specific object. If the user answers
affirmatively, the system will activate the BTG operation and
trigger the associated obligations like alarms, log file, etc.
BTG-RBAC model is much more flexible than normal RBAC
but one of the disadvantages is that human processes are
needed in order to enforce the BTG rules.
Yu et al [4] proposed Fine-grained Data Access Control
(FDAC) model which is based on Attribute-Based Encryption
(ABE) [5]. The main idea of their approach is to provide a fine-
grained access control over sensor data and is resilient against
the attacks such as user colluding and node compromising.
Their model is based on a centralized approach because only
the network controller is managed for key management. If the
network controller is compromised, there will be no security
provisioning in the network. Therefore, a single point of failure
can be occurred. In this approach, CP-ABE based selective
broadcast is used for the user revocation and key revocation
but there is no detailed information on how to use it.
To avoid a single point of failure, Ruj et al [6] pro-
posed an access control scheme based on Multi-authority
Attribute Based Encryption. Their objective is to provide fully
distributed data access control by using several Distribution
Centers (DCs). All the access structures from each DC, which
need to satisfy the attributes from sensor nodes, are ANDed
together to get a complete access for the single user. There
is no detailed explanation of how to combine all the access
structures together. Without the combining approach, the user
has to store all the access structures in order to access different
types of data from the sensor network.
From the above discussion, it is clear that achieving fine-
grained data access control with flexibility is still an open
challenge in WSNs. There is no protection for unauthorized
usage from both legitimate and illegitimate users. A flexi-
ble access decision is needed because it is hard to predict
and predefine data access policies for any unexpected and
unanticipated events in the real world applications. Current
access control models are not flexible enough to make an
effective access decision at any time. Therefore, we proposed
an adaptive access control model [7] to fill the gap in WSNs
area. The proposed model has a similar structure like BTG
access control model but the main difference is that no human
effort is needed to override rules and policy for unexpected
events because of the introduction of users’ behaviour trust
model, and prevention and detection mechanism.
III. ADAPTIVE ACCESS CONTROL MODEL
Previously, we have proposed an adaptive access control
model [7] to provide a flexible access decision in WSNs. The
proposed model is incorporated the concept of possibility-with-
override [8] into WSN for hard-to-define and unanticipated
situations. Possibility-with-override means users might be able
to override a denial of access, when unexpected events occur.
The proposed model also uses user behaviour monitoring
and trust model to check users’ actions, location, time, etc.
Whenever users try to access data at the sensor nodes, all user
behaviour and user information will be kept by prevention and
detection mechanism as an audit record to detect and prevent
abnormal and unauthorized access. The detailed information of
different modules inside the proposed adaptive access control
model are explained in this section.
There are two main modules in the proposed access control
model: Policy Enforcement Point (PEP) and Policy Decision
Point (PDP). Whenever a user requests the access to an object,
an access request will go through PEP for the authentication
process and then it will forward a decision request to PDP for
decision making process. PDP makes the access decision on
user request based on defined policy. The decision response
will be forwarded internally to the target. Also, PDP will
forward the decision response to the users, whether they have
the privileges to access data at the sensor nodes or not.
Fig. 1. An Overview of Implementation Framework
The proposed access control model is extended version
of Ponder2 [9] by adding extra module and using additional
information to provide flexibility. The proposed model is de-
signed to make an effective access decision in both normal and
emergency situations. Figure 1 shows the high level overview
design of the proposed access control model. The detailed
information of both PEP and PDP are explained in next sub
section.
A. Policy Enforcement Point (PEP)
In the proposed framework, PEP is used as an authenti-
cation service provider between users and sensor nodes. The
authentication service is an important security provisioning
to provide in the system. Whenever PEP receives an access
request from the user, it will check the user information like
ID and cryptographic key for the authentication purpose. PEP
checks the authenticity of the users, before it forwards the
decision request to PDP. Currently, we assume that authen-
tication service and key distribution are already provided in
PEP. In future, we will work on the implementation of PEP
by using Attribute-Base Encryption (ABE) [5] for data storage.
Also Two-Tier Data Dissemination (TTDD) [10] protocol is
considered to use for data transmission between users and
nodes.
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B. Policy Decision Point (PDP)
PDP is a main module in the proposed framework. There
are three different modules inside the PDP as shown in
Figure 2. These three modules are; the access control module,
prevention and detection module, and user behaviour trust
module. After PEP forwards the decision request to PDP,
the information such as user, action, environment and context
information will be forwarded to the access control module
and the user behaviour trust module. The user behaviour trust
module will calculate the trust value and forward that value
to the access control module. The access control module will
use the trust value from the user behaviour trust module and
the other information, which is forwarded by PEP, to make
access decisions on the user request. After the access control
module makes a decision, it sends back a response message
to the users and forwards internally to the target object. The
three different modules of PDP are explained as follows.
Fig. 2. Policy Decision Point
1) Access Control Module: The access control module is
used to make an access decision based on access policies
which are predefined in that module. In a normal access
control model, there are two access decisions: permitted and
denied access. If the user has the privileges to get data at the
sensor nodes, his access will be permitted. If the user does
not have rights to access data, his access will be rejected. In
the proposed model, overriding access is introduced to provide
flexibility and make access decisions effectively and efficiently,
when the user needs to access data immediately. The access
control module will only grant the overriding access to the
user, when his trust value is high or trustworthiness enough
to access data. Altogether, three access decisions are used in
the proposed access control module: permitted access, denied
access and overriding access.
In the access control module, there are several predefined
authorization, obligation and overriding policies. In the pro-
posed model, the permitted and denied access will be defined.
By default, everything else is possible to override. The autho-
rization policy will handle for normal permitted and denied
access. The overriding and obligation policy will be used to
make an effective access decision based on user behaviour
trust value in unexpected events. The detailed definition of
these three policies are explained as below.
• Authorization Policy
An authorization policy is used to enforce the ac-
cess control module to check whether a subject is
authorized to execute an action on a target. In the
authorization policy, subject, target, condition and
action are used to define access role. Subject means
a user, who is trying to access data from the target
that stores information. Whenever the access control
module receives a decision request, it will check the
conditions i.e, location and time which are declared in
the specific policy. If the decision request meets the
criteria from a certain policy, the subject is allowed to
do some actions at the target.
• Obligation policy
An obligating policy expects zero or more conditions
to be evaluated and one or more actions to be per-
formed if the conditions are satisfied. One of the
objectives of using an obligation policy is to provide
finer-level access control than mere permitted and
denied decisions. After a policy has been evaluated,
specific obligations are sent along with the authoriza-
tion decision. The obligation policies are used when
the access control module is faced with abnormal user
behaviour or overriding access.
• Overriding Policy
The proposed adaptive access control model intro-
duces an overriding policy based on a user behaviour
trust module. Overriding of access control is one
way to handle such hard-to-define and unanticipated
situations where availability is critical. An overriding
policy is used to support flexibility of access control in
the proposed model. The policy is designed especially
for unpredictable and unexpected situations. Current
access control models cannot make an effective access
decision based on predefined policies and roles, when
an unexpected event occurs. It is hard to predict all
of the access control policies because unpredictable
events can happen at any time. Comparing the pro-
posed model with other access control models, it
provides a flexible approach to make the effective
access decisions.
2) Prevention and Detection Module: The privacy and
confidentiality of data are still provided even in the emergency
case because of the prevention and detection and user be-
haviour trust module. The prevention and detection module is
introduced to prevent abnormal and unauthorized access from
both legitimate and illegitimate users. The main idea is to keep
the information from user access request as an audit record.
The audit record maintains a record of user activities in the
system. An audit record can assist to detect security violations
and flaws in the system.
In the proposed model, an event-oriented log method is
used. The purpose of an event-oriented log is to record an event
and specify when it occurred, the user information associated
with that event and the results of the decision-making process.
The prevention and detection module is used to prevent any
specious access from the users to protect confidentiality and
privacy of data. An audit record will be used by the user
behaviour trust module to predict and calculate the user
behaviour trust value for the user’s next attempt. We will use
ABE based encryption which is already explained under PEP
section, to provide confidentiality and integrity of the audit
data. The TTDD protocol is considered to provide a secure
communication channel for data transmission within BSN and
WSN.
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3) User Behaviour Trust Module: In current access con-
trol models, a user with right access privileges can access
data. There is no way to prevent abnormal data access from
the authorized user. The proposed model can be protected
from these kind of situations by using both the prevention
and detection module, and the user behaviour trust module
together. In the proposed model, the users’ behaviour trust
value is calculated and evaluated based on the audit record
from the prevention and detection module. The behaviour
trust value will be forwarded to the access control module
and stored in a database for another evaluation process. The
overall structure of users’ behaviour trust module is shown
in Figure 3. To determine the user behaviour trust value,
Fig. 3. A Framework of User Behaviour Trust Module
the previous, predicted and current value of user behaviour
trust will be used. Current trust value will be calculated and
evaluated based on the user information that is forwarded
by the PEP. The previous trust value is stored in the trust
module. For predicting user behaviour trust value, Naive-Bayes
classification algorithm [11] will be used. The predicting user
behaviour is important and significant in forming a trustworthy
network. For the classification algorithm, the audit record from
the prevention and detection module will be used. There might
be more than two classifiers to predict the user behaviour
trust value. Overall, the behaviour trust value of the user is
calculated based on previous, predicted and current user trust
value.
IV. DEVELOPMENT OF AN ADAPTIVE ACCESS CONTROL
MODEL
The proposed adaptive access control model has been
developed in Ponder2 [9] that is a popular policy language
to use in BSN. Ponder2 comprises a self-contained, stand-
alone, general-purpose object management system with mes-
sage passing between objects. It incorporates an awareness of
events and policies and implements a policy execution frame-
work. It has a high-level configuration and control language
called PonderTalk and user-extensible managed objects are
programmed in Java.
Ponder2 is implemented as Self Managed Cell (SMC) [12]
that is a set of hardware and software components forming
an administrative domain. It is capable of self management.
We assumed SMC as a sensor and try to implement access
control model within the Ponder2. Everything in Ponder2
is a managed object. The managed object has to be loaded
dynamically into the SMC from a library, thereby producing
the factory managed object (Java class). The proposed model is
an extended version of Ponder2 by applying possibility-with-
override concept, user behaviour trust model and prevention,
and detection mechanism together.
We developed the proposed adaptive access control model
based on Ponder2 framework. The interface for all the users
are implemented in Java based on the managed objects in
Ponder2. The Java class file will be loaded dynamically into
SMC. The access control module is already implemented
for the proposed model and defined the policies based on
an application scenario. We designed and implemented the
prevention and detection module in Ponder2. The interface for
the audit log is implemented in Java. The audit log keeps all the
information from user requests, whenever users try to access
patient medical records from any location at any time. The
audit log is stores as “Write.csv” file that will be used by the
user behaviour module to evaluate the trust value of each user.
For the users’ behaviour trust module, a simple calculation is
used and developed. In future, we need to do more work on
the user behaviour trust module.
V. EVALUATION OF ADAPTIVE ACCESS CONTROL MODEL
In this section, a medical scenario is used to develop the
proposed model for BSNs and WMSNs. The policy specifica-
tion for all scenarios is similar but an access policy for example
medical scenario is discussed in this section. SMC [12] is
represented as a BSN. In this example, each patient has his
own BSN, which consists of several sensors. Sensors sense
and collect information such as glucose level, temperature,
heart rate, etc. We assumed that sensed data are stored as
the medical record in BSN. Users such as doctors and nurses
are trying to access medical record of the patient via mobile,
personal digital assistant or personal computer. For example,
sensors can interact with each other via IEEE 802.15.4 wireless
links and interactions with other mobile phone and personal
digital assistant from users via Wifi or Bluetooth. Each SMC
has its own policy management. Policies are managed by each
SMC specifying which actions can be performed. For doctor
and nurse, context information will be used, when they try to
interact with other SMC or request to join the patient’s BSN
for data access. The following example scenario will show and
express how the proposed access control model is designed and
developed for WSNs.
In an example scenario, users are doctors, nurses, patients,
patient’s family and administrative staff. We assumed that all
the users in this scenario are in a “Hatfield” hospital. All the
users will try to access the medical record of the patient. Based
on their access privileges, the access to the patient medical
record will be different. Therefore, access policies are based on
the users responsibility, their role and context information such
as location and time. A simple scenario of medical application
will be used to express and state the policy clearly.
There are two departments in an example scenario: Heart
and Cancer department. Nurses and patients will be assigned
in one of the department. A doctor can be assigned in the
same department as nurse and patient or he can be assigned
in any other department. The doctor should be a physician of
Heart or Cancer department or General Practitioner (GP) in
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“Hatfield” hospital. The doctor and nurse can access patient
medical records with a normal authorization policy when they
are in the same department as the patient. But the nurse and
doctor cannot access the medical record of another patient,
who is not in the same department as they are. Otherwise, there
might be a lack of data privacy for patient’s medical record.
For such a case, the overriding policy is used to override the
denied access in urgent and emergency cases.
Fig. 4. Normal and Overriding Access
The patient’s family might try to access data. They will
have the access to the medical record but some important
information will be hidden because of patient confidentiality
and data security. It is the same for administrative staff. They
can only access patient information like name, department
and other general information, which means that they are not
allowed to request the illness and prescription of the patient.
Therefore, based on the role, responsibility of users and trust
value, the access control model will make an effective access
decision on user requests. Figure 4 explains the overview of
normal and overriding access with an example scenario.
A. Evaluation Framework Based on Example Scenario
We evaluate and test the proposed adaptive access control
model based on an example scenario. In this section user
interface, policies definition of authorization, obligation and
overriding, and audit log interface are explained based on the
example scenario.
1) User Interface: The Interfaces for all the users in an
example scenario have more or less the same feature but the
information from the patient medical record will be changed
based on their roles and access privileges. Consequently, the
access decision will be different for each user. The interface
of the nurse is shown in Figure 5.
In Figure 5, a user needs to give input of the patient path
that includes the name and location of the patient. For example,
Bob is a patient from the Heart department. The path of “Bob”
is expressed as /patient/heart/bob. Aung is a nurse from Cancer
department by looking at his path; /role/nurse/cancer/aung in
above figure. All the trust values for the nurse and doctor are
initialized as 5 that is average trust value. The range of the
trust value is from 0 to 10. The user needs to fill the time
framework, which is between one to twenty-four represented
as twenty-four hours in a day. Time framework can be used
to check time constraint, e.g a nurse can have access to the
patient medical record only at a certain period of time. It is
also part of information that will be used to predict the trust
value of users.
Fig. 5. Interface of A Nurse
Figure 5 also shows the access results of the decision-
making process and medical record of the patient. The first
result shows that, the nurse from Cancer department cannot
access the medical record of the patient from Heart department.
Therefore, his access request has been denied because he
does not meet any criteria from the authorization policy. The
second result shows that if a nurse’s trust value is higher than
average trust value, he can get the patient medical record from
Heart department by overriding his denied access. The access
control module assumes that he is trustworthy to access the
medical record based on previous interaction between other
patients and behaviour trust values. All the permitted, denied
and overriding access of the users are kept as an audit record
that is used to predict trust value of the users.
2) Authorization Policy: Authorization policy is used for
normal permitted and denied access in the proposed model.
For example, a nurse sends the access request to a target.
The access control module will respond to access request
based on the access policy, which is defined in that module
for decision making process. The authorization policy can be
changed based on the requirements of the application. There
might be several authorization policies based on the users’
level and access privileges. An example authorization policy
is expressed as below:
Def: Permit-Policy
subject nurse or doctor
action getrecord
target patient from which department
condition location or time
focus target or subject
The above permit-policy defines that who has a right to
access the medical record from a target object. Subject can
only access the target object, when it meets the criteria from
the permit policy such as condition. The authorization policy
can be handled based on predefined policies, apart from that all
the access requests will be denied. For example, the nurse from
the Heart department can access medical record of patients
from the same department.
3) Obligation Policy: Obligation policy is used in some
events to prevent a certain condition. For example, if a nurse
meets the criteria to override access policy, the obligation
policy will be used and sent along with the overriding policy.
Obligation policy is used for triggering an alarm and kept
the audit record for further investigation. For example, if the
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nurse’s trust value is less than 5, his access will be denied. At
the same time, the obligation policy will become active and
keep the audit record based on user information and access
request. Additionally, the security alarm will be triggered at
the patient side. The format of obligation policy is shown as
below.
Def: Audit-Log
on auditrecord
if policy type is override
or trust value is < 5
do write.audit < subject, Time, Target, Behaviour Trust Value, Context
Value >
4) Overriding Policy: The proposed model extends the
Ponder2 by adding an overriding policy. The overriding policy
will check one or more one conditions for decision making
process at the access control module. A user should be a
nurse or a doctor and he can access data from anywhere at
any-time. The nurse or doctor needs to meet at least two
criteria to override the denied policy. The important factor is
the user behaviour trust value which has to be over five to
override the policy. If the trust value is set to zero, the person
is untrustworthy but if it is set to ten, the person is trustworthy.
To override the access policy, the subject have to meet more
than one condition that are described as follow:
Def: Overriding-Policy
subject nurse or doctor
target patient <medical record>
if trust value is > 5
and location = Hatfield
or time is between 8am to 10am
or nurse or doctor is staff
do Set-alarm and Audit-Log
action getrecord
For example, if a nurse wants to override his access policy
in an emergency or urgent case, his user behaviour trust value
has to be more than 5 and at least two of the above conditions
need to be trued.
5) Prevention and Detection Mechanism: The prevention
and detection mechanism keeps all the information from the
user requests as an audit log, whenever users try to access
patient medical records from any location at any time. The
audit log can be seen on Figure 6. In the audit log format,
the subject is a user, who tries to access medical record from
the target. In the audit log, time, user behaviour trust value
and context information such as location are also recorded.
For example from Figure 6, “Doctor Oliver”, who works as a
“Physician” in “Hatfield” hospital, tried to access the medical
record of “Bob” from “Heart” department at “12am” with his
trust value “5” and his access request has been permitted.
Auditlog := [Subject + Time + Target + Trust Value + Context Value]
6) User Behaviour Trust Module: The user behaviour trust
module used all the information from the audit log to evaluate
and calculate the current and predicted user behaviour trust
value. When the application is started, the trust value of all
the users is initialized as five which is an average trust value.
The trust value will be set between zero and ten based on the
trust level of the users. The proposed user behaviour module is
Fig. 6. Audit Log
not finished yet. The overriding policy is tested by giving the
user trust value manually. Currently, the simple calculation is
used for user behaviour trust value. Whenever the user access
request has been permitted, his trust value will be increased by
one. If it is a denied access, his trust value will be decreased by
one. The user behaviour trust value is forwarded to the access
control module. The computation effort of trust model will
be evaluated after it is finished completely. The trust model
needs to be analyzed and implemented carefully to meet the
requirements of WSNs.
B. Summary
Based on the evaluation result with an example medical
scenario, the access control module is cooperated with the
user behaviour trust module, which worked together with
prevention and detection mechanism to evaluate and calculate a
trust value of users, to make an effective access decision. All
policies are predefined in the access control module, which
can adjust its decision based on trust value at any time. Based
on the previous discussion, the overriding policy is useful to
handle unanticipated situations. Therefore, all the modules in
the proposed access model are worked together to make the
effective access decision.
VI. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
The overall contribution of this paper is to design and
develop an adaptive access control model for medical data in
BSNs and WSNs. In this paper, the interface of the example ap-
plication, the development of possibility-with-override, and the
prevention and detection mechanism are developed in Ponder2.
The proposed model is developed in Ponder2 framework with
additional extensions to adapt the unexpected events by using
privilege overriding and also adjust its decision based on users’
behaviour trust value. All the modules in the proposed access
control are cooperated to make an effective access decision. In
this paper, detailed design, implementation result and policy
testing for the proposed adaptive access control model are
discussed.
Currently, we are working on the user behaviour trust
module. A classification algorithm will be used to predict the
user behaviour trust value. The previous, current and predicted
user trust value are needed to calculate the overall trust value of
the user. It is also important to clean up the data from the audit
log to use it for the classification algorithm. Further research is
needed for how Naive-Bayes and weight metric algorithm can
be applied in the user behaviour trust module. In future, we
plan to implement the proposed adaptive access control model
within the sensor nodes. IRIS version of sensor motes, IRIS
2013 IEEE 15th International Conference on e-Health Networking, Applications and Services (Healthcom 2013)308
Processor Radio Modules and Lotus motes are considered for
the implementation of the proposed model.
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Abstract: Wireless sensor networks (WSNs) have attracted considerable interest in the
research community, because of their wide range of applications. However, due to the
distributed nature of WSNs and their deployment in remote areas, these networks are
vulnerable to numerous security threats that can adversely affect their proper functioning.
Resource constraints in sensor nodes mean that security mechanisms with a large overhead
of computation and communication are impractical to use in WSNs; security in sensor
networks is, therefore, a challenge. Access control is a critical security service that offers
the appropriate access privileges to legitimate users and prevents illegitimate users from
unauthorized access. However, access control has not received much attention in the
context of WSNs. This paper provides an overview of security threats and attacks, outlines
the security requirements and presents a state-of-the-art survey on access control models,
including a comparison and evaluation based on their characteristics in WSNs. Potential
challenging issues for access control schemes in WSNs are also discussed.
Keywords: wireless sensor networks; access control schemes; security mechanisms;
security vulnerabilities
1. Introduction
A wireless sensor network (WSNs) consists of hundreds or even thousands of distributed,
autonomous, low-power, low-cost, small-sized devices, each with sensing, processing and
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communication capabilities. Typically, these devices, known as sensor nodes, monitor the real-world
environment and send the collected information to a gateway node through an infrastructure-less ad hoc
wireless network. Sensor networks are envisioned to play an important role in a wide variety of areas,
ranging from critical military surveillance applications to forest fire monitoring. WSN technology has
been of interest to scientists in many research areas, because of its potential to change our way of living,
with applications in entertainment, travel, retail, industry, medicine, health-care, traffic monitoring,
military, emergency management, etc.
Among these applications, the military and medical applications are the most security-oriented fields
of WSNs and have received the most attention from security researchers. WSNs are rapidly becoming an
important technology in the medical or healthcare domain. Sensor nodes are becoming smaller and more
powerful, making them suitable to use in a wide range of medical applications, such as health monitoring,
chronic disease management and measuring user vital signs. Wireless medical sensor network (WMSN)
is the name of this form of WSN used in the medical and healthcare domain. In WMSN, sensors are
attached to the human body to monitor healthcare information, like electrocardiogram (ECG), blood
pressure, etc. Medical staff can access, collect and record medical data directly from a patient’s sensor for
remote healthcare monitoring services. However Garcia-Morchon [1] mentioned that there are security
and privacy concerns about possible access to user’s medical data. Therefore, security services are
required to provide the confidentiality of medical records and privacy of patient information. In addition,
the control of access to patient’s data becomes another issue in WMSN, because there might be a number
of medical staff and family members, who try to interact with the confidential medical data.
WSNs can also be used for a number of purposes in the military sector, such as enemy tracking,
military activities monitoring and battlefield surveillance. The rapid deployment, self-organization
and fault tolerant characteristics of sensor networks make them a very promising data gathering
technique for military Command, Control, Communications, Computing, Intelligence, Surveillance
and Reconnaissance (C4ISR) [2]. In military applications, the sensor nodes are used to collect the
information of enemies and tracking military vehicles. The data sensed and stored at the sensor nodes
are highly confidential, so security services, such as confidentiality, integrity, etc., need to be provide by
using security and access control mechanisms.
Nowadays, a sensor node can capture pictures and multi-media data. A sensor node has the capability
of sensing data from the environment. It stores the sensed data locally in a distributed fashion or transmits
the sensed data to central storage in a centralized approach. In both the centralized and distributed
approach, data security and data access control are important issues in WSNs. As a large amount of
data is stored in the sensor nodes locally, aspects of data security (such as confidentiality and integrity)
have become serious concerns, because the sensor nodes are not well equipped with tamper-proof or
tamper-evident equipment. From a data-centric point of view, the most challenging issues in WSNs are
how to store the highly sensitive sensor data and how to control the access of internal and external users.
Based on the above discussion, access control is a critical security requirement to protect sensitive
sensor information from unauthorized access, but it has not received attention in the context of WSNs by
researchers. Data in real-time WSNs applications are made available to users on demand. Faye et al. [3]
mentioned that the sensed data may no longer be accessed only at the base stations, and users can access
data at the sensor node directly from anywhere in an ad hoc manner. Depending on user’s access control
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privileges, data access to the sensor nodes will be different. In this report, we will survey and discuss the
state-of-the-art for access control schemes in WSNs.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Background information of security
vulnerabilities and security requirements and the traditional access control models for information
systems are discussed in Section 2. Section 3 reviews WSN access control models that are proposed as
models in the literature. Section 4 compares the current access control models based on characteristics,
such as network architecture, key management, etc. Section 5 evaluates these access control models
qualitatively and quantitatively. Section 6 discusses the potential research issues of access control models
in WSNs, and finally, Section 7 concludes the paper.
2. Background
In WSNs, there are several attacks that can break the security services, such as confidentiality,
availability, integrity, authenticity, etc. These security services can be protected in WSNs by using
security mechanisms. In this section, we discuss the security vulnerabilities and security requirements
for WSNs. We then introduce the traditional access control models. Access control is one of the security
mechanisms that needs to be provided in WSNs.
2.1. Security Vulnerabilities and Security Requirements
The nature of WSNs makes them vulnerable to various kinds of attack. Security attacks can be
categorized as passive or active: malicious users could either intercept private information or send false
messages to the sensor nodes in WSNs. The listening and monitoring of the communication channels
by unauthorized and malicious users are regarded as passive attacks. Sensor nodes can sense and collect
data from their environments in WSNs; as a result, the network becomes vulnerable to potential abuse of
these data resources. Vella [4] mentioned that the data obtained by sensing nodes need to be kept private
and confidential. Since the data are stored in the sensor nodes without tamper-proof or tamper-evident
equipment, the privacy and confidentiality of data become important to protect from passive attacks,
such as eavesdropping, passive monitoring and traffic analysis [5].
An active attack can monitor, listen and modify data streams in the communication channels, where
an adversary can maliciously disturb the communication channels between the sensor nodes. In harmful
active attacks, the adversary can alter and spoof the packets and interfere with the wireless signals to
jam the network. Ng et al. [6] argued that even if the information is protected from eavesdropping
by means of encryption, the attacker may blindly modify that encrypted information and turn the
information into meaningless information. The common active attacks in WSNs include camouflage [7],
Sybil [8], wormhole [9], replay, hello flood [10], sinkhole [5], denial of service (DoS) [11] and node
replication [5].
Apart from the active and passive attacks, Perrig [12] suggested that there might be other types of
attack, which are not yet identified in all layers of the TCP/IP protocol stack in WSNs. Securing WSNs
against all of the attacks and threats is a challenging task. WSN is considered a highly distributed and ad
hoc approach, and because of that, the security requirements and goals of WSNs should be well studied
and provided. The aim of security is to protect the right thing in the right way. Gligor [13] pointed out
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that “A system without an adversary definition cannot be insecure. It can only be astonishing”. WSNs are
vulnerable to many attacks, because of the broadcast nature of the transmission links and the unprotected
physical environment. Therefore, we need to analyze carefully which things need to be protected against
which threats and how these attacks and threats can be detected and prevented. The security goals for
WSNs are similar with other network technologies. Security properties, such as confidentiality, integrity,
availability, access control, authorization, authentication, freshness and secure localization, need to be
provided in WSNs.
In WSNs, there are two additional requirements which need to be investigated for the security of
sensor networks because there may be situations like new sensor nodes are joined and deployed and
old sensor nodes are failed to operate in the networks. Based on these requirements, Wang et al. [14]
suggested that forward and backward secrecy need to be considered in WSNs. Forward secrecy means
that an old sensor node should not be able to read any message after it leaves the sensor networks.
Backward secrecy means that a new sensor node should not be able to read any previous message sent
before it joined the sensor network.
Table 1. Security properties, security attacks and possible solutions in WSNs [6,9,15–17].
Security Properties Security Threats Possible Solutions
Confidentiality Message Disclosure Encryption, Access Control
Integrity Message Modification Digital Signature, Secure Hash
Function
Availability DoS (denial of service),
Wormhole, Sinkhole, Hello Flood
Intrusion Detection, Pairwise
Authentication
Access Control, Authorization Unauthorized and
Unauthenticated Access
Access Control, Key
Distribution, Encryption
Authentication Message Modification, Sybil, Replay
and Spoofing Attack
Random Key Distribution,
Digital Signature
Freshness Replay and Spoofing
attack
Time-stamp, One Way Secure
Hash Function
Secure Localization Node Capture and Note
Replication Attack
Temper-proof and
Temper-evident
Forward and Backward Secrecy Message Disclosure Key Distribution
Table 1 lists the security attacks and threats, which can violate the security properties, and the possible
solutions to defend against them. Security mechanisms are essential to provide the required security
properties in WSNs. An access control mechanism is one of them. Different users may have different
privileges to access data based on their roles. An access control mechanism is one of the security
mechanisms to prevent unauthorized usage in WSNs. Faye et al. [3] described how access control must
be able to authorize and grant access privileges of users for data access in the sensor network and prevent
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unauthorized access from the malicious users. This paper only focuses on the access control models in
WSNs, and the next sub-section will present the traditional access control models for information system.
2.2. Traditional Access Control Models
There are two original access control models in information systems, which are mandatory access
control (MAC) [18] and discretionary access control (DAC) [19]. MAC manages access control levels
by means of an administrator in the organization. It uses a hierarchical approach to control access to
the objects, which represent system resources here. The administrator defines an access control policy
that cannot be modified by the subjects. MAC is mostly used in the systems where priority is placed
on confidentiality, such as in military applications. In a DAC model, the owner of an object controls
access to that object. This means that he has power to create the permissions for data access. By default,
subjects without this permission cannot access the objects. Subjects mean users here.
The concept of an access control matrix, which defines the relationships between subjects, objects
and the actions that the subjects want to perform on the objects, was introduced by Butler Lampson [20].
The subjects’ identities are placed in rows and the objects’ identities in columns. Each action that a
subject wants to perform on an object is placed in the intersection of the corresponding row and column.
The size of the access control matrix is directly proportional to the number of subjects and to the number
of objects. Samarati and Vimercati [21] suggested that there are three possible approaches to implement
the access control matrix in electronic systems, named authorization table, access control list (ACL) and
capabilities. Among these, ACL and capabilities are commonly used in access control schemes. The
three ways of representing the access control matrix are explained as follows:
• Authorization Table
A three-dimensional table, corresponding to subjects, actions and objects, respectively. Each entry
in the table corresponds to an authorization.
• Access Control List (ACL)
Each ACL contains the list of subjects and their access permissions to a given object. When a
subject tries to access an object, the ACL for that object is used to verify the request from the
subject. If the subject access pair is in the ACL list, access will be granted. Otherwise, access will
be denied. In the ACL approach, the lists of subject and action pair are stored for each object. An
ACL is represented by a column in the matrix table as seen in Figure 1. In this figure, r, w and x
stands for read, write and executable.
• Capabilities
Capabilities are different from ACLs. Pairs of action and object are stored for each subject in the
access control matrix. In a capability approach, the subject can get access to the object, when he
presents the correct capability to the system. A subject’s capabilities are represented by a row in
the access control matrix.
The difference between ACLs and capabilities can be seen in Figure 1. One of the drawbacks of using
an access control matrix is that when there are a large number of subjects and objects in the system, the
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administration of those subjects and objects becomes very difficult to handle. The role-based access
control (RBAC) model [22] has been developed to model access control permissions in an organization
in a more manageable way than the access control matrix does. The detailed description of RBAC and
other different types of access control models in WSNs based on their architectural model, strength and
weakness will be explained in the next section.
Figure 1. Difference between access control list (ACL) and capabilities.
3. Access Control Models in WSNs
A considerable number of access control models has been proposed for use in WSNs, though some
of them are not yet implemented. In this section, we present the proposed access control models
before we compare and contrast them in the next section. We group the proposed models into three
main categories based on the nature of their architecture, namely: role-based access control (RBAC),
cryptography-based access control (CBAC) and users’ privacy preserving access control (UPPAC). A
taxonomy of access control models for WSNs, including the publication year of each proposal, is shown
in Figure 2.
Figure 2. A taxonomy of access control schemes in WSNs
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3.1. Role-Based Access Control (RBAC)
Most of the access control models in WSNs and WMSNs are based on traditional RBAC [22], which
has been widely accepted as a policy-based access control model. Applications based on RBAC have
been implemented and deployed in commercial companies and education industries. The principle of
RBAC model is the role, defined as an intermediary concept relating a group of subjects to a set of access
permissions. Any member from the subject group role has all of the permissions that are associated with
that role. When a new subject is assigned to a group, he receives all of the associated access permissions,
but these permissions are revoked when the subject leaves the group or is removed from the system. It
is the same procedure to add and remove permissions from the roles. When a permission is added to a
role, all of the members of the associated subject group will receive that permission. The permission will
be revoked when it is deleted from the role. This feature helps to simplify system administration when
there are many thousands of subjects and objects in an organization.
In RBAC, the access decision is a choice between two outcomes: permitted access or denied access.
The following access control models are proposed based on the RBAC model with different extensions
to provide further security properties in WSNs. Figure 3 shows how RBAC-based access control models
have evolved in the WSN research community.
Figure 3. An evolution of role-based access control (RBAC)-based access control models
in WSNs.
• Zhu’s Model [2009]
Zhu et al. [23] proposed a light-weight policy-based access control model, which used
authorization and obligation policies to perform actions and make access decisions at the sensor
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nodes in a WMSN. The main idea of the proposed approach is to support sensor-level access
control policy. A light-weight policy system, which is known as Fingers [24], enables policy
enforcement and interpretation on the distributed sensors to provide fine-grained access control.
Each sensor manages its own policies to implement both the policy decision point (PDP) and
policy enforcement point (PEP). A PDP interprets policies and makes a policy decision, while
a PEP enforces the policy by permitting and denying a subject from performing the requested
actions. A controller (perhaps a PDA) uses a Diffie–Hellman (DH) key agreement to share keys
with the sensor nodes. The sensor nodes can communicate between each other in a WMSN by
using secret keys from the controller. An authentication process is used to prevent malicious
nodes and users from joining the network. Only the sensor nodes that have keys from the same
controller can communicate with each other. If a user has access to the network controller, he can
request it to perform some actions at the sensor nodes. As an application, this approach can be
used in WMSN to prevent unauthorized access to actuators, such as insulin or other drug pumps,
that may harm the patients.
• Context-Aware Role-Based Access Control (CA-RBAC) [2010]
Garci-Morchon and Wehrle [1] proposed the context-aware role-based access control (CA-RBAC)
model based on a modular context structure for WMSNs. The aim of the model is to provide
context awareness and adapt its security properties to ensure the users’ safety in WMSNs.
Wehrle et al. [25] pointed out that the RBAC model is not good enough to use in a WSN, because
in traditional RBAC models, the roles and policies have to be predefined in advance. In the
proposed model, the decision-making process is divided into three modular context situations:
critical, emergency and normal condition. Based on these situations, the access privileges to sensed
data will be different. The access control decision will be made based on context information, such
as time, location, etc., and the access control policies of three different modules. In a WMSN,
the sensor nodes are attached to the human body to sense and check medical information for a
healthcare service. In the normal case, an authorized doctor needs to verify his access control
role in order to access the medical data of a patient, but a nurse may not have the same level of
privilege. When the system declares a critical or emergency case based on the modular context
information, the doctor or nurse can perform any action and can access data, even though they may
not be able to access that data in a normal condition. One of the disadvantages of this model is that
there is no prevention or detection mechanism, as well as no verification process to check a user’s
data access, when the critical situation occurs.
• Break-the-Glass Role-Based Access Control (BTG-RBAC) [2011]
Ferreria et al. [26] proposed the break-the-glass role-based access control (BTG-RBAC) model
based on the RBAC model. The main idea of this model is to gather necessary information from
the end users with their collaboration for a usable access control policy that can perform the
BTG action in emergency situations. The break-the-glass (BTG) rule allows the users’ to have
emergency and urgent access to the system when a normal authentication does not perform or
work properly. They introduced BTG rules in order to override access policy whilst providing
non-repudiation mechanisms for its usage. In a real environment, unanticipated situations may
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occur because it is impossible to predict all of the access permissions in advance for all situations.
The BTG extension is used for emergency and important cases whenever a user wants to access
data urgently and immediately. When the user tries to perform BTG actions, the system will ask
him if he really wants to perform that action on a specific object. If the user answers affirmatively,
the system will activate the BTG operation and trigger the associated obligations, like alarms, log
file, etc. The BTG-RBAC model made the system much more flexible than normal RBAC, but one
of the disadvantages is that human processes are needed in order to enforce the BTG rules.
3.2. Cryptography-Based Access Control (CBAC)
Cryptography-based access control (CBAC) is another form of access control model for the
information systems. Ghani et al. [27] mentioned that the CBAC mechanism is designed for untrusted
environments, where a lack of global knowledge and control are defining characteristics. It absolutely
relies on cryptography to control data access and to ensure data confidentiality and integrity. The main
idea is to use a unique key for each data resource. Users who are allowed to access that data resource
are assigned the key for data access [28]. Cryptography methods in WSNs should meet the constraints
of sensor nodes, such as limited power, resources and memory shortage. Therefore, choosing a suitable
cryptography method is important in WSNs. There are two types of cryptographic method; asymmetric
encryption, known as public key cryptography (PKC), and symmetric encryption, known as symmetric
key cryptography (SKC). The PKC-based scheme provides better data access security than SKC in the
open multi-user environment [29]. The nature of PKC is using two keys: one for encryption and one
for decryption. In PKC, the data encryption is usually targeted to only one recipient or one group. This
means that any message encrypted by using a public key can be decrypted only with the corresponding
private key.
Many researchers considered that PKC schemes, such as Rivest–Shamir–Adleman (RSA) [30] and the
DH key agreement scheme [31], were unsuitable for applications in WSNs, because of the big size of the
code, message and data, the long processing time and the high power consumption. Sen [5] suggested
that public key algorithms are computationally intensive and usually execute lots of multiplication
instructions to perform a single-security operation. Therefore, one-to-one encryption is not efficient
to be used in WSNs, because the overhead of encryption and the amount of cipher text are directly
proportional to the total number of authorized users. Broadcast encryption [32] is an alternative solution
to provide a one-to-many encryption method, but it requires the users to present their keys and other
information individually. However, recent studies [33–35] argued that it is feasible to employ PKC in
WSNs by using the right selection of algorithms and associated optimization, parameters and low power
methods.
Many researchers in WSNs are interested in SKC schemes because of the lower computation overhead
of SKC. SKC uses the same key for both encryption and decryption between two communicating hosts,
who share the secret key. SKC seems to be suitable for low-end devices, like sensor nodes, because of
their low overhead [36]. One major issue of using SKC methods is how to securely distribute the key
between communication nodes. It is a major problem of using SKC, because key pre-distribution is not
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always feasible and reliable in WSNs. Even many symmetric ciphers are still too expensive to implement
on sensor nodes.
Key management in WSNs has received lots of attention from researchers. Key management is
an essential mechanism to ensure security in network services and applications, when cryptographic
schemes are applied in the sensor networks. The main idea is to establish keys between nodes, trusted
authorities and users in a secure and reliable manner. There are three different tasks in key management,
namely key establishment, key revocation and key update. Key management is a big challenge in WSNs,
because the sensor nodes can be deployed in any location and they know nothing about their neighbour
nodes before deployment.
Choosing a suitable cryptography method is important in WSNs. In this section, we will explain two
different types of CBAC models, namely elliptic curve cryptography (ECC)-based access control and
attribute-based encryption (ABE)-based fine-grained access control.
3.2.1. Attribute-Based Encryption (ABE)-Based Fine-Grained Access Control
Sahai and Waters [37] proposed the ABE scheme to model and design a scalable and flexible access
control system. ABE is a public key cryptography primitive generalising identity-based encryption
(IBE) [38], which is associated with user’s identity in a single user message. In ABE, a group of
users is described by the combination of several descriptive attributes and access structures, which is
also called an attribute policy. In ABE, the public key encryption is based on one-to-many encryption.
There are two different types of ABE, which are proposed by Sahai and Waters [37], namely key-policy
ABE (KP-ABE) and ciphertext-policy ABE (CP-ABE). In KP-ABE, data that is sensed and stored in
the sensor node is encrypted with a set of attributes; the user’s private key is associated with an access
structure that specifies which types of ciphertexts the key can decrypt. Only the users that have the
right access structure and the key can access and decrypt the sensed data. In CP-ABE, the ciphertext is
associated with the access structure. The user’s private key is associated with the attributes that specify
which type of the ciphertext the key can decrypt. Some ABE-based fine-grained access control models
use ECC for key management and distribution.
The ABE [39] method is commonly used in the access control models for data encryption and storage
in WSNs. Li et al. [40] suggested that ABE is a highly promising public key encryption approach
to realize scalability and fine-grained access control, where the flexible access permissions and rights
are assigned to each individual user. Fine-grained access control facilitates granting different kinds of
access permissions to a number of users. The sensors may sense or collect various types of information,
like medical and battlefield information, which may belong to different security levels. Fine-grained
access control is a security requirement to protect sensitive information from unauthorized access.
One alternative way of providing fine-grained access control in WSNs is using an ABE scheme. The
step-by-step development of ABE-based access control models in the WSN research community is
shown in Figure 4. Based on this Figure, the four access control models, which use ABE-based
encryption to provide fine-grained access control, are discussed next.
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Figure 4. An evolution of attribute-based encryption (ABE)-based access control models in
WSNs.
• Fine-Grained Distributed Data Access Control (FDAC) (2011)
Yu et al. [29] proposed the fine-grained distributed data access control (FDAC) model based
on ABE. The main idea of their approach is to provide a distributed data access control, which
is able to support fine-grained access control over sensor data and is resilient against attacks,
such as user collusion (unauthorized users may collude to compromise the encrypted data) and
node compromise (the sensor node could be compromised by a malicious user, due to lack of
compromise-resistant hardware.). A network controller, which stores access structures, acts like a
central distribution centre and distributes keys to users in FDAC. Only users with the right access
structure and the right key can access data at the sensor nodes. The access structures will be
different for each user depending on the access privileges of users.
For example, in a battlefield application, the sensor nodes may be responsible for collecting
different types of data, such as vibration, smoke, etc., in different locations (village, forest).
Therefore, the attributes, such as {location = village, data type = (vibration, smoke),
owner = (explosion experts, officers)}, are used to specify the data access privileges of users.
Based on the above example, the access structure of a user is designated as “(location is village)
AND (type is vibration)”, which allows the user to obtain the vibration data within the village area.
More sophisticated access structures can be defined based on the application requirements. If the
network controller is compromised by a malicious user, there will be no security provisioning
in the system anymore. User revocation (user revocation may be one of the following: the
service subscription is expired, the user changes group intentionally or the user or group key
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is compromised) can be done by updating the master secret key that is embedded in the user
secret key via broadcasting. In this approach, CP-ABE-based selective broadcast is used for user
revocation, but there are no details on how to use it.
• Distributed Fine-Grained Access Control (DFAC) (2011)
Ruj et al. [41] proposed a fully distributed fine-grained access control (DFAC) scheme using
multi-authority ABE [42] to prevent a single point of failure. Instead of using one authority,
like FDAC, several distribution centres (DCs) are used to store and distribute different access
structures, sets of attributes and cryptographic keys to users and sensor nodes. All DCs are disjoint
from each other. Each DC has its own access subtree (a subtree contains attributes at the leaf nodes
of that subtree.) for each sensor node. Users, who want to access data at the sensor node, need
to activate their ID with each DC to obtain access structures, access subtrees and keys. All of the
subtrees from each DC are ANDed together to build a complete access structure for a single user,
but the user has to store all of the access structures in order to access different types of data from
the sensor network. This model facilitates modification and secret key distribution when the access
rights of a user are changed, but the communication overhead of the user’s revocation process is
higher than with FDAC.
• Distributed Fine-Grained Data Access Control for Distributed Sensor Networks
(DFG-AC) (2011)
Hur [43] proposed an access control model called distributed fine-grained data access control
(DFG-AC). It uses both a network controller and a data aggregator for central key management
and central storage. The collected data from sensor nodes are transferred to the data aggregator
by using a distributed sensor data collection protocol, such as the Two-Tier Data Dissemination
protocol (TTDD) [44]. The main idea of using the data aggregator as central storage is to perform
more data encryption. Additionally, the users can get all of the information by accessing the data
aggregator. The data aggregator is more powerful than the sensor nodes, and it can use complex
encryption methods. The advantage of the proposed model is that it considers the stateless receiver
problem. (Practically, users may miss a key update message. Therefore, they cannot keep their
key states up-to-date. This problem is known as the stateless receiver problem.) To solve this
problem, key revocation is done with a stateless group key distribution mechanism using a binary
tree. One of the disadvantages is that the transmitting data from sensor nodes to the data aggregator
consumes lots of battery power and energy. In addition, there might be a single point of failure
because of the centralised data storage. This model provides user revocation by using the KP-ABE
scheme with the attributes for distributed WSNs.
• Adaptive Access Control (A2C) (2012)
Htoo et al. [45,46] proposed an adaptive access control (A2C) model with privilege overriding
and behaviour monitoring to provide fine-grained access control for medical data in WSNs. A2C
incorporates the concept of possibility-with-override and a user behaviour trust model into WSNs
for hard-to-define and unanticipated situations. This model has a similar structure to BTG-RBAC,
but the main difference is that no human effort is needed to override rules and policies, because
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of the introduction of the overriding access privileges, the users’ behaviour trust model and the
prevention and detection mechanism. In this model, the users may be able to override a denial
of access, when unexpected events occur. In addition, the users’ behaviour trust model is used
to check user’s action, location, time, etc. The advantage of this model is that all of the user
behaviour information is kept by the prevention and detection mechanism as an audit record to
detect and prevent abnormal and unauthorised access, whenever the users try to access data from
WSNs. ABE-based encryption and TTDD are used for data storage and data transmission. The
main contribution of the proposed model is to adapt to unexpected situations by using privilege
overriding and also to adjust its decision based on users’ behaviour trust values.
3.2.2. Elliptic Curve Cryptography-Based Access Control (EC-CBAC)
Elliptic curve cryptography-based access control (EC-CBAC) models [36,47,48] use ECC to
authorize and grant users access to data. They prevent the malicious nodes from joining the sensor
network. ECC has become popular as the solution for WSN due to low computational overhead and
small key size. Unlike for the RBAC and ABE-based access control models, there is no table for the
evolution of ECC-based models in this section. The similarity of the proposed models is simply that
they used ECC-based encryption.
• Wang, Sheng and Li Model (2006)
Wang et al. [47] proposed an access control model based on ECC. The main objective of the
proposed model is to use an ECC scheme for granting user access rights to the collected data.
Different users may have different levels of data access due to restriction of access implicated
by the data confidentiality and privacy. ECC is used in key distribution and sharing information
between the users and a key distribution centre (KDC). In this approach, KDC is responsible
for generating all security primitives, such as random numbers, access lists and hash functions,
and maintains a user list with associated user identifications. The users have to request access
permission from KDC. Access lists, which comprise user identity, group identity and user privilege
mask, define the user’s access privileges. User access privilege mask is a number of binary bits,
and each bit represents a specific information or service. Therefore, users who possess the same
mask and access privileges are put in the same group.
• Zhou, Zhang and Fang Model (2007)
Zhou et al. [36] proposed an access control protocol based on ECC for node authentication and
key establishment. The main idea of their approach is to accomplish node authentication and key
establishment for new nodes, whenever they join the sensor network. The proposed access control
model uses node identity and node bootstrapping time for the node authentication procedure. They
introduced the node bootstrapping time into authentication procedures to differentiate malicious
nodes from legitimate new nodes. In this model, the authors are mostly looking at the node
deployment to prevent malicious nodes from joining the network. A certification authority
(CA) is used to generate a certificate, which includes ID information and bootstrapping time,
to authenticate the identity of a new node. Furthermore, the node certificate is signed with CA’s
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private key. Therefore, the adversaries cannot alter ID and bootstrapping time. When the new node
is deployed in WSNs, it shows its certificate to the neighbour nodes in order to verify its identity
with CA’s public key. This access control protocol enforces control sensor node deployment and
prevents malicious nodes from joining sensor networks.
• Al-Mahmud and Morogan Model (2012)
Al-Mahmud and Morogan [48] proposed an identity-based authentication and access control
model in WSNs. The main idea of the proposed model is to use an identity-based signature
(IBS) [49] for providing both user authentication and data access control in WSNs. This protocol
is based on the IBS scheme, where an ECC-based digital signature algorithm (DSA) [50] is used
to sign and verify a message. A base station (BS) is responsible for generating the private keys of
both users and sensor nodes in the network. For the key distribution, a one pass key establishment
protocol [51] is used to share session keys between sensor nodes and users. Users are required to
register with BS. Based on the access request from the users, BS generates private key and access
structure for each user. The sensor nodes are preloaded with hash value of user identities and the
private key, which will be used for the authentication process. After the authentication process,
the sensor node will check whether the user is authorized to access the data.
3.3. Users’ Privacy-Preserving Access Control (UPPAC)
Most of the access control models in WSNs are to provide data privacy and data confidentiality. The
privacy of users and sensor nodes in WSNs is different from data privacy and has received less attention
in the literature. In user privacy, users aim to hide their ID and other information. Therefore, no one in
the network knows the real ID of a user, except the network authority and the user himself. Recently,
there are two schemes proposed for the privacy-preservation of users’ information in WSNs, namely
distributed privacy-preserving access control (DP2AC) [52] and distributed privacy-preserving access
control (PRICCESS) [53]. The PRICCESS model is related to the RBAC model. The main reason why
the PRICCESS model is presented under UPPAC is that it provides user privacy preserving distributed
access control in WSNs.
• Distributed Privacy-Preserving Access Control (DP2AC) (2009)
Zhang et al. [52] proposed distributed privacy-preserving access control (DP2AC). The owner
of the sensor network generates the token by using a blind signature [54]. Users need to buy
tokens from the network owner before entering the sensor network. The tokens can be verified by
any sensor node in the network, but no one can tell the identity of the token holder, including the
network owner. There is no relationship between user identities and tokens, so privacy preservation
for users is achieved. Once the token is validated by a sensor node, it provides the user with a
certain amount of requested data, which is equivalent to the denomination of the token. The main
objective of the proposed DP2AC model is that the network owner can prevent unauthorised access
to sensed data, while users can protect their data access privacy.
However, a recent study [55] pointed out that DP2AC is not fine-grained access control, because
each anonymous user has the same access privileges. Furthermore, the network user cannot sign
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a query command, because of the blind signature. As a result, the adversary can easily intercept
the tokens and impersonate authorized users to access data at the sensor nodes. A disadvantage
of using tokens in a WSN is that the sensor nodes need more storage for the token detection
mechanism. All of the used tokens have to be recorded and stored in the sensor nodes to prevent
the tokens being reused by malicious and unauthorized users.
• Distributed Privacy-Preserving Access Control (PRICCESS) (2011)
He et al. [53] proposed the PRICCESS protocol for WSNs. The main contribution to the research
community of this protocol is that it provides user privacy-preserving distributed access control in
a single-owner multi-user sensor network. A ring signature [56] is used to protect the anonymity of
users by using a group ID and group signature. Each group of users has different access privileges,
IDs and keys for signature. Users have to activate their information with a network controller to
receive the group ID and keys for data access. Users with the same access privileges are likely to
be put in the same group by the network controller. The PRICCESS model used an ACL matrix to
store the access list of the group for data access control in the network controller. Any user from
the group can use a group key when he signs the message for data access request. Therefore, the
network controller verifies that the message has been signed by one of the group members without
knowing who the actual signer is. One of the disadvantage of using ring signature is that the
overhead of signature becomes large when there is a large number of user groups in the network.
We have categorized and briefly discussed the access control models for WSNs in this section; next
we compare these access control models.
4. Comparison of Access Control Models in WSNs
This section compares current access control models as have been discussed above based on network
model, key management, data encryption, policy specification, the decision-making process, user
revocation and user privacy preservation. An outline of the comparison is presented in Table 2.
4.1. Network Model
Access control models can be different based on their network architecture model when the
cryptographic keys, roles, policies and attributes are distributed to users from the trusted authority or
controller. Based on the above discussion about current access control models in WSNs, we separated
them into two different network architecture models, namely the centralised network model and the
distributed network model.
In a centralised network model, WSN is deployed and initialized with key, role, attributes, etc., by
the controller. Whenever the users want to access data from the network, they have to register with the
controller to obtain the keys, access structure, token, role, etc. Some schemes involve cooperation with
a certificate authority (CA) before the users register with the controller. The users can send a query
message with keys, access structure, token, etc., which have to be matched the keys, attributes, role, etc.,
from the sensor nodes. If the users have the right access privilege, the sensor nodes will allow the users
to access data based on their access privileges.
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Table 2. Comparison of access control models in WSNs.
Access
Control
Model
Network
Architecture
and
Component
Key
Management
Encryption
and
Decryption
Policy
Specification
and Decision-
Making Process
User
Revocation
User Privacy
Preservation
Zhu’s Model
[23]
Authentication
Manager (AM)
DH - Role, Purpose,
Operation
- -
CA-RBAC
[1]
System
Administrator
(SA)
- - Role, Context
Information
- -
BTG-RBAC
[26]
System
Administrator
(SA)
- - Role, Purpose,
Operation,
Obligation
- -
FDAC [29] Network
Controller (NC)
DB-DH ABE Attributes-Based
Key
CP-ABE -
DFAC [41] Distribution
Centre (DC)
B-DH ABE Attributes-Based
Key
ABE -
DFG-AC
[43]
System
Controller
(SC) and Data
Aggregator
B-DH ABE Attributes-Based
Key
Attribute
Level User
Revocation
-
A2C [45] System
Administrator
(SA)
- ABE Attributes-Based
Key, Context
Information,
Behaviour Trust
Value
- -
Wang,
Sheng and
Li Model
[47]
Key
Distribution
Centre (KDC)
EC-DH ECC Key - -
Zhou, Zhang
and Fang
Model [36]
Certificate
Authority (CA)
DH ECC Key - -
Al-Mahmud
and
Morogan
Model [48]
Base Station
(BS)
One-Pass Key
Establishment
Protocol
ECC-Based
IBE
Key (Built on ID) - -
DP2AC [52] Network Owner RSA-DH RSA Role, Token - Blind
Signature
PRICCESS
[53]
Certificate
Authority (CA)
DH ECC Role, Group Key - Ring Signature
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Figure 5. Centralized network model.
An overview diagram of the centralised network model is shown in Figure 5. The current access
control models, such as Zhu’s model [23], CA-RBAC [1], BTG-RBAC [26], the FDAC model [29],
DFG-AC [43], Wang, Sheng and Li’s model [47], Zhou, Zhang and Fang’s model [36], Al-Mahmud
and Morogan’s model [48], DP2AC [52] and PRICCESS [53], used the centralised network model.
The controller shown in Figure 5 might be identified as the authentication manager (AM) [23],
system administrator (SA) [1,26], network controller (NC) [29], system controller (SC) [43], key
distribution center (KDC) [47], base station (BS) [48], certificate authority (CA) [36,53] or network
owner [52]. Users have to register with the controller to obtain the access privileges for data access. The
disadvantage of the centralised network management model is that a single point of failure can occur at
anytime, because the controller manages all of the key generation, distribution, etc. If the controller is
compromised, there is no security provision in the network.
In the distributed network model, multiple controllers manage the WSN instead of it being handled by
just one controller, as in the centralized network model. A user has to register with several distribution
centres (DCs) to obtain the data access according to his/her access privileges. In the distributed approach,
the controllers are not cooperating with each other. The public key of the network is derived from the
attributes. A sensor node is preloaded with some attributes from each DC and the public key parameter
set based on the possession of attributes. Each user needs to present his/her identity to each DC to
get a set of attributes and a set of access structures. An access structure consists of subtrees, which
contain attributes at the leaf nodes. Even at the leaf nodes of subtrees, there are AND, OR and t-out-of-n
threshold operations. Each DC gives only one access subtree to the user. All of the subtrees from each
DC are ANDed together to build a complete access structure for a single user. The user who matches a set
of attributes with a sensor is able to access data from that sensor. If one controller is compromised by an
attacker, he can only get certain types of data, which are managed by that controller. The disadvantage of
the distributed approach is that the sensor nodes need to interact with more than one controller and store
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multiple keys when the network is initialised and deployed by the controllers. The overview diagram of
the distributed network model can be seen in Figure 6.
Figure 6. Distributed network model.
Based on the above discussion, most of the access control models in WSNs use the centralised
approach apart from DFAC [41] and A2C [45], which use the distributed approach. However, the
network models are quite similar for all the access control models. In each model, different controllers
are used for network management and for key distribution. All of the controllers have similar
functionality, such as CA or trusted authority. Overall, AM, CA, SA, NC, DC, KDC and the network
owner, which have much the same functionality, are used in the current models to handle network
management and key distribution.
4.2. Key Management
The Diffie–Hellman (DH) key exchange protocol and ECC are widely used for key distribution
and key management in access control models in WSNs. Simple DH key exchange is used in Zhu’s
scheme [23] to provide sensor level access control and to protect from malicious nodes joining the
network. DH key exchange protocol is simple and fully distributed, and ECC has smaller-sized
cryptographic keys than other public key schemes. Therefore, the combination of DH and ECC is
suitable to use in resource and memory limited small devices, like sensor nodes. The ECC-based DH key
management scheme is used in Zhou, Zhang and Fang’s model [36], PRICCESS [53] and Wang, Sheng
and Li’s model [47]. ECC-based decisional bilinear Diffie–Hellman (DB-DH) is used in FDAC [29].
However, bilinear Diffie-Hellman (B-DH) is used in both DFG-AC [43] and DFAC [41]. RSA-based
public and private keys are used for key management in DP2AC [52], but the key management scheme
is based on the DH approach. In addition, the uTESLA[57] protocol is used by the network owner to
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update keys of the sensor nodes. In Al-Mahmud and Morogan’s model [48], a one-pass key establishment
protocol is used for the key distribution and shared session keys between sensor nodes, users and the
base station. There is no explanation about the key management scheme in BTG-RBAC [26] and
CA-RBAC [1].
4.3. Data Encryption
A popular encryption method for data storage in WSNs is using ABE at the sensor nodes. ABE-based
encryption is popular relative to other public key encryption methods because of its highly promising
approach to realize scalability and fine-grained access control. The ABE method is used in the
FDAC [29], DFAC [41], DFG-AC [43] and A2C [45] models for data encryption, as well as for data
access control. Data in the sensor nodes are encrypted using attributes and keys from the trusted
authorities. Data access is given only to users who have both keys and access structures to match the
attributes and keys from the sensor nodes. Other public key encryption methods are based on ECC
and RSA. ECC is a popular choice for data encryption, because of its characteristics, such as small
sized key and low overhead. ECC-based encryption is used in Zhou, Zhang and Fang’s model [36],
PRICCESS [53] and Wang, Sheng and Li’s model [47]. Simple data encryption based on RSA is used
in DP2AC [52] for data encryption.
4.4. Policy Specification and Decision-Making Process
Policy specification and decision-making processes depend on the network architecture and policy;
and the role specifications in the access control model. The decision-making process is based on
predefined roles and policies in RBAC-based models, such as Zhu’s model [23], CA-RBAC [1] and
BTG-RBAC [26], but in CB-RBAC, contextual information and roles are considered. BTG-RBAC used
authorization and obligation roles to make access decisions based on users’ requests in an emergency.
The main disadvantage of using the RBAC model is that the data access roles and policies need to be
defined in advance. Sometimes, it is hard to predict and predefine all the possibility of roles and policies
for policy specification and the decision-making process.
In ABE-based access control models, such as FDAC [29], DFAC [41], DFG-AC [43] and A2C [45],
attributes, such as location, role, etc., are used to define policies and make access decisions on users’
requests. The access policies are different based on the attributes and the unique key from each
user. In the A2C model, not only an attributes-based key is used, but also contextual information
and a behaviour trust value are used to make a flexible access decision in any situation. Therefore,
to override a denial access policy in the A2C model, the key, behaviour trust value and contextual
information are considered in order to make an effective access decision. In Wang, Sheng and Li’s
model [47], the private key and access list of the user are used to make an access decision at the sensor
nodes, but for Zhou, Zhang and Fang’s model [36], the private key and certificate are used for node
deployment. In Al-Mahmud and Morogan’s model [48], hash values of the user identity and the private
key of the user are used to specify policy. DP2AC [52] used a blind signature to generate a token,
which contains access privileges for the data. For PRICCESS [53], the ACL matrix is used to store roles
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and policies. These policies and roles are stored based on a group of users and their access privileges.
Therefore, each group of users has different access privileges based on their group’s policy.
4.5. User Revocation
User revocation means that the users’ service subscription is expired, the key of the user is
compromised or the user changes to a different group intentionally. It has received less attention in
WSNs. Only FDAC [29], DFAC [41] and DFG-AC [43] discussed user revocation in WSNs. In FDAC
and DFAC, the life time of a sensor node is divided into many phases. In each phase, the master key of
the network is updated by using a CP-ABE-based broadcast encryption scheme to prevent unauthorized
access from the old users who leave the sensor network. Only users who still have access to the sensed
data will receive the key update messages from the trusted authority. In DFG-AC [43], the system
controller notifies and sends the updated membership list to a data aggregator, as well as to the network
users that are listed on the membership list. When the data aggregator receives the notification message,
it changes the attribute group key and re-encrypts the stored data with that key. Therefore, only the
network users, who receive the update message, are able to access data from the sensor nodes.
4.6. Users’ Privacy Preservation
DP2AC [52] and PRICCESS [53] provide privacy preservation for users who access data from the
network. In DP2AC, the network owner generates the token by using a blind signature. No one will
know the true identity of that user, including the network owner himself, because user information is
not needed to generate the tokens. The ring signature is used in the PRICCESS protocol to provide the
privacy of user information in WSNs. Anyone in a group can access data by using the group ring key
instead of using his own identity and key. An alternative way to provide privacy preserving in WSNs
is to use pseudo-random functions (PRF) [58]. In that approach, the user ID is computed with a PRF
function to generate a random number. Therefore, no one in the network will know who the actual signer
of the access request is.
Table 2 shows the comparison of access control models in WSNs based on the above discussion. The
next section evaluates current access control models based on features and performance.
5. Evaluation of Access Control Model in WSNs
In this section, the criteria used for the comparison and evaluation of access control models are studied
and a novel set of evaluation criteria is proposed. The current access control models in WSNs will be
evaluated based on two aspects: features and performance evaluation.
5.1. Evaluation Based on Features
To make meaningful comparisons of the current access control models in WSNs, the evaluation
framework is defined to compare and contrast current access control models by using the following
features [27,59,60].
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1. Support Data Privacy
The need for data privacy is growing among all of the real-world applications in WSNs. Data pri-
vacy becomes more and more important in WSNs, when data are to be released to only authorized
and legitimate users. The more data being disclosed, the more the owner of that data loses his
own privacy.
2. Support User Privacy
The need for user privacy is important in some applications. Sometimes, a user, who tries to
access data from the network, does not want to share his detailed information with other users in
the network. This means that the users’ privacy preservation is needed to protect the privacy of
user information in the network.
3. Flexibility
No matter how perfect an access control system is, if it does not support accommodation to
changes, such as insertion and deletion of the application systems, the access control model is
not feasible to use in real-world applications. In WSNs, the user characteristics and the access
context are changing continuously. Therefore, the access control decisions must be synchronised
with continuously changing security conditions. It is desirable for the access control model to
handle the dynamism of users and environments. Therefore, the access control model needs to be
flexible enough to support changes and synchronise with the access control decisions.
4. Support for Emergency Data Access
An ideal access control model needs to support data access, not only in normal situations, but also
in an emergency situation. Many applications will benefit from such a provision.
5. Context Sensitivity
An access control model is context sensitive when context information plays a role in making the
appropriate access decision. This means that the contextual information is used in defining policies
for making an access control decision dynamically.
6. Granularity
There are two different types of granularity in access control, which are fine-grained and
coarse-grained. Fine-grained means that the access control models should allow different roles
for specific data accesses and provide a fine-grained reference to the subjects and objects.
Coarse-grained means that groups of users and collections of objects often share the same access
control requirements. The access control system should then offer support for authorization
specific to the groups of users, objects and possibly actions.
These six supporting features listed above are used to evaluate the current access control models
in WSNs. Table 3 shows a comparison of current access control models based on these features and
qualities. The first row of the table describes evaluation criteria, and the first column lists access control
models. Each cell in the table shows whether the model of that row has the feature of that column.
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All of the access control models in WSNs provide data confidentiality and data privacy in normal
conditions, but the users’ privacy preservation is only supported in DP2AC and PRICCESS. The access
control models that used ABE and contextual information to make access decisions provide flexibility in
the system. Based on Table 3, all of the access control models in WSNs support authorization decisions
and allow for changes, like roles, users, policy, etc. Among them, CA-RBAC, BTG-RBAC and A2C
support emergency and immediate data access, but data privacy has not been discussed, apart from the
adaptive access control model. There are few access control models that make authorization decisions
based on context information. Approximately equal numbers of access control models support coarse-
grained and fine-grained. As a summary, the authorization policy for each scheme is different, which
means that all models are proposed to solve different problems and look from different points of view
to fill the gaps in WSNs area. In addition, there is no access control model that provides data privacy in
emergency and unexpected conditions, apart from A2C model.
Table 3. Comparison of access control models based on features in WSNs.
Access Control
Models
Support
Data
Privacy
Support
User
Privacy
Flexibility
Support For
Emergency
Access
Context
Sensitivity
Granularity
Zhu’s Model [23] Yes No No No No Coarse-Grained
CA-RBAC [1] Yes No Yes Yes Yes Fine-Grained
BTG-RBAC [26] Yes No Yes Yes No Coarse-Grained
FDAC [29] Yes No Yes No Yes Fine-Grained
DFAC [41] Yes No Yes No Yes Fine-Grained
DFG-AC [43] Yes No No No Yes Fine-Grained
A2C [45] Yes No Yes Yes Yes Fine-Grained
Wang, Sheng and
Li Model [47]
Yes No No No No Coarse-Grained
Zhou, Zhang and
Fang Model [36]
Yes No No No No Coarse-Grained
Al-Mahmud and
Morogan Model
[48]
Yes No No No No Coarse-Grained
DP2AC [52] Yes Yes No No No Coarse-Grained
PRICCESS [53] Yes Yes No No No Coarse-Grained
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5.2. Evaluation Based on Performance
The performance evaluation is discussed based on computation cost, communication cost, memory
usage and processing or execution time. Before we discuss the performance evaluation, we describe the
hardware specifications and products that are used to deploy the access control engines and models for
WSNs. Figure 7 shows the comparison of hardware specifications that are used in the proposed access
control models. Based on Figure 7, the various platforms of sensor nodes are used. The CPU speed and
size of the memory are also varied based on the sensor node’s platform. However, all of the sensor nodes
are chosen to use IEEE 802.15.4 as the communication protocol. Some of the proposed access control
models in WSNs are not developed in practice, yet, but some of them are implemented in experiments.
Figure 7. A comparison of hardware specification.
Differently, A2C [45] has been designed and implemented in the simulation environment of
Ponder2 [61] for wireless body sensor networks in medical applications. The simulation results show
that fine-grained data access control is provided in this model, but there is no performance evaluation
based on memory, CPU speed, etc. Therefore, we cannot make a fully comparative performance
evaluation, but the performance evaluation of the developed access control models will be discussed
briefly. The comparison has been made based on the results obtained from the implementation and
evaluation outcomes of the proposed WSN access control models. In Figure 8, there are many blanks
cells in the table. This means that the performance measurement of each model is varied and measured
differently based on the design and what kind of security services are provided. It would be very useful
for future research if some kind of benchmark could be produced to compare the performance of different
WSN access control models.
Without such a benchmark, the performance evaluation for each model is quite different and is
measured differently. The computation overhead for each access control model is different based on
how the access control model has been designed and what was the purpose of the proposed model. The
processing time of access decisions and authentication processes are different based on what kinds of
method and approach are used in the proposed models. For example, in Zhu’s model, the processing of
authorization and obligation decisions takes about 81 µs and 62 µs, respectively. The processing time
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of access control decisions in CA-RBAC is 33 ms, which excludes delays due to the communication
overhead, length of the message, message collisions and verification of digital certificates. In Wang,
Sheng and Li’s model, the total access decision time is 14.13 s, which is relatively long, when compared
with CA-RBAC. It includes the users perceived delay from sending out the access request to the sensor
node, as well as the amount of time for the sensor node to make an access decision and to approve the
users. Ten-point-one seconds is required for the authentication processing time in Wang, Sheng and Li’s
model. This seems to indicate that the proposed WSN models are not measuring the same thing.
Figure 8. A comparison of access control models based on performance Evaluation.
It is also important to measure the processing time of encryption and decryption under the
computation overhead. The processing delay of both TinyECC [62] -based encryption and decryption
for 52-bytes message is 9.5 s and 5.2 s in Zhu’s model. If a symmetric Skipjack cryptography [63] is
used instead of TinyECC, the processing delay will be decreased dramatically from 9.5 s to 150 µs for
encryption and from 5.2 s to 90 µs for decryption. The processing time of encryption for 64-bytes text
message in the PRICCESS model is 0.39 ms, but there is no information about the processing time of
decryption in this model. In FDAC, the computation overhead of one scalar multiplication (the sensor
nodes need to execute one scalar multiplication on elliptic curves, one-way hash and one symmetric
key data encryption for 64-bytes text message) on Imote2 is 139 ms when working with 104 MHz.
For 208 MHz and 416 MHz, it took 69 ms and 35 ms for one scalar multiplication. The computation
overhead of one scalar multiplication will be much lower, if the RSA-based algorithm is used instead of
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the ECC-based algorithm. The processing time of encryption is 0.4 ms for the RSA-based algorithm to
encrypt 64 bytes of random text.
Some access control models are mostly concerned with the energy consumption in WSNs, because
battery power is used. Therefore, it is important to measure the energy consumption based on
computation and communication cost. In Wang, Sheng and Li’s model, the power consumption
for communication is calculated based on the maximum current draw. The total computation and
communication cost for one access control decision in this model is 55.1 mJ, which is 54.4 mJ for
computation cost and 594.8 µJ for communication cost. In FDAC, the energy consumption cost for one
scalar multiplication process in 104 MHz is 8.74 mJ. In PRICCESS, the energy consumption cost will
be different based on the number of users in a group. The node verification cost for 10, 20, 30, 40 and
50 members in the group is 0.35 J, 0.66 J, 0.98 J, 1.29 J and 1.45 J.
Based on the hardware specification of the sensor node in Figure 5, there is a limited memory storage
for each sensor node, but it will be different on the platforms. Therefore, the usage of memory for each
sensor node has to be measured correctly and carefully. Comparing Zhu’s model with Wang, Sheng and
Li’s model, the memory usage for authentication executable occupies 31.77 Kb and 46.01 Kb of ROM,
respectively, but for RAM, 2.88 Kb and 2.01 Kb are occupied. The total memory requirement for the
CA-RBAC model is 2.87 Kb.
Based on the above discussion, the comparison of the proposed WSN access control models is hard to
clarify, especially in performance measurement, because these models are proposed and designed based
on different requirements and different security services to fill the gaps of active application areas in
WSNs. It also shows and indicates that various access control models are measuring different things.
Further studies are needed to clarify and evaluate the performance measurement of WSN access control
models. This means that the authors, or other researchers in the WSN community, should study and
measure the performance of all of the proposed WSN access control models in a similar way. The next
section will explain some potential research issues for the access control models based on the above
comparison and evaluation results.
6. Potential Research Issues
The development of access control in WSNs is challenging, because memory and other resources are
limited, but access control is an essential security service, which is necessary to prevent unauthorized
access by malicious users in a WSN. Especially in medical and military applications, data access controls
for legitimate users are important to provide in any situation, because it is hard to assume and predefine
all of the possibilities of what will happen in the future and what kind of unexpected situations will occur
in the system. Based on the above literature review of the current access control models in WSNs and
WMSNs, key open research issues are identified as follows:
• Various access control models have been proposed; however, no systematic comparisons have been
conducted on these models. Further evaluation and comparison is desirable to learn the security
services, performance, reliability and efficiency of these access control models.
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• Most of the proposed access control models for WSNs are focused on node authentication and
query authentication, but users’ data access control has received little attention. The control of the
user to the sensed data at the sensor nodes merits more investigation.
• Current access control models need to be made much more flexible to make access decisions on the
unexpected events, because it is hard to predefine all of the possibilities in a WSN. A new access
control model is needed to address higher reliability, scalability, availability and accountability
to prevent unauthorized user access and allow authorized users data access in unexpected and
unpredictable cases.
• The performance of WSN access control models should be studied and measured carefully in the
future. It would be useful to produce an appropriate benchmark for the WSN research community.
• It is also likely that more powerful sensor nodes will need to be designed in order to support the
increasing requirements for computation and communication in the sensor nodes. This means that
a powerful encryption and decryption method should be able to apply in the future.
7. Conclusion
In this paper, we present the security vulnerabilities, security requirements and a literature review of
current access control models, and also, we discuss the performance evaluation and comparison of the
proposed models in WSNs. Although research efforts have been made on cryptography, key distribution
and management and access control models in WSNs, there are still some challenges to be addressed, like
the selection of appropriate cryptographic methods. Furthermore, the design of access control models
in WSNs must satisfy constraints, such as energy, computation capacity and memory. Access control is
a critical security service in sensor networks and is essential to ensure that network services are offered
only to legitimate users in WSNs. The comparison of current access control models showed that there is
still lots of work to be done on access control models in WSNs, especially for emergency and immediate
data access.
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Abstract—Wireless Sensor Networks (WSNs) have recently
attracted a lot of attention in the research community because it is
easy to deploy them in the physical environment and collect and
disseminate environmental data from them. The collected data
from sensor nodes can vary based on what kind of application
is used for WSNs. Data conﬁdentiality and access control to that
collected data are the most challenging issues in WSNs because
the users are able to access data from the different location via
ad-hoc manner. Access control is one of the critical requirements
to prevent unauthorised access from users. The current access
control models in information systems cannot be applied straight-
forwardly because of some limitations namely limited energy,
resource and memory, and low computation capability. Based
on the requirements of WSNs, we proposed the Break-The-
Glass Access Control (BTG-AC) model which is the modiﬁed
and redesigned version of Break-The-Glass Role-Based Access
Control (BTG-RBAC) model. The several changes within the
access control engine are made in BTG-RBAC to apply and ﬁt
in WSNs. We developed the BTG-AC model in Ponder2 package.
Also a medical scenario was developed to evaluate the BTG-AC
model for medical data in WSNs. In this paper, detail design,
implementation phase, evaluation result and policies evaluation
for the BTG-AC model are presented. Based on the evaluation
result, the BTG-AC model can be used in WSNs after several
modiﬁcations have been made under Ponder2 Package.
I. INTRODUCTION
Wireless Sensor Networks (WSNs) have been an area of
signiﬁcant research for a decade because of the potential
to change the way of living with applications in military
surveillance, electronic medical record, medicine, disaster and
emergency management, and many other areas. Recently,
WSNs have become more widespread and more active in the
research community. The nature of WSNs consist of a hundred
or even a thousand of sensor nodes that have an ability to
collect, store and transfer data between each other in the
network. These days, the sensor nodes can even store and
collect multimedia information themselves. A user, who has
an appropriate permission, is able to access the collect data at
the sensor nodes directly via ad-hoc manner. This means that
the data security and control access to that data are essential to
provide in WSNs when the users try to access collected data
at the sensor nodes. Based on the requirements of application,
the provision of security requirements can change. For the
military and medical application, the data collected by sensor
nodes need to be stored securely and allowed access only to the
authorised users. Therefore, some kinds of security mechanism
are required for WSNs to provide the security requirements
such as conﬁdentiality, integrity, authenticity, etc.
This paper focuses on an access control model in WSNs
and Body Area Networks (BANs). The current access control
models in information systems are not efﬁcient enough to
apply directly in WSNs and BSNs because of limitations such
as limited memory, resource and power. These limitations
impose unique security challenge. A new light-weight access
control model is desired to provide the ﬂexible making process
of decision in WSNs. Towards addressing these requirements
of WSNs, we developed a BTG-AC model. This is a modiﬁed
and redesigned version of BTG-RBAC [1] to better ﬁt for
WSNs. It provides a ﬂexible approach to the access control
engine. The implementation results in Ponder2 framework [2]
are also discussed. The remaining structure of this paper is
explained as follows. Section 2 presents the related work.
Section 3 discusses an overview of the BTG-AC model for
WSNs. The development and implementation of the BTG-AC
model can be seen in Section 4. Section 5 provides evaluation
results based on a medial scenario. Section 6 concludes the
paper with the suggestion for future work.
II. RELATED WORK
An access control is a critical security service to prevent
unauthorised access to certain network resources. In WSNs,
users can enter a sensor ﬁeld directly to access data at
the sensor nodes. Different users may have different access
privileges to access data at the sensor nodes based on their
roles. Maw et al. [3] stated that a considerable number of
access control models has been proposed for use in WSNs,
though some of them are not yet implemented. Most of the
current access control models in WSNs and Wireless Medical
Sensor Network (WMSN) are based on traditional Role-Based
Access Control (RBAC), which has been widely accepted
as a policy access control model. Cryptography-based access
control is designed for the untrusted environment, where the
lack of global knowledge and control are deﬁning charac-
teristics. Cryptography is relied upon to control data access
and to ensure data conﬁdentiality and integrity. Cryptography
methods in WSNs should meet the constraints of sensor nodes.
Yu et al. [4] proposed the Fine-grained Distributed Data
Access Control (FDAC) model based on Attribute Based
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Encryption. The main idea of their approach is to provide a
distributed data access control which is able to support ﬁne-
grained access control over sensor data. A network controller,
which stores access structures, acts like a central distribution
centre and distributes keys to users in FDAC. Only users with
the right access structure and the right key can access data at
the sensor nodes. The access structures will be different for
each user depending on the access privileges of users. If the
network controller is compromised by a malicious user, there
will be no security provisioning in the system anymore.
Garcia-Morchon and Wehrle [5] proposed the Context-
Aware Role-Based Access Control (CA-RBAC) model based
on a modular context structure for WMSNs. The aim of the
model is to provide context awareness and adapt its security
properties to ensure the users’ safety. Normally, an authorised
doctor needs to verify his access control role in order to access
the medical data of a patient but a nurse may not have the same
level of privilege. When the system declares to be a critical or
emergency case based on the modular context information, the
doctor or nurse can take any action and can access data even
though they may not be able to access that data in normal
conditions. One of the disadvantages of this model is that
there is no prevention or detection mechanism nor veriﬁcation
process to check a user’s data access right, when the emergency
occurs.
Maw et al. [6], [7] proposed an Adaptive Access Control
(A2C) model with privilege overriding and behaviour moni-
toring to provide ﬁne-grained access control for medical data
in WSNs. This model has a similar structure to BTG-RBAC
[1] but the main difference is that no human effort is needed
to override rules and policies because of an introduction of the
users’ behaviour trust model, and the prevention and detection
mechanism. In this model, the users may be able to override
a denial of access, when unexpected events occur. In addition,
the users’ behaviour trust model is used to check the user’s
action, location, time, etc but there is no detailed information
about the behaviour trust model. Without the behaviour trust
model, the access decisions cannot be made effectively.
The current access control models in WSNs such as FDAC,
CA-RBAC and A2C are mostly looking at how to avoid overly
tight policy in the system. Sometimes, the overly tight access
control policy might hold access for the appropriate users in
unanticipated events. Ferreira et al introduced the BTG-RBAC
engine [1], [8] to integrate BTG in the core RBAC model with
obligations. They proposed to securely break access control in
a controlled manner. The BTG-RBAC model was developed in
Premis policy language with an Apache database and XML for
Electronic Medical Records (EMRs). The BTG-RBAC model
cannot be applied directly to WSNs because of limitations of
WSNs. This means that the proposed access control model
needs to be light-weight to apply in WSNs. Therefore, we
redesigned and modiﬁed the BTG-RBAC model to become a
light-weight access control model to ﬁll the gaps of WSNs.
The proposed BTG-AC model has been developed in
Ponder2 [2] that is a popular light-weight policy language
for BANs and WSNs. Ponder2 is implemented as a Self
Managed Cell (SMC) [9]. It is a set of hardware and software
components forming an administrative domain. It is capable
of self management. We assumed that SMC is performed and
worked as the sensor node to evaluate the proposed BTG-AC
with the example medical scenario. Ponder2 comprises a self-
contained, stand-alone, general-purpose object management
system with message passing between objects. It incorporates
an awareness of events and policies and implements a policy
execution framework. It has a high-level conﬁguration and con-
trol language called PonderTalk and user-extensible managed
objects are programmed in Java.
III. BREAK-THE-GLASS ACCESS CONTROL MODEL
Based on the requirements of WSNs, we modiﬁed and
redesigned the framework of the BTG-RBAC model to ﬁt in
WSNs. Our model refer to as Break-The-Glass Access Control
(BTG-AC) still has similar functions to those of the BTG-
RBAC model. The main difference is that the BTG-AC model
has been developed and implemented within the Ponder2
policy package for BANs and WSNs. The proposed BTG-AC
model is to provide BTG action in access control engine for
decision making process regarding access. It provides more
ﬂexible control of access to data in the event of emergency.
The BTG action will perform within the users’ traceability
by extending the access control engine with obligations for
auditing purposes.
Notwithstanding, an overview of BTG-AC in Ponder2
frame-work [2] can be seen in Figure 1. This shows that
there are two main modules in the BTG-AC model: Policy
Enforcement Point (PEP) and Policy Decision Point (PDP).
The user requests will go through PEP and all the user
formation will be forwarded to PDP for the decision making
processes. There are limitations and issues for the BTG-AC
model in Ponder2 language to ﬁt in WSNs. These are discussed
as follow:
• There is no BTG state variable in BTG-AC. This
means that a ﬁxed BTG state value is used.
• Initially the BTG state is set to FALSE but the state is
set as TRUE if there is policy rule that allows a user
to perform the BTG operation. The administrator can
change the BTG state variable and create a new BTG
state for the another or the same role.
• We have assumed that the authentication process is
already provided for PEP in the BTG-AC model
Fig. 1. Overview of the BTG-AC Model
The details information of PEP and PDP are explained next.
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A. Policy Enforcement Point (PEP)
In BTG-AC, PEP performs as an authentication service
provider between the users and sensor nodes. The authenti-
cation service is needed for the provision of security in the
system especially when the access control model is allowing
users to perform BTG action for data access in emergency
situations. A user has to submit the information to PEP for the
authentication process. When PEP receives the access request
from the users, it will check the users’ information such as
their identity and cryptographic key. We assumed that the au-
thentication service is provided through use of a users’ normal
log-in process before forwarding request to PDP. In future, we
will work on the implementation of the authentication service
in PEP by using Attribute-Based-Encryption (ABE) [10].
B. Policy Decision Point (PDP)
In BTG-AC, PDP is a main module. When PDP receives
the decision request from PEP, the access control module will
make an access decision. There are different predeﬁned roles
and policies in the access control module based on the users
location and users’ privileges. In the BTG-AC model, there
is another module - a prevention and detection module - that
keeps a record of all users’ information for audit purposes. The
two modules cooperate with each other to make the access
decision with some ﬂexibility but still within the required
degree of prevention and detection. More details of the access
control module, and prevention and detection module are
explained next.
1) Access Control Module: The access control module is
used to enforce the policies for the decision making process.
The roles and policies are needed to predeﬁne in advance.
Whenever the decision request is forwarded by PEP, the access
control module will check whether the information from that
decision request is matched with predeﬁned roles and policy.
In the access control module, there are three different policies,
namely authorisation, BTG and obligation policy. These three
policies are developed and designed under the access control
module that can be seen on Figure 2.
Fig. 2. The Access Control Module
If a user’s criteria satisﬁes the access control policies, the
access request will be granted. If they do not match, the access
will be denied. In the BTG-AC model, BTG and the obligation
policies are introduced to make access decisions in normal
as well as emergency situations. A user can perform a BTG
action for the targeted object - say, conﬁdential medical record
- in an emergency but some obligations will be triggered
and performed at the same time. In normal access control
models, the decision outcomes will be either permitted or
denied access. The existing decision outcomes in the normal
access control models are extended by introducing BTG and
obligation policy in the access control engine. These decision
outcomes are presented as follow:
• (Permit, ∅) → A user has permission to access the
targeted object.
• (Permit, OBLGS) → A user is allowed to access the
targeted object but an obligation is carried out when
the access is given.
• (Deny, ∅) → A user request to access the targeted
object is denied.
• (Deny, OBLGS) → Along side of a denied access,
some obligations are performed.
• (Permit(BTG)∗(OBLGS)) → A user’s request for ac-
cess has been granted by performing BTG action and
obligations such as ”Write to Audit”, ” Trigger the
Alarm” or ”A Notiﬁcation Message” are performed
along with access decision.
Based on the above decision outcomes, it is clear that the
introduction of BTG and obligation policy is beneﬁcial for
medical data in WSNs. The following section explains more
details of the authorisation, BTG and obligation policy in that
order.
• Authorisation Policy: An authorisation policy is used
in BTG-AC to enforce an access decision. It also
checks whether a user should be allowed to access
the targeted object. In authorisation policy, the subject,
target and action are checked to enforce the policy.
This means that a user, who wants to perform some
action on the target object that stores both normal
and conﬁdential medical information, has to possess a
right access privilege. The access control module will
check whether a user’s access request has possessed
appropriate access right that the subject is allowed to
do at the targeted object.
• Break-the-Glass (BTG) Policy: A BTG policy is
used to perform a BTG operation on a targeted ob-
ject. To perform the BTG operation, the new role
that describes who is allowed to perform a certain
action at the targeted object, is added. The obligation
policy is used along with the BTG operation allowing
an administrator to take actions when the ”glass is
broken”. The new role can be added into the access
control module to present how the BTG state variable
is reset to FALSE. The BTG state of the permission
can be set from TRUE to FALSE or from FALSE to
TRUE. The administrator deﬁnes the BTG policy for
each situation where the BTG action is required by
users in an emergency situation.
• Obligation Policy: An obligation policy is used along
with authorisation and BTG policy in some situations.
The obligation policy checks whether one or more
conditions have been evaluated and if they have, they
carried out one or more actions to be performed. In
the BTG-AC model, after the authorisation policy has
made the evaluation, some obligations are performed
along with the decisions. Similarly the same hap-
pened when the BTG policy is activated and made
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its decision. The obligation policy is linked with the
prevention and detection module to store the user
information and his access request as an audit log.
2) Prevention and Detection Module: A prevention and
detection module can be used for detecting security violations
and ﬂaws in the deﬁned application. It is used to prevent an
unauthorised access in the system. Whenever the obligation
policy is activated, actions such as write to audit, trigger the
alarm, send a notiﬁcation message to administrator or auditor,
etc are performed. There are various methods to store the users’
information for the audit log but an event-oriented approach is
used to keep a record of the event when it happened, and user
information related to that event. Thus, the proposed model
can prevent legitimate use by illegitimate users and detect
illegitimate use by authorised users.
IV. DEVELOPMENT OF THE BREAK-THE-GLASS ACCESS
CONTROL MODEL
The proposed BTG-AC model is an extended version of
Ponder2 in which the BTG concept, obligation policy and
prevention and detection mechanism are applied together. The
interface for all the users such as doctors, nurses and other
member of staff is developed in Java based on managed
objects in Ponder2. The Java class ﬁle is loaded dynamically
into SMC. The PEP and PDP are already implemented for
the proposed BTG-AC model but the policies deﬁnition and
expression of authorisation, BTG and obligation policy can
vary depend on the requirements of application. The deﬁnition
and expression of these three policies for medical data in
Ponder2 is presented as follow.
A. Authorisation Policy
The terms of the authorisation policy can be changed based
on the requirements of the application. In the BTG-AC model,
the predeﬁned authorisation policies will be slightly different
based on the privileges and roles of the users. An example
policy is explained as below:
Def: Permit-Policy
subject A User
role Doctor or Nurse
action Read
target Normal Medical Record
The above authorisation policy deﬁnes that a user -a doctor
or a nurse- has a right to perform an action called ’read’ on a
normal medical record. This means that the subject can only
access the targeted object, when he meets the criteria of the
authorisation policy unless the BTG state variable is TRUE to
make a positive decision for access in an emergency situation.
Otherwise, the user request will be denied.
B. Break-The-Glass (BTG) Policy
A BTG policy provides a ﬂexibility on decision making
process regarding access for the emergency or urgent data ac-
cess. Thus, the BTG policy allows a user access to conﬁdential
data even if he does not have the access right. We assumed that
the BTG policy is already deﬁned in advance for these kinds
of situations to perform BTG action at the targeted object. If
there is no BTG policy for that object, the user request will not
be granted. The example BTG policy can be seen as follows:
Def: BTG Policy
subject Nurse
action Read
BTG Yes
target Conﬁdential Medical Record
do Call Obligation Policy
The above BTG policy deﬁnes that a user - a nurse -
can perform the BTG action to the targeted object but the
obligation policy will be activated when the access is given to
that user.
C. Obligation Policy
An obligation policy is used along with the authorisation
and BTG policies to prevent unauthorised access and to
detect security violations. The example of obligation policy
is explained as follows:
Def: Audit-Log
on auditrecord
if BTG action is performed
do write.audit < subject, Time, Target, User Role >
The above obligation policy deﬁnes that it will be activated
when the ”glass is broken” for urgent and emergency data
access. Thereafter, the users’ information such as subject,
targeted object and user role is stored as comma separated
value (csv) in an audit log for further security purposes.
From the above discussion, it can be seen how the proposed
BTG-AC was developed and how the policies for authorisation,
BTG and obligation can be deﬁned in Ponder2 for medical data
in WSNs. The audit log is kept as comma separate value (csv)
extension in the BTG-AC model. The next section will explain
how the BTG-AC was evaluated based on a medical scenario
that was also developed under Ponder2 package.
V. EVALUATION OF BREAK-THE-GLASS ACCESS
CONTROL MODEL
In this section, a medical scenario is explained. It was
developed under the Ponder2 package to evaluate the BTG-AC
model for BSNs and WMSNs. We assumed that a SMC [9]
is represented as the wearable sensor node. In the example
scenario, each patient had his own BSN, which consisted
of several sensors. The sensor nodes sense and collect
information such as glucose level, temperature, heart rate, etc.
We assumed that collected data were stored as the medical
record in BSN. Users such as doctors and nurses were trying
to access the medical record of the patients via mobile,
personal digital assistant or personal computer. For example,
sensors are able to interact with each other via IEEE 802.15.4
wireless links and interactions with other mobile phone and
personal digital assistant from users via Wiﬁ or Bluetooth.
Each SMC had managed its own policy. These policies were
speciﬁed and could be performed by each SMC.
In a medical scenario, there are two different types of
data for each patient: normal medical records (ob2) and
2014 IEEE 16th International Conference on e-Health Networking, Applications and Services (Healthcom)
133
conﬁdential medical records (ob1). The access policies for
users’ access to these medical records will be different based
on the access privileges and roles of the users. Also different
security levels are required in these medical records. This
means that the tight policies might be used for conﬁdential
medical records to provide data privacy. Nevertheless, the
access to even conﬁdential data can be essential in some
circumstances. For example, the doctor should be able to
access the conﬁdential medical record of a patient when the
nurse cannot but the decision can be changed to a positive
decision if the nurse performs the BTG actions.
Subject Role Operation Object BTG Obligations
Doctor r1 read ob1 - oblg [Write to Audit]
Doctor r2 read ob2 - -
Nurse r3 read ob1 BTG -
Nurse r3 OBTG(read) ob1 - oblg [Notify Manager;
Write to Audit; Trigger
the alarm]
Nurse r4 read ob2 - oblg [Write to Audit]
Staff r5 read ob2 BTG -
Staff r5 OBTG(read) ob2 - oblg [Notify Manager;
Write to Audit; Trigger
the alarm]
TABLE I. EXAMPLE OF BTG-RBAC POLICY
Table 1 shows how the designed of BTG-AC model
is developed for medical data in WSNs with predeﬁned
authorisation, BTG and obligation policies. In this table, the
role (r1) is related to a doctor. The doctor is allowed to
access the conﬁdential medical record (ob1) of a patient but
an obligation such as ”Write to Audit” will be taken as an
action when the decision has been made. This means that
the management teams can check the audit log to detect
security breaches of doctor. The role (r2) allows access of the
doctor to the normal medical record (ob2) without obligation.
This means that the stored data at the object (ob2) is not as
sensitive as object (ob1). The roles and policies for other users
such as nurses and other members of staff will be predeﬁned
differently.
In role (r3), the nurse is not permitted to access the
conﬁdential data (ob1) unless he performs the BTG action in
that object for emergency data access but some obligations will
be activated when ”the glass is broken”. This means that an
extra BTG role is needed for the nurse. The role (r4) allows
the nurse to access the normal medical data (ob2) but still
one obligation action is triggered. The role (r3) and (r5) have
a similar property. There is no way for other members of
staff in the hospital to gain access to the conﬁdential medical
record (ob1). There is a way for them to access the normal
medical record (ob2) but they have to ”break the glass”. The
administrator or manager can easily check the audit log to
detect illegitimate use from authorised users and to prevent
legitimate use from unauthorised users.
A. Evaluation Framework Based on Example Scenario
We evaluate the BTG-AC model based on an example
scenario that was developed under Ponder2 package. In this
section, user interface, BTG interface, audit log interface for
prevention and detection module and how the access decision
was made based on different access policies are presented with
following screen shots.
Fig. 3. User Interface for A Doctor
1) User Interface: To evaluated the BTG-AC model for
medical data in WSNs, we developed the users’ interfaces
under Ponder2 package. Based on Figure 3, a doctor (Aung)
tries to access the normal medical data of Alice. His access
has been granted without any obligation. When he requests
access to the conﬁdential data, his requested information will
be stored as an audit log to detect security breaches.
Fig. 4. User Interface for A Nurse
Different access policies are applied to a nurse. Figure 4
shows the interface of a nurse (Htoo). Based on Figure 4, the
nurse can access the normal medical record of Alice but one
obligation action is triggered and activated when the access is
given. The nurse does not have access right regarding access
to the conﬁdential medical data unless the BTG policy is used
to make an authorisation decision as in urgent and emergency
circumstances. At the same time, obligations are triggered and
activated. The management teams can check the audit log to
prevent and detect security violations.
2) BTG Interface: We developed these simple interfaces for
the BTG action. When a nurse wants to perform a BTG action
2014 IEEE 16th International Conference on e-Health Networking, Applications and Services (Healthcom)
134
to access patients’ conﬁdential data, the BTG interface will
appear. The user’s attempt to gain access will be notiﬁed to the
user and his/her management team and necessary actions will
be taken for security. The conﬁrmation message will appear
twice before the access is given to the nurse. The interfaces
for BTG action are shown in Figure 5.
Fig. 5. Interfaces for BTG
3) Audit Log Interface: We developed the audit framework
based on managed objects in Ponder2 package. The interface
of an audit log can be seen in Figure 6. This Figure shows what
kind of information and data are stored in the audit log. The
ﬁrst audit log shows that the nurse accessed the normal medical
record of Alice. For the second log, the same nurse requested
access to the conﬁdential medical record by performing the
BTG action and his or her access was granted. A doctor, who
accessed a conﬁdential medical record, was granted access as
can be seen in the audit log of that patient. All the access
requests to the medical records are recorded in which everyday
is determine by the user’ role. Based on the audit log, the
management teams can check which users performed the BTG
action and who among these will be granted access to the
conﬁdential medical records.
Fig. 6. Interface for Audit Log
B. Summary
Based on the evaluation results with a medical scenario,
the BTG-RBAC model proposed by Ferreira et al [1] can be
applied for medical data in WSNs after the framework and
several changes within the access control engine are made. The
BTG-AC model provides ﬂexibility of decision making pro-
cesses regarding access to medical records. The three policies
such as authorisation, BTG and obligation cooperate with each
other to make decisions about data access in the emergency
situations. Based on the overall outcomes, the BTG-AC model
can be applied in BSN and WSNs.
VI. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
The overall contributions of this paper are the design and
development of BTG-AC model for medical data in WSNs.
The concepts of BTG, prevention and detection mechanism,
and obligation provide more ﬂexible access than other current
access control models in WSNs. The BTG-AC model has been
developed under Ponder2 package. All the modules - access
control module and prevention and detection module - have
been found to cooperate together to make an access decision
and recorded a users’ accountability to illegitimate data usage
from authorised users as well as excluding illegitimate users
for data access. One possible weakness of BTG-AC is that
the human decision is needed to predeﬁne BTG policy for
each object. We are considered to redesign the BTG-AC model
based on that weakness as future work. In addition, we will
plan to develop the BTG-AC model within the actual sensor
nodes for medical applications in WSNs.
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Abstract—Wireless Sensor Networks (WSNs) have recently
attracted much interest in the research community because of
their wide range of applications. An emerging application for
WSNs involves their use in healthcare where they are generally
termed Wireless Medical Sensor Networks (WMSNs). In a hos-
pital, outfitting every patient with tiny, wearable, wireless vital
sign sensors would allow doctors, nurses and other caregivers
to continuously monitor the state of their patients. In such a
scenario, patients are expected to be treated in reasonable time,
so, an access control model is needed which will provide both
real-time access to comprehensive medical records and detect
unauthorised access to sensitive data. In emergency situations, a
doctor or nurse needs to access data immediately. The loss in data
availability can result in further decline in the patient’s condition
or can even lead to death. Therefore, the availability of data is
more important than any security concern in emergency situa-
tions. To address that research issue for medical data in WSNs,
we propose the Break-The-Glass Access Control (BTG-AC) model
that is a modified and redesigned version of the Break-The-Glass
Role-Based Access Control (BTG-RBAC) model to address data
availability issue and to detect the security policy violations from
both authorised and unauthorised users. Several changes within
the access control engine are made in BTG-RBAC in order to
make the new BTG-AC to apply and fit in WSNs. This paper
presents the detailed design and development of the BTG-AC
model based on a healthcare scenario. The evaluation results show
that the concepts of BTG, prevention and detection mechanism,
and obligation provide more flexible access than other current
access control models in WSNs. Additionally, we compare the
BTG-AC model with an adaptive access control model (A2C)
which has similar properties, for further evaluation. Alongside
with the comparison, the advantages and disadvantages of BTG-
AC over current WSN access control models are presented.
I. INTRODUCTION
Wireless Sensor Networks (WSNs) have been an area of
significant research for more than a decade because of the
major potential applications in military surveillance, industrial
control, medicine, disaster and emergency management, and
many other areas. The nature of WSNs consist of hundreds or
even thousands of sensor nodes that have an ability to collect,
store and transfer data between each other in the network.
These days, sensor nodes can store and collect multimedia
information themselves. A user, who has an appropriate per-
mission, is able to access the collected data at the sensor
nodes directly via ad-hoc manner. Data security and access
control to that data are essential to provide in WSNs when
the users try to access collected data at the sensor nodes.
Based on the requirements of application, the provision of
security requirements can change. For the military and medical
application, the data collected by sensor nodes need to be
stored securely and allowed access only to the authorised
users. Therefore, security mechanisms are required for WSNs
to provide the security requirements such as confidentiality,
integrity, authenticity, etc.
Most of the current WSN access control models are based
on traditional Role-Base Access Control model (RBAC) [1] to
control data access based on roles. The decision is binary: deny
or permit access. The RBAC model has been widely accepted
as a policy-based access control model and it is suitable for
most commercial applications but roles and policies need to
be predefined before the system can make decisions. Some
WSN access control models used cryptographic methods for
data storage and data access control but the systems still need
to predefine attributes, roles and policies before deployment. It
is, however, difficult to determine in advance all the possible
needs for access in real world applications because there may
be unexpected situations at any time.
There are many potential situations that cannot be defined
in traditional RBAC and cryptography-based systems. For
example, the roles and policies for emergency and unexpected
situations cannot be defined in advance. When the system
faces these kinds of situations, what will the system do? Does
the system wait until the authorised user comes and logs in?
Alternatively, in the medical scenario, does a nurse wait for
a doctor who takes care of a patient, in order to retrieve
that patient’s medical record? In most of the emergency and
urgent cases, the users cannot wait until someone comes in
order to retrieve the necessary data. Given this, what is a
possible method to provide a flexible approach in the access
control engine? For real world applications, the system needs
to be flexible enough to make decisions regarding data access
based on unusual situations in addition to normally defined
situations. Using the traditional RBAC model often cannot
fulfil the requirements of real world applications in WSNs.
Therefore, a new access control model is needed to provide
a flexible policy to address the data availability issue and to
detect the security policy violations [2] such as unauthorised
information release.
To address the above research issue in WSN, we developed
a Break The Glass Access Control (BTG-AC) model. This is
a modified and redesigned version of Break-The-Glass Role-
Based Access Control (BTG-RBAC) [3], [4] to better fit the
requirements of WSNs. It provides a flexible approach to the
access control engine for data availability purpose. The main
contribution of this paper is the design and development of
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a lightweight BTG-AC model to address the data availability
issue and to detect the security policy violations from both
authorised and unauthorised users in healthcare application.
The remaining structure of this paper is explained as fol-
lows. Section 2 presents the related work. Section 3 discusses
an overview of the BTG-AC model for WSNs. The develop-
ment and implementation of the BTG-AC model in Ponder2
framework [5] can be seen in Section 4. Section 5 evaluates
BTG-AC based on a medical scenario. Section 6 presents the
frameworks of the adaptive access control model (A2C) which
was proposed by Maw et al. [6] to make a comparison with the
proposed BTG-AC model in WSNs. Additionally, this section
reviews the advantages and disadvantages of BTG-AC over
current WSN access control models. Section 7 concludes the
paper with the suggestion for future work.
II. RELATED WORK
Access control is a critical security service to prevent
unauthorised access to network resources. In WSNs, users can
enter a sensor field directly to access data at the sensor nodes.
Different users may have different access privileges to access
data at the sensor nodes based on their roles. Maw et al. [7]
stated that a considerable number of access control models
have been proposed for use in WSNs, though some of them are
not yet implemented. Most of the current access control models
in WSNs and Wireless Medical Sensor Network (WMSN)
are based on traditional Role-Based Access Control (RBAC),
which has been widely accepted as a policy access control
model. The RBAC based access control models such as trust
and centrality-based access control model [8], Maerien’s model
[9] and Gaurkar’s model [10] are aimed to prevents a malicious
node from joining the sensor network. Cryptography-based
access control is designed for the untrusted environment, where
the lack of global knowledge and control are defining charac-
teristics. Cryptography is relied upon to control data access
and to ensure data confidentiality and integrity. Cryptography
methods in WSNs should meet the constraints of sensor nodes.
Yu et al. [11] proposed the Fine-grained Distributed Data
Access Control (FDAC) model based on Attribute Based
Encryption. The main idea of their approach is to provide a
distributed data access control, which is able to support fine-
grained access control over sensor data. A network controller,
which stores access structures, acts like a central distribution
centre and distributes keys to users in FDAC. Only users with
the right access structure and the right key can access data at
the sensor nodes. The access structures will be different for
each user depending on the access privileges of users. If a
malicious user compromises the network controller, there will
be no security provisioning in the system anymore. Distributed
fine-grained access control model [12] has a similar structure
as FDAC but the main difference is that this model uses
different distribution centres for key management to avoid a
single point to failure problem. The same concept is applied
to distributed fine-grained data access control for distributed
sensor networks that was proposed by Hur [13]. The data
aggregator is used in this model as central management object
for data encryption and key distribution.
Garcia-Morchon and Wehrle [14] proposed the Context-
Aware Role-Based Access Control (CA-RBAC) model based
on a modular context structure for WMSNs. The aim of the
model is to provide context awareness and adapt its security
properties to ensure the users’ safety. Normally, an authorised
doctor needs to verify his access control role in order to access
the medical data of a patient but a nurse may not have the same
level of privilege. When the system declares to be a critical or
emergency case based on the modular context information, the
doctor or nurse can take any action and can access data even
though they may not be able to access that data in normal
conditions. One of the disadvantages of this model is that
there is no prevention or detection mechanism nor verification
process to check a user’s data access right, when the emergency
occurs.
Maw et al. [6], [15] proposed an Adaptive Access Con-
trol (A2C) model with privilege overriding and behaviour
monitoring to provide fine-grained access control for medical
data in WSNs. In this model, no human effort is needed to
override rules and policies because of the introduction of the
users’ behaviour trust model, and the prevention and detection
mechanism. In this model, the users may be able to override
a denial of access, when unexpected events occur. In addition,
the users’ behaviour trust model is used to check the user’s
action, location, time, etc. but there is no detailed information
about the behaviour trust model. Without the behaviour trust
model, the access decisions cannot be made effectively. This
model is compared with the proposed BTG-AC model in
session VI.
The current access control models in WSNs such as FDAC,
CA-RBAC and A2C are mostly looking at how to avoid overly
tight policy in the system. Sometimes, the overly tight access
control policy might hold access for the appropriate users in
unanticipated events. Ferreira et al. introduced the BTG-RBAC
engine [3], [4] to integrate BTG in the core RBAC model with
obligations. They proposed to securely break access control in
a controlled manner. The BTG approach can be easily applied
in the existing architectures and systems. It is very useful
for existing systems because it does not involve additional
automated technology. It is intended to cover unanticipated and
emergency situations and should not be used as a replacement
for a help-desk. BTG-AC can make decisions regarding data
access quickly without unreasonable administrative involve-
ments and delays. The BTG-RBAC model was developed in
Premis policy language with an Apache database and XML for
Electronic Medical Records (EMRs). The BTG-RBAC model
cannot be applied directly to WSNs because of limitations of
WSNs. This means that the proposed access control model
needs to be lightweight to apply in WSNs. Therefore, we
redesigned and modified the BTG-RBAC model to become
a lightweight access control model to fill the gaps of WSNs.
III. BREAK-THE-GLASS ACCESS CONTROL MODEL
Based on the requirements of WSNs, we modified and
redesigned the framework of the BTG-RBAC model to fit in
WSNs. Our model is referred to as Break-The-Glass Access
Control (BTG-AC) and has similar functions to those of
the BTG-RBAC model. The proposed BTG-AC model is to
provide BTG action in access control engine for decision-
making process regarding access in Body Sensor Networks and
WSNs. It provides a flexible approach for data access control
in the event of emergency. The BTG action will perform within
Page 2 of 11
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
For Review Only
the users’ traceability by extending the access control engine
with obligations for auditing purposes.
Notwithstanding, an overview of BTG-AC can be seen in
Figure 1. This shows that there are two main modules in the
BTG-AC model: Policy Enforcement Point (PEP) and Policy
Decision Point (PDP). The user requests will go through PEP
and all the user formation will be forwarded to PDP for the
decision-making processes. There are limitations and issues
for the BTG-AC model in Ponder2 language to fit in WSNs.
These are discussed as follow:
• There is no BTG state variable in BTG-AC. This
means that a fixed BTG state value is used.
• Initially the BTG state is set to FALSE but the state is
set as TRUE if there is policy rule that allows a user
to perform the BTG operation. The administrator can
change the BTG state variable and create a new BTG
state for another or the same role.
Fig. 1. Overview of the BTG-AC Model
The details of PEP and PDP are explained next.
A. Policy Enforcement Point (PEP)
In BTG-AC, PEP performs as an authentication service
provider between the users and sensor nodes. The authenti-
cation service is needed for the provision of security in the
system especially when the access control model is allowing
users to perform BTG action for data access in emergency
situations. A user has to submit the information to PEP for the
authentication process. When PEP receives the access request
from the users, it will check the users’ information such as
their identity and cryptographic key. We assumed that the au-
thentication service is provided through use of a users’ normal
login process before forwarding request to PDP. In future, we
will work on the implementation of the authentication service
in PEP by using Attribute-Based-Encryption (ABE) [16].
B. Policy Decision Point (PDP)
In BTG-AC, PDP is a main module. When PDP receives
the decision request from PEP, the access control module will
make an access decision. There are different predefined roles
and policies in the access control module based on the users’
location and users’ privileges. In the BTG-AC model, there is
another module - prevention and detection module - keeps a
record of all users’ information for audit purposes. The two
modules cooperate with each other to make the access decision
with some flexibility but still within the required degree of
prevention and detection.
1) Access Control Module: The access control module is
used to enforce the policies for the decision-making process.
The roles and policies need to be defined in advance. Whenever
the decision request is forwarded by PEP, the access control
module will check whether the information from that decision
request is matched with predefined roles and policy. In the ac-
cess control module, there are three different policies, namely
authorisation, BTG and obligation policy. These three policies
are developed and designed under the access control module
that can be seen on Figure 2.
Fig. 2. The Access Control Module
In normal access control models, the decision outcomes
will be either permitted or denied access. If a user’s criteria
satisfy the access control policies, the access request will be
granted. If they do not match, the access will be denied.
In the BTG-AC model, BTG and the obligation policies are
introduced to make access decisions in normal as well as
emergency situations. A user can perform a BTG action for
the targeted object - say, confidential medical record - in
an emergency but some obligations will be triggered and
performed at the same time. The existing decision outcomes in
the normal access control models are extended by introducing
BTG and obligation policy in the access control engine. These
decision outcomes are presented as follow:
• (Permit, ∅) → A user has permission to access the
targeted object.
• (Permit, OBLGS) → A user is allowed to access the
targeted object but an obligation is carried out when
the access is given.
• (Deny, ∅) → A user request to access the targeted
object is denied.
• (Deny, OBLGS) → Along side of a denied access,
some obligations are performed.
• (Permit, (BTG)*(OBLGS)) → A user’s request for
access has been granted by performing BTG action
and obligations such as “Write to Audit”, “Trigger the
Alarm” or “A Notification Message” are performed
along with access decision.
Based on the above decision outcomes, it is clear that
the introduction of BTG and obligation policy is beneficial
for medical data in WSNs by extending the existing decision
outcomes. The following section explains more details of the
authorisation, BTG and obligation policies.
• Authorisation Policy: An authorisation policy is used
in BTG-AC to enforce an access decision. It also
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checks whether a user should be allowed to access
the targeted object. In authorisation policy, the subject,
target and action are checked to enforce the policy.
This means that a user, who wants to perform some
action on the target object that stores both normal
and confidential medical information, has to possess a
right access privilege. The access control module will
check whether a user’s access request has possessed
appropriate access right that the subject is allowed to
do at the targeted object.
• Break-the-Glass (BTG) Policy: A BTG policy is
used to perform a BTG operation on a targeted ob-
ject. To perform the BTG operation, the new role
that describes who is allowed to perform a certain
action at the targeted object, is added. The obligation
policy is used along with the BTG operation allowing
an administrator to take actions when the “glass is
broken”. The new role can be added into the access
control module to present how the BTG state variable
is reset to FALSE. The BTG state of the permission
can be set from TRUE to FALSE or from FALSE to
TRUE. The administrator defines the BTG policy for
each situation where users in an emergency situation
require the BTG action.
• Obligation Policy: An obligation policy is used along
with authorisation and BTG policy in some situations.
The obligation policy checks whether one or more
conditions have been evaluated and if they have, they
carried out one or more actions to be performed. In
the BTG-AC model, after the authorisation policy has
made the evaluation, some obligations are performed
along with the decisions. Similarly, the same hap-
pened when the BTG policy is activated and made
its decision. The obligation policy is linked with the
prevention and detection module to store the user
information and his access request as an audit log.
2) Prevention and Detection Module: A prevention and
detection module can be used for detecting security violations
and flaws in the defined application. It is used to prevent an
unauthorised access in the system. Whenever the obligation
policy is activated, actions such as write to audit, trigger the
alarm, send a notification message to administrator or auditor,
etc. are performed. There are various methods to store the
users’ information for the audit log but an event-oriented
approach [17] is used to keep a record of the event when it
happened, and user information related to that event. Thus, the
proposed model can detect an unauthorised information release
by authorised users.
IV. DEVELOPMENT OF THE BREAK-THE-GLASS ACCESS
CONTROL MODEL
The proposed BTG-AC model has been developed in
Ponder2 [5] that is a popular lightweight policy language
for BANs and WSNs. Ponder2 is implemented as a Self-
Managed Cell (SMC) [18]. It is a set of hardware and software
components forming an administrative domain. It is capable
of self-management. We assumed that SMC is performed and
worked as the sensor node to evaluate the proposed BTG-AC
with the example medical scenario. Ponder2 comprises a self-
contained, stand-alone, general-purpose object management
system with message passing between objects. It incorporates
an awareness of events and policies and implements a policy
execution framework. It has a high-level configuration and con-
trol language called PonderTalk and user-extensible managed
objects are programmed in Java.
The proposed BTG-AC model is an extended version of
Ponder2 in which the BTG concept, obligation policy and
prevention and detection mechanism are applied together. The
interface for all the users such as doctors, nurses and other
member of staff is developed in Java based on managed
objects in Ponder2. The Java class file is loaded dynamically
into SMC. The PEP and PDP are already implemented for
the proposed BTG-AC model but the policies definition and
expression of authorisation, BTG and obligation policy can
vary depend on the requirements of application. The definition
and expression of these three policies for medical data in
Ponder2 are presented as follow.
A. Authorisation Policy
The terms of the authorisation policy can be changed based
on the requirements of the application. In the BTG-AC model,
the predefined authorisation policies will be slightly different
based on the privileges and roles of the users. An example
policy is explained as below:
Def: Permit-Policy
subject A User
role Doctor or Nurse
action Read
target Normal Medical Record
The above authorisation policy defines that a user (a doctor
or a nurse) has a right to perform an action called ‘read’ on a
normal medical record. This means that the subject can only
access the targeted object, when he meets the criteria of the
authorisation policy unless the BTG state variable is TRUE to
make a positive decision for access in an emergency situation.
Otherwise, the user request will be denied.
B. Break-The-Glass (BTG) Policy
A BTG policy provides flexibility on decision-making pro-
cess regarding access for the emergency or urgent data access.
Thus, the BTG policy allows a user access to confidential data
even if he does not have the access right. We assumed that
the BTG policy is already defined in advance for these kinds
of situations to perform BTG action at the targeted object. If
there is no BTG policy for that object, the user request will not
be granted. The example BTG policy can be seen as follows:
Def: BTG Policy
subject Nurse
action Read
BTG Yes
target Confidential Medical Record
do Call Obligation Policy
The above BTG policy defines that a user (a nurse)
can perform the BTG action to the targeted object but the
obligation policy will be activated when the access is given to
that user.
Page 4 of 11
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
For Review Only
Policy Subject Role Operation Object BTG Obligations
1 Doctor r1 read ob2
2 Doctor r2 read ob1 oblg [Write to Audit]
3 Nurse r3 read ob1 BTG
4 Nurse r3 OBTG(read) ob1 oblg [Notify Manager; Write to
Audit; Reset BTG to FALSE
after 30 mins]
5 Nurse r4 resetBTG ob1
6 Nurse r5 read ob2 oblg [Write to Audit]
TABLE I. EXAMPLE OF BTG-RBAC POLICY
C. Obligation Policy
An obligation policy is used along with the authorisation
and BTG policies to prevent unauthorised access and to
detect security violations. The example of obligation policy
is explained as follows:
Def: Audit-Log
on auditrecord
if BTG action is performed
do write.audit < subject, Time, Target, User Role >
The above obligation policy defines what is a course
of action that will be activated when the “glass is broken”
for urgent and emergency data access. Thereafter, the users’
information such as subject, targeted object and user role is
stored as comma separated value (csv) in an audit log for
further security purposes.
From the above discussion, it can be seen how the proposed
BTG-AC was developed and how the policies for authorisation,
BTG and obligation can be defined in Ponder2 for medical data
in WSNs. The audit log is kept as comma separated value (csv)
extension in the BTG-AC model. The next section will explain
how the BTG-AC was evaluated based on a medical scenario
that was also developed under Ponder2 package.
V. EVALUATION OF BREAK-THE-GLASS ACCESS
CONTROL MODEL
A. Evaluation Scenario
In this section, a medical scenario is explained. It was
developed under the Ponder2 package to evaluate the BTG-
AC model for BSNs and WMSNs. We assumed that a SMC
[18] is represented as a wearable sensor node. In the example
scenario, each patient had his own BSN, which consisted of
several sensors. The sensor nodes sense and collect information
such as glucose level, temperature, heart rate, etc. We assumed
that collected data were stored as the medical record in BSNs.
Users such as doctors and nurses were trying to access the
medical record of the patients via mobile, personal digital
assistant or personal computer. For example, sensors are able
to interact with each other via IEEE 802.15.4 wireless links
and interactions with other mobile phone and personal digital
assistant from users via Wifi or Bluetooth. Each SMC had
managed its own policy. These policies were specified and
could be performed by each SMC.
In a medical scenario, there are two different types of data
for each patient: confidential medical records (ob1) and normal
medical records (ob2). The access policies for users’ access to
these medical records will be different based on the access
privileges and roles of the users. In addition, different security
levels are required in these medical records. Tight policies
might be used for confidential medical records to provide data
privacy. Nevertheless, the access to even confidential data can
be essential in some circumstances. For example, the doctor
should be able to access the confidential medical record of a
patient when the nurse cannot but the decision can be changed
to a positive decision if the nurse performs the BTG actions.
In Table I, policy 1 states that the role r1 is allowed to
read object 2 (ob2). As in policy 2, the doctor is allowed to
access the confidential medical record (ob1) based on r2 but
an obligation such as “Write to Audit” is activated. In policy
3, the nurse is not permitted to access the confidential data
(ob1) unless he or she performs the BTG action in that object
for emergency data access, but the BTG variable needs to be
TRUE meaning that BTG is enabled. Therefore, an extra BTG
role is needed for the nurse (see policy 5). Additionally, policy
4 will be activated and at the same time, some obligations will
be activated when “the glass is broken”.
Policy 4 demonstrates that if policy 3 is allowed, the system
will perform three obligations such as “write to audit”, “notify
to manager”, “reset BTG variable to FALSE after 30 minutes”.
This implies BTG = TRUE, FALSE. Policy 5 is quite simple.
It is allowed to reset the BTG variable to FALSE to TRUE
or TRUE to FALSE. For policy 6, r5 allows a user to read
ob1 but it will trigger one obligation that is “write to audit”.
The administrator or manager can easily check the audit log
to detect any use from authorised users and to prevent any use
from unauthorised users.
B. Evaluation Framework Based on Example Scenario
We evaluate the BTG-AC model based on the above
example scenario and policy definition that was developed
under Ponder2 package. In this section, user interface, BTG
interface, audit log interface and how the access decision was
made based on different access policies are presented with
screen shots.
1) User Interface: To evaluate the BTG-AC model for
medical data in WSNs, we developed the users’ interfaces
under Ponder2 package. Based on Figure 3, a doctor (Aung)
tries to access the normal medical data of Alice. His access has
been granted without any obligation. When he requests access
to the confidential data, his access request has been granted
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Fig. 3. User Interface for A Doctor
but his requested information will be stored as an audit log to
detect security breaches.
Fig. 4. User Interface for A Nurse
Different access policies are applied to a nurse. Figure 4
shows the interface of a nurse (Htoo). The nurse can access
the normal medical record of Alice but one obligation action
is triggered and activated when the access is given. The nurse
does not have access right regarding access to the confidential
medical data unless the BTG policy is used to make an
authorisation decision in urgent and emergency circumstances.
At the same time, obligations are triggered and activated. The
management teams can check the audit log to prevent and
detect security violations.
2) BTG: When a nurse wants to perform a BTG action
to access patients’ confidential data, a BTG interface will
appear. The user’s attempt to gain access will be notified to the
user and his/her management team and necessary actions will
be taken. The confirmation message will appear twice before
the access is given to the nurse. Additionally, another simple
authentication process is used to protect the privacy of patients’
information by using normal log in process before the second
confirmation box appears. The interfaces for BTG action are
shown in Figure 5.
Fig. 5. Interfaces for BTG
3) Audit Log: We developed the audit framework based
on managed objects in Ponder2 package. The interface of an
audit log can be seen in Figure 6. This figure shows what kind
of information and data are stored in the audit log. The first
audit log shows that the nurse accessed the normal medical
record of Alice. For the second log, the same nurse requested
access to the confidential medical record by performing the
BTG action and his or her access be granted. A doctor, who
accessed a confidential medical record, was granted access as
can be seen in the audit log of that patient. All the access
requests to the medical records are recorded in which every
day is determined by the user’ role. Based on the audit log,
the management teams can check which users performed the
BTG action and who among these will be granted access to
the confidential medical records.
Fig. 6. Interface for Audit Log
C. Summary
Based on the evaluation results with a medical scenario, the
BTG-AC model can be applied for medical data in WSNs after
the framework and several changes within the access control
engine are made. The BTG-AC model provides flexibility
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of decision-making processes regarding access to medical
records. The three policies such as authorisation, BTG and
obligation cooperate with each other to make decisions about
data access in the emergency situations.
VI. COMPARISON BETWEEN BTG-AC AND A2C MODEL
To make a full comparison with the proposed BTG-AC
model, an adaptive access control model (A2C) model is chose
among current WSN access control model because it has simi-
lar properties as BTG-AC. As well, both models are developed
in Ponder2 policy language. This section recapitulates both
A2C and BTG-AC models to make a comparison based on the
evaluation criteria. Firstly, a brief discussion of the A2C model
is explained. Additionally, the evaluation criteria are discussed
for both A2C and BTG-AC models. This is followed by an
exploration of advantages and disadvantages of BTG-AC over
current access control models in WSNs.
A. Adaptive Access Control Model (A2C)
The A2C model was proposed by Maw et al. [15] to pro-
vide a flexible access decision in WSNs. This is incorporated
the concept of possibility-with-override [19], [20] into WSN
for hard-to-define and unanticipated situations. Possibility-
with-override means users might be able to override a denial
of access, when unexpected events occur. The A2C model also
uses user behaviour monitoring and trust model to check users’
actions, location, time, etc. Whenever users try to access data
at the sensor nodes, all user behaviour and users’ information
will be kept by prevention and detection mechanism as an
audit record to detect and prevent abnormal and unauthorised
access. The overview diagram of the A2C model can be seen
on Figure 7.
Fig. 7. An Overview of Implementation Framework
There are similarities between A2C and BTG-AC model.
There are two main modules in the proposed access control
model: Policy Enforcement Point (PEP) and Policy Decision
Point (PDP). Whenever a user requests the access to an object,
an access request will go through PEP for the authentication
process and then it will forward a decision request to PDP for
decision-making process. PDP makes the access decision on
user request based on defined policy. The decision response
will be forwarded internally to the target. In addition, PDP
will forward the decision response to the users, whether they
have the privileges to access data at the sensor nodes or not.
The main difference between A2C and BTG-AC models
is that the user behaviour trust module is introduced in PDP
Fig. 8. Policy Decision Point
as shown in Figure 8. Therefore, there are three modules
inside PDP unlike BTG-AC (see Figure 1). These modules are
the access control module, prevention and detection module,
and user behaviour trust module. After PEP forwards the
decision request to PDP, the information such as user, action,
environment and context information will be forwarded to the
access control module and the user behaviour trust module.
The user behaviour trust module will calculate the trust value.
The overall structure of users’ behaviour trust module is shown
in Figure 9.
Fig. 9. A Framework of User Behaviour Trust Module
To determine the user behaviour trust value, the previous,
predicted and current value of user behaviour trust will be used.
Current trust value will be calculated and evaluated based on
the user information that is forwarded by the PEP. The previous
trust value is stored in the trust module. For predicting user
behaviour trust value, Naive Bayes and Bayesian classification
algorithm [21], [22] will be used. Predicting user behaviour is
important and significant in forming a trustworthy network.
For the classification algorithm, the audit record from the
prevention and detection module will be used. There might
be more than two classifiers to predict the user behaviour trust
value. After the evaluation and calculation behaviour trust, that
value will be forwarded to the access control module. The
access control module will use the trust value from the user
behaviour trust module and the other information, which is
forwarded by PEP, to make access decisions on the user request
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based on the authorisation policy, the overriding policy and the
obligation policy.
B. Evaluation Based on Features
In this section, the comparison of the A2C and BTG-AC
models are made based on the evaluation criteria including the
network architecture model, the concepts and approaches, the
decision outcomes, the access control policy and role, the data
confidentiality and data privacy, and the data availability.
1) Network Architecture Model: Access control models
can be different based on their network architecture model
when the cryptographic keys, roles, policies and attributes are
distributed to users from the trusted authority or controller.
The A2C model is based on a distributed approach to make
and adjust access decisions dynamically. This means that each
sensor is deployed with the access control engine to make an
effective local decision within itself based on the users’ request
and the sensor is required to store access policies. Unlike A2C,
the BTG-AC model is based on a centralised approach because
each sensor node cannot store all the possible situations and
BTG operations in the system. The disadvantage is that there
might be a single point of failure in the BTG-AC model.
2) Concepts and Approaches: The A2C and BTG-AC mod-
els use different concepts and approaches to fill the research
gaps and the requirements of the application in WSNs. One
similarity between these two WSN access control models
is that both aim to provide data availability in emergency
and unanticipated situations. An outline of the concepts and
approaches for these two models can be seen in Table II.
A2C BTG-AC
- Discretionary Overriding of
Access Control
- Role Based Access Control
- User Behaviour Trust Model - Break-The-Glass concept
- Prevention and Detection
Mechanism
- Prevention and Detection
Mechanism
TABLE II. THE CONCEPTS AND APPROACHES FOR A2C AND BTG-AC
There is limited local decision-making capability in current
WSN access control models because it is impossible to define
the possibility of denied and permitted access for all situations,
especially in WMSNs and WSNs. The A2C model is based
on the concept of discretionary overriding of access control
by Rissanen et al. [19]. The system defines permitted and
denied access policies for normal situations and leaves the
possibility-with-override for emergency and unusual situations
as the default to address the data availability issue. In the A2C
model, the behaviour trust model is introduced to monitor the
behaviour information as well as to compare with previous and
predefined users’ behaviour pattern. A prevention and detection
mechanism is used in both models to prevent the unauthorised
information release and to detect security violations that can
occur in the system anytime. The concepts of the A2C model
can provide both data availability and data privacy but there
is a lack of information for the behaviour trust model.
Unlike A2C, the BTG-AC model uses core RBAC with
obligation and BTG concept to make decisions regarding
access for emergency and unanticipated situations with de-
tails information for each components. The BTG-AC model
needs predefined access roles and policies in advance for any
situation. The authorisation decision-making process is made
within the core RBAC engine based on the inputs of the current
section, the requested operation and the target object. The main
idea of the Break-The-Glass concept is to allow the users
emergency and urgent access to the system when a normal
authentication process does not perform or work perfectly. In
BTG-AC, BTG action is based on predefined user accounts.
The system is managed in a manner that can make data access
available in emergency situations with minimum of human
interactions.
The BTG approach can be easily applied in the existing
architectures and systems. It is very useful for existing systems
because it does not involve additional automated technology.
It is intended to cover unanticipated and emergency situations
and it should not be used as a replacement for a help-desk.
BTG-AC can make decisions regarding data access quickly
without unreasonable administrative involvements and delays.
When an emergency or BTG account is activated in the system,
it can alert the security administrator for that event for auditing
purposes. This means that the monitoring process is required as
an extra checkpoint to detect security violations. The proposed
approach is well suited for the emergency decision-making
process, but after an emergency in which a BTG account has
been used, that account has to be deleted or disabled to prevent
a replay attack. Therefore, human interactions are still involved
in the system. The advantage of the BTG-AC model is that it
can provide data availability service in emergency situations
with a certain level of prevention and detection.
3) Access Control Policy: In this subsection, the access
control policies defined in both A2C and BTG-AC are pre-
sented. Similar access control policies are used from both
models to make an effective comparison.
Table III shows how the access control policies are defined
in the A2C model for the same medical scenario in section V.
In policy 1, a doctor is allowed to read the normal medical
record (ob2) without obligation. In policy 2, the doctor is
allowed to read the confidential medical record (ob1) of a
patient but an obligation such as “Write to Audit” will be taken
as an action when the decision has been made. Therefore, the
management teams can check the audit log to detect security
breaches that can occur by the authorised users. This means
that the stored data at the ob2 is not as sensitive as ob1. The
roles and policies for other users such as nurses and other
members of staff will be predefined differently. Policy 1 and
policy 2 are the same in Table I for BTG-AC.
In policy 3, the nurse is not allowed to access the confiden-
tial data (ob1) unless the associated user overrides the access
policy for emergency data access, but some obligations will be
activated. Based on policy 3, the users (U* represents the group
of nurses) can override access policy. If he or she overrides
based on policy 3, his or her behaviour trust value will be
lower than normal data access. Access will only granted to
that user when his behaviour trust value is great than three.
Otherwise, his or her access to the confidential data will be
denied. Policy 4 allows the nurse to access the normal medical
data (ob2); however, one obligation action is triggered. Policies
5 and 3 have a similar property. There is a chance for member
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Policy Subject Role Operation Object Override Obligations
1 U1 Doctor read ob2 - -
2 U1 Doctor read ob1 - oblg [Write to Audit]
3 U∗ Nurse Override(read) (if T
> 3)
ob1 Override oblg [Notify Manager; Write to
Audit; Trigger the alarm]
4 U2 Nurse read ob2 - oblg [Write to Audit]
5 U∗ Staff Override(read) (if T
> 3)
ob2 Override oblg [Notify Manager; Write to
Audit; Trigger the alarm]
TABLE III. EXAMPLE OF DEFINED POLICY FOR THE A2C MODEL
of staff from hospital to access the normal medical record (ob2)
but they have to override access policy. The administrator or
manager can easily check the audit log to detect illegitimate
use from authorised users and to prevent legitimate use from
unauthorised users.
The complete BTG-AC policy can be seen in Table 1
and discussion in section V. The policy definitions for both
A2C and BTG-AC have a similar structure. The weakness
of the BTG-AC model is that an additional role for a BTG
policy is needed for each user to perform BTG operation and
an additional account is needed for emergency access. As a
constraint, the BTG role needs to be considered in advance
and predefined before the system is running in real-time.
4) Decision Outcomes: In both A2C and BTG-AC models,
the existing decision outcomes in current access control models
such as permitted access and denied access are extended into
five different outcomes. The decision outcomes for the BTG-
AC model are already discussed in the previous section. For
the A2C model, the decision outcomes are extended because
of the discretionary overriding process with the user behaviour
trust value and the prevention, and detection mechanism. These
decision outcomes are explained as follows:
• Permitted Access: A user access request has been
permitted.
• Denied Access: A user access request has been denied.
The user is not allowed to access the resources.
• Permitted Access with Obligation: A user access re-
quest has been permitted but an obligation is executed
when data access is given to that user especially for
important and confidential information.
• Permitted Access with Overriding and Obligation: A
user does not have privilege to access the resources but
his or her request will be granted if he or she overrides
policy within some constraints. The obligation policies
are activated when access is granted to the user.
• Denied Access with Overriding and Obligation: A user
access will be denied, if he or she tries to override the
policy and does not satisfy some thresholds from that
policy. At the same time, the obligations such as write
to audit, etc. will be performed.
Based on the above decision outcomes, it is clear that the
introduction of different concepts and approached can provide
a flexible approach in the access control engine by extending
the decision outcomes. Both A2C and BTG-AC models add
a finer grained level of control in access control engine for
emergency situations.
5) Data Availability and Data Privacy: Both the A2C and
BTG-AC models are designed for making access decisions
dynamically and efficiently in emergency and unanticipated
situations. In the A2C model, the decisions regarding access
can be evaluated and adjusted dynamically, based on policies
such as authorisation, obligation and overriding. Especially in
emergency situations, the user behaviour trust value and the
overriding policy are used to adjust access decisions to provide
data availability in emergency and unanticipated situations.
BTG-AC has similar properties to the A2C model but human
interaction is still needed to define for BTG operation; the
BTG role also needs to be predefined in advance for emergency
situations. Users need extra roles for breaking the glass for un-
expected situations and need an additional emergency account
to do so for unexpected and unanticipated situations. Another
advantage of the BTG-AC model over the A2C model is that
a simple user log in process is used as an additional security
provisioning to protect the privacy of the patient information.
6) Summary: A comparison of the BTG-AC model with
related works are expressed in Table IV based on the evaluation
criteria. The centralised access control management is used in
BTG-AC, FDAC and CA-RBAC, but for A2C and DFG-AC,
the distributed access control management is used. The existing
decision outcomes such as permitted access and denied access
are extended in both BTG-AC and A2C and these are only
two models that address data availability issue and detect
security policy violation by using the prevention and detection
mechanism.
Access
Control
Model
Network
Architec-
ture
Decision
Outcomes
Data
Availability
Prevention
and
Detection
Mechanism
BTG-AC Centralised 5 Yes Yes
A2C [6] Distributed 5 Yes Yes
FDAC [11] Centralised 2 No No
CA-RBAC
[14]
Centralised 2 Yes No
DFG-AC
[12]
Distributed 2 No No
TABLE IV. A COMPARISON OF THE BTG-AC MODEL WITH RELATED
MODELS
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Advantage Disadvantage
- Administrator can manage policy such as (create a new
role, edit an existing role, etc).
- A security administrator needs to be involved in some
processes.
- It can be used easily in existing systems and architec-
tures.
- The BTG option or account needs to be disabled and
deleted once the account is activated.
- It provides data availability based on BTG policy for
emergency situations.
- A new BTG account is needed after the old account
is used.
- BTG state can be defined based on time period. - The storage is costly because of an additional role for
BTG.
- Audit log can be checked by security administrator.
- It detects security policy violations from authorised
users.
TABLE V. ADVANTAGES AND DISADVANTAGES OF BTG-AC
C. Advantages and Disadvantages over Current WSN Access
Control Models
The highlights for the advantages and disadvantages of
BTG-AC over current WSN access control models can be
seen in Table V. The BTG-AC model can manage policy
such as creating a new role and editing an existing role and
it can be used easily in existing systems and architectures.
This model can provide data availability in normally defined
situations as well as emergency situations; however, in
the BTG-AC model the BTG state and account need to
be opened and defined in advance for emergency access.
The BTG-AC model can provide data availability with
certain constraints and limitations. Additionally, the BTG-AC
model can detect security violations in the systems by
checking the audit record in the prevention and detection
mechanism. The main contribution of the BTG-AC model
is that data availability and data privacy can be provided
in both defined situations and some emergency situations
for effective treatment of patients in the real time environment.
Alongside with the advantages, there are some drawbacks
in the proposed BTG-AC model. The disadvantages of the
BTG-AC model can be seen on Table V. Data availability
is provided in BTG-AC, but some limitations apply for data
access in emergency situations. A system administrator needs
to open an emergency account for users in advance for BTG
operation and emergency access. In addition, the BTG or
emergency account can be used one time only to prevent replay
attacks. The user needs to reopen the emergency account for
another attempt. If this is not done, the system administrator
needs to open and activate the emergency account for all
users. This means that some kinds of administration processes
are needed in BTG-AC for emergency situations. The storage
might be costly because an additional role is needed for each
user to use a BTG account. An alternative way is to use data
aggregator as centralised access management to reduce the
storage space in actual sensor nodes.
VII. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
The overall contributions of this paper is the design and
development of a lightweight BTG-AC model for medical
data in WSNs to address the data availability issue and to
detect the security policy violations from both authorised and
unauthorised users. The concepts of BTG, prevention and
detection mechanism, and obligation provide more flexible
access than other current access control models in WSNs. The
BTG-AC model has been developed under Ponder2 package.
All the modules - access control module and prevention and
detection module - have been found to cooperate to make
access decisions and record a users’ accountability to detect
security violations from authorised users. Additionally, the
A2C framework, which has similar properties as BTG-AC,
is briefly discussed to make a meaningful comparison and
compared with BTG-AC. One possible weakness of BTG-AC
is that the human decision is needed to predefine BTG policy
for each object. We are considering to redesign the BTG-AC
model to overcome that weakness in future work. We plan to
develop the BTG-AC model within the actual sensor nodes
for medical applications in WSNs. In addition, we will work
on the implementation of the authentication service by using
Attribute-Based-Encryption.
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Abstract—Wireless Sensor Networks (WSNs) have recently
attracted much interest in the research community because of
their wide range of applications. One emerging application for
WSNs involves their use in healthcare where they are generally
termed Wireless Medical Sensor Networks (WMSNs). In the
healthcare industry, patients are expected to be treated in
reasonable time and any loss in data availability can result in
further decline in the patient’s condition or can even lead to
death. Therefore, the availability of data is more important than
security concerns. The overwhelming priority is to take care of
the patient, but the privacy and confidentiality of that patient’s
medical records cannot be neglected. In current healthcare
applications, there are many problems concerning security policy
violations such as unauthorised denial of use, unauthorised
information modification and unauthorised information release of
medical data in the real world environment. Current WSN access
control models used the traditional Role-Based Access Control
(RBAC) or cryptographic methods for data access control but the
systems still need to predefine attributes, roles and policies before
deployment. It is, however, difficult to determine in advance all
the possible needs for access in real world applications because
there may be unanticipated situations at any time. This paper
proceeds to study possible approaches to address the above issues
and to develop a new decentralised access control model to fill
the gaps in work done by the WSN research community. To
address the conflict between data availability and data privacy,
this paper proposes the Trust-based Adaptive Access Control
(TBA2C) model that integrates the concept of trust into the
access control engine. A simple user behaviour trust model is
developed to calculate the behaviour trust value which measures
the trustworthiness of the users and that is used as one of the
defined thresholds to override access policy for data availability
purpose. The proposed model can also protect data privacy
because only a user who satisfies the relevant trust threshold can
get restricted access in emergency and unanticipated situations.
Moreover, the introduction of trust values in the enforcement
of authorisation decisions can detect abnormal data access even
from authorised users. Ponder2 is used to develop the TBA2C
model. The proposed TBA2C model is the first to realise a
flexible access control engine and to address the conflict between
data availability and data privacy by combining the concepts of
discretionary overriding, the user behaviour trust model, and the
prevention and detection mechanism.
I. INTRODUCTION
Wireless Sensor Networks (WSNs) have attracted much
interest in the research community because of their wide
range of applications. An emerging application for WSNs
involves their use in healthcare where they are generally
termed as Wireless Medical Sensor Networks (WMSNs). In a
hospital, outfitting patients with tiny, wearable, wireless vital
sign sensors would allow doctors, nurses and other caregivers
to monitor continuously the state of their patients. More
importantly in an emergency scenario, the same technology
would enable medics to care more effectively for large
numbers of casualties. Moreover, unlike many sensor network
applications, the healthcare application cannot make use
of traditional in-network aggregation1 [13] since it is not
generally meaningful to combine data from multiple patients.
In such a scenario, centralised data management cannot be
effected.
In the healthcare industry, security is the degree of
protection against danger, loss, damage and criminal activity.
There are many problems concerning unauthorised information
release of medical data in the real world environment. Based
on the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act
(HIPAA) [55], unauthorised information release is the second
highest (35 percent) cause of large security breaches in the
healthcare industry. Another six percent is caused by hacking
and IT incidents. There were several high-profile breaches of
users’ privacy and data confidentiality when the California
Health Department reported on incidents involving patient
medical records at UCLA medical Centre. It found that more
than 100 hospital workers had been accessing the medical
records of 1,041 patients. Some hospital workers were passing
information of hospitalised celebrities to the tabloid media
and in some cases to insurance companies.
According to another report [19], 1,754 separate Parkland
Hospital employees viewed the medical record of a famous
person whilst staying in Parkland Hospital. It is unknown how
many of the hospital staff had a legitimate reason to view that
patient’s record but it would not be more than a few dozen.
1In-network aggregation deals with this distributed processing of data
within the network. Data aggregation techniques are tightly coupled with how
data is gathered at the sensor nodes.
Wang et al. [54] mention that security breaches may be
detrimental to patient health or even life threatening. At the
same time, there is a need to access all the patient information
in order to accurately evaluate patient health and provide
better treatment. Normally, healthcare professionals want to
meet emergency needs without security concerns; however,
security must be addressed and included for a solution to be
completed. Aside from the obvious security considerations
with sensitive patient data, both data availability and data
privacy need to be addressed.
In current healthcare applications [17], there is a lack
of security incident responses and reports, and a lack of
access control models. Ferreira et al. [3] reviewed a decade
(2002-2012) of published literature on access control models
for the medical industry. There are more than three dozen
papers published on access control models for the healthcare
industry; however, only a few of the proposed models have
been implemented in practice. There are no well-considered
threat models for the access control models that reside
in both paper and electronic medical record systems for
healthcare applications. Wang et al. [54] mentioned that, in
theory, access control solved the problems of which users
can or cannot access medical records. In practice, some
large organisations still face problems when policy becomes
unmanageable and consequently users circumvent controls.
In the healthcare industry, patients are expected to be treated
in reasonable time. Therefore, an access control model should
provide real-time access to comprehensive medical records.
In emergency situations, a doctor or nurse needs to access
data immediately. Any loss in data availability can result in
further decline in the patient’s condition or can even lead to
death. Therefore, the availability of data is more important
than security concerns. The overwhelming urgency is to take
care of the patient; however, the privacy and confidentiality
of that patient’s medical records cannot be neglected. Thus,
careful consideration in defining flexible policy is required to
solve the conflict between data privacy and data availability
in this real world application. Additionally, it should also
detect unauthorised information release of patient medical
records from both authorised and unauthorised users because
security breaches can happen at any time.
Security policy violations in multi-user systems were
categorised by Anderson [4] into three categories:
unauthorised information release, unauthorised information
modification and unauthorised denial of use. It is difficult to
address the above violations in an access control policy for
the healthcare application because an overly “loose” policy
might permit access to inappropriate users, but an overly
“tight” policy might prevent access from the appropriate
users. The aim of this paper is to present new ways to provide
a flexible approach to access control engine in WSNs and
WMSNs.
To address the above issues, this paper proposes a new
framework for access control engines to fill the needs and
requirements of WSNs and WMSNs. A TBA2C model is
developed to address the access control related issues such
as how to provide a flexible approach in an access control
engine for both defined and unanticipated situations, how to
detect security violations, and how to address the conflict
between data privacy and data availability. To address the
conflict between data availability and data privacy, a simple
user behaviour trust model is developed to calculate the
behaviour trust value which is used as one of the defined
thresholds in access policy. The trust model can also protect
data privacy because only the user who satisfies the relevant
trust threshold, can get a restricted access even in emergency
and unanticipated situations. Notwithstanding, the TBA2C
model is easy to adapt with other trust models in WSNs.
The main contribution to the WSN research community
that this work makes is the Trust-Based Adaptive Access
Control model (TBA2C) model itself. The introduction
of overriding policy based on a user behaviour trust value
and contextual information is the main novel element of
the proposed TBA2C model. The novel usage of the
discretionary overriding concept with user behaviour trust in
adjusting decisions regarding data access for emergency and
unanticipated situations is a new concept. The combination
of the discretionary overriding concept and the behaviour
trust model is a possible solution that helps to address the
conflict between data availability and data privacy by using
the behaviour trust value as one of the defined thresholds in
the access policies. Only the trusted user, who satisfies these
thresholds including trust value, can get a restricted access
in emergency and unanticipated situations. Additionally, the
usage of user behaviour monitoring and the prevention and
detection mechanism can detect security policy violations
such as unauthorised information release, unnecessary
overriding process and abnormal data access from both
authorised and unauthorised users. Moreover, the use of a
behaviour trust value in an authorisation policy is a novel
approach to detect abnormal data access from authorised users.
The remaining structure of this paper is explained as
follows. Section II reviews the related works. Section III
discusses a user behaviour trust model to apply in the access
control engine. Section IV presents a TBA2C model for
WSNs. A threat model for TBA2C with an example medical
scenario can be seen in section V. Section VI discusses the
implementation tool and simulation test scenario to evaluate
the proposed TBA2C model. Section VII concludes the paper
with suggestions for future work.
II. RELATED WORKS
This section gives an overview of the related work laying
out the background to this paper. It primarily reviews research
in the field of access control models and trust schemes in
WSNs.
A. Access Control in WSNs
Most of the access control models in WSNs and WMSNs
are based on traditional Role-Based Access Control (RBAC),
which has been widely accepted as a policy access control
model. Applications based on RBAC have been implemented
and widely deployed by commercial companies and education
industries. Cryptography-based access control is a new access
control model that is designed for the untrusted environment,
where lack of global knowledge and control are defining
characteristics. Cryptography methods in WSNs should
meet the constraints of sensor nodes such as limited power,
resources and memory shortage. Therefore, choosing the
suitable cryptography method is important in WSNs. Maw
et al. [34] mentioned that a considerable amount of access
control models has been proposed for use in WSNs, though
some of them are not yet implemented. In this section, the
existing proposed models that are similar to the proposed
approach are explained and discussed.
The distributed PRIvacy-preserving aCCESS control
(PRICCESS) protocol [18] is proposed to provide privacy
preserving distributed access control in WSNs. The
PRICCESS model used Access Control List (ACL) to
store the access permission of user groups in the network
controller. For ACL, roles need to be predefined in advance
based on RBAC. Garci-Morchon et al. [16] pointed out that
RBAC model is not good enough to use in WSNs because in
the traditional RBAC model, the roles and policies have to
be predefined in advance. Instead Garci-Morchon and Wehrle
[16] proposed the Context-Aware Role-Based Access Control
model for WMSNs, in which an access control decision will
be made based on the modular contextual information such
as normal, emergency and critical, to ensure the users’ safety.
In this model, there is no prevention or detection mechanism
and no verification process to check user’s data access, when
the critical situation occurs.
The Break-the-Glass Access Control (BTG-AC) model is
proposed by Maw et al. [31] for medical data in WSNs.
The main objective of the BTG-AC model is to provide
availability of data access in the emergency situation but the
users need to be kept in the log and will be audited by both
internal and external auditor for being Break-the-Glass to get
access to patient’s medical records. The major disadvantages
of this model is that the human process is involved in BTG
action.
Yu et al. [57] proposed the Fine-grained Data Access
Control (FDAC) model which is based on Attribute-Based
Encryption (ABE) [9]. The main idea of their approach is to
provide a fine-grained access control over sensor data and
is resilient against attacks such as user colluding and node
compromising. Their model is based on centralised approach
because only a network controller is managed for key
management. If the network controller is compromised, there
will be no security provisioning in the network. Therefore, a
single point of failure can be occurred.
To avoid a single point of failure, Ruj et al. [47] proposed
an access control scheme based on Multi-authority Attribute
Based Encryption. Their objective is to provide fully
distributed data access control by using several Distribution
Centres (DCs). All the access structures from each DC,
which need to satisfy the attributes from sensor nodes, are
ANDed together to get a complete access for the single
user. There is no detailed explanation of how to combine
all the access structures together. Without the combining
approach, the user has to store all the access structures in
order to access different types of data from the sensor network.
Based on the above discussion, there are a couple of
access control models, such as BTG-AC and CA-RBAC
which are designed to support availability of data access in
emergency cases but there is no prevention, and detection
mechanism and authentication service to prevent authorised
usage as well as privacy of the data from both internal and
external users. In addition, an overly “loose” policy without
prevention and detection mechanism might grant permitted
access to the inappropriate users. There are several access
control models like FDAC and Ruj’s model that are designed
to provide fine-grained data access in WSNs but there is no
consideration of making access decisions effectively based on
the users’ circumstances. On the other hand, an overly “tight”
policy might prevent permitted access from the appropriate
users in unanticipated events. Therefore, a new access control
model is needed to consider the flexible approach for making
access decisions effectively. It is clear that availability to
access data at any time and privacy of data by providing a
flexible access control policy is vital in WSNs.
TBA2C has similar structure as BTG-AC but the main
difference is that the decisions can be made effectively based
on dynamic changes of users’ behaviour. It supports a flexible
access control policy to provide both data confidentiality and
data availability when it is required. The proposed access
control model is aimed to achieve flexibility of the access
control engine is to override access policy with user behaviour
trust value and contextual information, whenever unexpected
events occur. The overriding considers a user’s behaviour
trust value and adapts a certain level of prevention and
detection mechanism to provide both availability and privacy.
Therefore, the proposed TBA2C model had a great advantage
over current access control models because of introducing
of overriding access policy based on user’s behaviour trust
model, contextual information and prevention and detection
mechanism.
B. Trust in WSNs
Trust plays an important role in networks and human
life environments. In the context of a network, trust is used
to help its components to decide whether another member,
node or device from the same network is being inattentive,
uncooperative or compromised. Fernandez-Gago [14] states
that trust becomes quite important in self-configurable and
autonomous systems such as WSNs and WMSNs. Having
different definitions in security related literatures “trust” in
this chapter is considered as the trustworthiness of users
based on highly dynamic and unpredictable characteristic of
their behaviour.
Trust in WSNs can be classified into different categories
based on the needs of the application. The classification of
trust [49] is explained as follow:
• Direct Trust: Direct trust is the trust that a subject holds of
another service provider without any intermediate service
provider or entity.
• Indirect Trust: Indirect trust is the trust that a subject
holds of one service provider through some other service
provider or entity.
• Full Trust: A subject is said to have full trust of a service
provider if that subject trusts all the services provided.
• Partial Trust: A subject is said to have partial trust of a
service provider, if that subject trusts some of the services
provided.
• Recommended Trust: Recommended trust is the trust
of one entity of another that is recommended by other
entities.
• Authentication Trust: Authentication trust is the trust
of an entity of the authenticity based on an identity
certificate signed by a certificate authority.
• Communication Trust: Communication trust means that
the trust is calculated between the sensor nodes based on
their cooperation of routing messages to other nodes in
the network [41].
• Data Trust: Data trust is the trust that is based on the
actually sensed data of the sensors [39].
Regarding the above categorisation of trust, direct and
indirect trust are commonly used in trust calculations of
sensor nodes [40], [39] to check whether the nodes are
trustworthy or not based on Bayesian network [11] and Naive
Bayes classification algorithms [58]. For reputation-based
trust calculation [42], [15], trust are used in key management
and network management. Authentication trust is mostly
used in policy-based trust management systems [49]. The
communication and data trust proposed by Momani [41],
is used to calculate trust between sensor nodes. sTherefore,
trust can be divided in six groups regarding the aspects
of requirements in WSNs: trust-based routing management
or protocol; trust-based intrusion detection; trust-based key
management; trust-based malicious node detection; and
group-based and reputation-based trust management for
network. Table I shows the taxonomy of trust-based schemes
in the published literatures for WSNs.
Trust can also resolve security related routing issues.
Several trust management schemes [52], [7], [1], [24], [43]
are proposed to detect suspicious transmission and identify
malicious nodes for disseminating information in the network.
For example, trust-based routing management only allows the
trusted sensor nodes to participate in the routing. Direct trust
and indirect trust are mostly used to evaluate each node’s
trustworthiness based on trust metrics (i.e. Quality of Service
(QoS) characteristics such as data packets forwarded, control
message forwarded, availability based on bacon or Hello
message, etc.) and weight factors. One of the trust algorithms
for routing management calculates the direct trust based on
Geometric Mean [37] of the QoS characteristics. The indirect
(second-hand) information may be particularly useful when
there is no direct interaction, i.e. when the situation is risky,
then the indirect trust plays major role in the formation of
trust on any node.
Trust-based intrusion detection schemes such as [5], [6],
[7] are used to effectively deal with selfish or malicious nodes
and to improve QoS in WSNs. The trust-based intrusion
detection schemes considered the effect of both social trust
(such as honesty2) and QoS trust (such as competence,
reliability and task completion capability) to detect malicious
nodes.
Trust-based key management schemes [23], [25], [26]
based on cryptographic method are proposed to provide
a secure communication channel in WSNs. Since sensor
nodes collect personal medical data, security and privacy
are important services in this kind of networks. It is aimed
to securely and efficiently generate and distribute session
keys based on biometrics (such as electrocardiogram [28]) or
identity-based encryption [2] between the sensor nodes and
the base station to secure end-to-end transmission.
The aim of trust-based malicious node detection is to
minimise communication and storage overhead, and to
improve reliability in WSNs. Direct and indirect trust are
mostly used in malicious node detection methods to calculate
the trust value of each node based on weighted running
average approach [38]. Direct trust method [20] consists of
the following steps:
• Behaviour of the node is monitored periodically.
• In each period the numbers of good and bad behaviour
of the node are recorded.
• Based on the numbers of good and bad behaviour, trust
is calculated periodically.
Indirect trust is calculated based on recommendation
(second hand information) obtained from trustful neighbours.
Additionally, the communication and data trust are also used
to detect malicious node based on Bayesian network.
The group-based trust management scheme for clustered
2The honesty trust is the trust that measure through evidences of dishonesty
such as false self-reporting and abnormal trust recommendations.
Trust based Schemes in WSNs
Trust-based Schemes References
Trust-based routing management or protocol [52], [7], [1], [24], [43], [56], [44]
Trust-based intrusion detection [5], [6], [7]
Trust-based key management [23], [25], [26], [28]
Trust-based malicious node detection [22], [61], [20], [40]
Group-based trust management [48], [60]
Reputation-based trust management [42], [15], [51]
TABLE I: A taxonomy of trust-based schemes in WSNs
WSNs such as [48], [60] is aimed to detect and prevent
selfish, faulty and malicious nodes, to minimise the memory
overhead, and to reduce the communication overhead by
making sensor nodes only communicate with the cluster
head. The trust value calculation in cluster head is based on
weighted running average, so that the recent trust value can
be given more weight in the overall trust calculation.
Distributed Reputation-based Beacon Trust System
(DRBTS) [51] is aimed at providing a method by which
bacon nodes3 can monitor each other and provide information
so that sensor nodes can choose whom to trust, based on a
quorum voting approach [50]. In order to trust a bacon node’s
information, a sensor must get votes for its trustworthiness
from at least half of their common neighbours. Ganeriwal
and Srivastava [15] propose a framework where each sensor
node maintains reputation metric representing past behaviour
of other nodes, which are then used as an inherent aspect
in predicting future behaviour. This approach is based on a
Bayesian formulation, specifically a beta reputation system
[21], for the algorithm steps of reputation representation,
updates, integration and trust evolution. Overall, reputation-
based trust management are employed in WSNs to deal with
malicious and unreliable nodes based on first and second
hand information from the neighbours.
Based on the above discussion, most of the trust schemes
in WSNs are using weight factors, so that the direct trust
or recent trust can be given more weight in the overall trust
calculation. Direct trust, indirect trust and trust that based on
QoS characteristics are commonly used in trust calculations of
sensor nodes to check whether the nodes are trustworthy or not
based on Bayesian network, Naive Bayes and geometric mean.
Regarding the above facts, there is no existing trust model
that evaluates trust based on users’ behaviour information.
This means that none of the existing trust models can be
readily related to the decision-making process in the access
control engine. The evaluation of trust for users based on their
behaviour information is significant in forming a trustworthy
network and is a new research issue in WSNs. Therefore, we
propose a user behaviour trust model to use in WSNs and
WMSNs in order to measure behaviour trust of the user from
the system perspective to enhance access decisions. Unlike
existing trust models in WSNs, the proposed model is aimed
at calculating the trust value of each user regarding whether
3A beacon node assists other sensor nodes to determine their location.
the users are trustworthy or untrustworthy, based on highly
dynamic characteristics of their behaviour information.
III. A USER BEHAVIOUR TRUST MODEL
Fig. 1: Overview of the Trust Model
A user behaviour trust model that uses current user be-
haviour information and previous trust values to calculate user
trustworthiness from the system perspective is proposed and
introduced in WSNs. The current trust value is the geometric
mean [37] of information obtained from the user’s current
access requests to an object, such as user’s role, location and
time. The main reason of using the geometric mean is that it
compares different attributes - finding a single “figure of merit”
for these attributes - when each attribute has different numeric
ranges. The concept of using geometric mean to calculate
the direct trust based on QoS characteristics of a sensor
node for routing management motivates us to reproduce a
simple calculation for current trust evaluation based on a user’s
behaviour information such as the role and the contextual
information from the access request. The user’s behaviour
information can be considered as user’s characteristic and
calculated based on geometric mean formula. The geometric
mean equation can be seen as follow:
(
n∏
i=1
ai)
1
n = n
√
a1 ∗ a2 ∗ ...... ∗ an (1)
For the previous trust value, the total trust value of the
user from the previous transaction is used. This means that
the total trust value of users does not rely completely on the
evaluation of current trust. The traditional weighting approach
[38] is used to calculate the total trust value of a user based
on the current trust and the previous trust. The weight factor
is commonly used in the trust calculation, so that the recent
behaviour characteristics can be given more weight in the
overall trust calculation. If total behaviour trust value is higher
than the defined threshold, the user is trustworthy enough to
perform an action on a certain object. When it goes under the
defined threshold, the user becomes an untrustworthy person
and the system may decline his access to a specific object.
An overview of the user behaviour trust model can be seen in
Figure 1. There are three sub-modules: current trust, previous
trust and total trust.
A. Current Behaviour Trust Value (Tcur)
A user’s behaviour information (such as the role and the
contextual information from the access request) is used to
calculate the current trust value of the user. The formula for
the evaluation of current behaviour trust based on geometric
mean is shown below:
Tcur = (
n∏
i=1
ai)
1
n (2)
where,
n = Number of Attributes
a = Attribute
Based on the users’ behaviour information (such as location,
role and time), the above equation is substituted as follow:
Tcur= 3
√
TLo ∗ TRo ∗ TTi (3)
where,
Tcur = Current Trust Value
TLo = Trust Value for Location
TRo = Trust Value for User’s Role
TTi = Trust Value for Time Range
Equation 3 shows that the current behaviour trust value is
evaluated based on three different attributes: location; user’s
role; and user’s time range. Each attribute has a defined
value between 1 and 4 because we consider three different
conditions in the proposed model. The defined value of each
attribute is evaluated differently. Based on the geometric
mean, the maximum value of current behaviour trust can be
up to 4 and the lowest value can be 1.
In the proposed model, the physical location of a user
(location of subject), which department that user is from
(department of subject) and where is the targeted data that
the user tries to access (department of object) are considered
as the evaluation criteria for the location attribute. Table II
represents an example data set to evaluate the trust value of
location for a user.
Department
of Subject
Department
of Object
Location of
Subject
TLo
A A A 4
A A B 3
A B A 2
A B B 1
TABLE II: An Evaluation Criteria for Location Attribute
Based on Table II, if the department of the subject, the
location of the subject and the department of the object are
the same (in this case “A” department), the trust value of
location for a user is defined as 4 that is a maximum value.
If the user works in department “A” and tries to access data
which stores the same department “A” but his actual location
is from another department (“B”), his trust value is set as 3.
If the object is stored in “B” department but both department
of subject and location of subject are from “A” department,
the trust value is defined as 2 because the user tries to
access data which is stored in the different department.
In last case, the trust value of location for a user is the
lowest 1 when the location of subject and the department of
object are different compared to the department of the subject.
The defined trust value for a user’s role is reflected based
on their responsibility and duty. For the doctor, the trust value
for user’s role is set as 4 but for the nurses, it is defined
as 2. The trust value can be different for other roles (such
as administration staff, laboratory staff, etc.) but we only
consider doctors’ and nurses’ roles. In general, if the current
user’s time range is within the system defined time frame,
the trust value of the time criteria TTi is set between 1 to 4.
In a medical application, some users work in the daytime and
some in the night time. Therefore, the defined trust value for
time criteria can change based on users’ working schedule or
time framework. Example conditions for time criteria can be
seen in Table III.
Ti TTi
12 ≤ Ti < 18 4
6 ≤ Ti < 12 3
18 ≤ Ti < 24 2
0 ≤ Ti < 6 1
TABLE III: An Evaluation Criteria for Time Attribute
Based on the above discussion, the evaluation for each
criterion is considered separately based on the requirements of
the application for the current behaviour trust. The proposed
current trust module can easily be extended with additional
attributes for extra critera for evaluation of trust.
B. Previous Trust Value (Tpre)
In the proposed model, the previous trust value is used as
one of the supporting factors for total trust evaluation when
the user requests at the next attempt. The user trust values
from the previous transactions are used as the previous trust
value of the users. Tpre is equivalent to the total trust value
of users from the previous transactions.
C. Total Trust Value (Ttotal)
The total behaviour trust value checks whether the user is
trustworthy or untrustworthy to perform some actions based
on his or her current and previous behaviour trust values. The
total trust value is a function of current and previous trust
values. The proposed model also uses the traditional weighting
approach as in [38], [2] to combine current and previous trust
to form the total trust per relation in the system, as shown in
equation 4.
Ttotal(n) = ( α * Tcur(n)) + ( β* Tpre(n)) (4)
where,
Ttotal(n) = Total Trust Value of the nth Transaction
Tcur(n) = Current Trust Value of the nth Transaction
Tpre(n) = Previous Trust Value of the nth Transaction
α = Constant Weighting Factor ( 0 ≤ α ≤ 1 ) to the current
trust
β = Constant Weighting Factor ( 1 - α ) to the previous trust
α is a weighting given to the current trust and β to the
previous trust where α + β = 1 and 0 ≤ α, β ≤ 1. Weights
can be assigned using different approaches. Depending on the
application, sometimes the current trust may be given more
weight and the previous trust may be given less weight i.e.
α > β, and vice-versa. Additionally, the traditional weighting
approach is commonly used in the overall trust calculation
in WSNs regarding direct and indirect trust. If there is no
previous behaviour trust, the current behaviour trust value is
used as the total behaviour trust value. Based on the evaluation
of the total behaviour trust value of a user, the levels of
trustworthiness can be expressed as follows:
• A user is trustworthy if Ttotal≥ Tthreshold
• A user is untrustworthy if Ttotal< Tthreshold
Currently, a simple method is used to differentiate whether
a user is trustworthy or untrustworthy based on the total
trust. If the total trust value of the user is higher than the
defined threshold (Tthreshold) which is 2.5 based on the
arithmetic mean4 [12] of previous trust and current trust, he
is a trustworthy person, but when the total trust value is under
the defined threshold, that person is deemed an untrustworthy
person. After the evaluation of total behaviour trust value for
that user, that value will be forwarded to the access control
module for decisions regarding data access. Using behaviour
trust values can enhance the decision-making process at the
access control module. The behaviour trust module assists
the decision-making process regarding whether the user is
trustworthy or un-trustworthy to perform some actions in the
specific targeted objects.
4The arithmetic mean is used as a good measure of central tendency,
compared to α = β = 0.5.
D. Data Flow Chart
The data flow chart for the behaviour trust module
can be seen in Figure 2. When the user behaviour trust
module receives user requested information (Uinfo), the
current behaviour trust module evaluates the current user’s
information. After that, the system checks whether the user
has previous interaction by checking his previous behaviour
trust value. If it is the first attempt for that user, where
Tpre(n) is inapplicable, the current behaviour trust value is
used as the total behaviour trust value.
Fig. 2: Flow Chart of the Trust Model
If Tpre(n) is greater than zero, both current and previous
trust values are forwarded to the main trust engine to calculate
the total behaviour trust based on equation 4. The total trust
value will be forwarded to the access control module for
decisions regarding data access. All the users’ information and
trust value are kept as an audit log.
E. Evaluation of Trust Algorithm
The user behaviour trust algorithm is evaluated based on
numerical analysis in MATLAB [30] to check and show
how the total trust value of users vary given different users’
behaviour information or attributes. The trust algorithm is
calculated with random variables5 that represent the trust
value of three different attributes such as trust value for
location, users’ role and time range. Random variables
are useful when solving and complex problems related to
probability (whether the users can be trusted or not trusted).
5A random variable is a process that assigns values of an attribute to
different cases.
Fig. 3: Behaviour Trust Evaluation
The trust algorithm can be seen as follows:
Calculate Total Trust (Ttotal, Tcur, Tpre, TLo, TRo, TTi,
α, β)
Uinfo = Current User Information
Ttotal = Total Trust Value
Tpre = Previous Trust Value
Tcur = Current Trust Value
TLo = Trust Value for Location
TRo = Trust Value for User’s Role
TTi = Trust Value for Time Range
α and β = Constant Weighting Factor (0 ≤ α, β ≤ 1)
For TLo,
TLou= randi(4,1,10);
For TRo,
TRo= randi(4,1,10);
For TTi,
TTi= randi(4,1,10);
For Current Trust (Tcur),
Tcur(n) = 3
√
TLo ∗ TRo ∗ TTi
For Total Trust (Ttotal),
if Tpre(n) = NA,
Tcur(n) = Ttotal (n)
Return Ttotal(n);
else Tpre(n) = Ttotal(n-1);
Ttotal(n) = ( α * Tcur(n)) + ( β* Tpre(n))
Return Ttotal(n);
Figure 3 shows the numerical analysis of trust algorithm
based on users’ behaviour pattern in MATLAB. The green
line presents the previous trust value of the user and the red
line represents the total trust value of the users. The blue line
represents the current behaviour trust of the user; the black
lines represent the trust value of three different attributes such
as location; user’s role; and user’s time range. These attributes
were simulated by using the “randi” [30] function based on
uniformly distributed pseudo-random integers to generate the
random integers. This function generates different variables
that are used as the defined trust value for location of user,
value for location of targeted object, value for user’s role
and value for time range, for the current trust evaluation.
“randi(4,1,10)” represents the numerical number between 4 to
1 for the transactions (10). Therefore, it shows that the current
trust value of a user varies based on the dynamic changes of
his or her behaviour information. Overall, it shows that the
trust value of users can be evaluated and calculated based on
highly dynamic characteristics of their behaviour information.
Additionally, Figure 3 demonstrates that the total trust value
of a user does not only rely on the current trust value that
evaluate based on the users’ behaviour information from recent
transaction but also depends on the previous trust values.
F. Summary
This section discussed a simple user behaviour trust model
with figures and diagrams. The proposed model is developed
and designed based on the geometric mean and weight running
average to calculate the trust value of the user. The results
obtained from the evaluation of trust algorithms based on
numerical simulation in MATLAB show that the trust value
of the users can vary based on the current users’ behaviour
information and the previous trust value. The proposed model
is developed to cooperate with access control engines and to
be used as one of the policy evaluation criteria for making
access decisions effectively and dynamically. The proposed
model is designed based on the user behaviour information
(such as location, role and time) that can be easily obtained
from any data access request. This means that, there is no
essential requirement regarding the behaviour information or
attributes and it can be easily adapted in current access control
engines. Additionally, the introducing of trust model in access
control engines can help to address the conflict between data
privacy and data availability because only the trusted users
can get the restricted access in emergency and unanticipated
situations.
IV. TBA2C : TRUST-BASED ADAPTIVE ACCESS CONTROL
MODEL
Trust-Based Adaptive Access Control (TBA2C) is an
extended version of the adaptive access control model that
proposed by Maw et al. [32], [33] by introducing a user
behaviour trust model from the previous section in the
access control engine. TBA2C is aimed at protecting the
privacy of the users’ information and the privacy of the
patients’ information allowing only trusted users to have a
restricted access in emergency and unanticipated situations.
The TBA2C model is incorporated the concepts of the
possibility-with-override [45] into WSNs for hard-to-define
and unanticipated situations regarding data availability
purpose. Possibility-with-override means users may be able
to override the denial of access when unanticipated situations
occur. It is combined with the user behaviour trust model
to enforce access decisions effectively and efficiently at the
access control engine. The user behaviour trust model is
employed to evaluate the total behaviour trust value of the
users based on their role, department, time, etc. In addition,
the trust value is used as an extra condition in the authorisation
policy to detect abnormal data access from authorised users.
Therefore, TBA2C is an emerging concept that builds on the
concepts of the user behaviour trust model, the prevention
and detection mechanism, and the possibility-with-override
concept to provide a flexible policy that is not too permissive
nor too strict in the access control engine and to adjust the
access decisions effectively based on the user behaviour trust
values.
There are three main modules in TBA2C namely: Policy
Enforcement Point (PEP), Policy Decision Point (PDP) and
user’s behaviour trust module. The overview of TBA2C can
be seen on Figure 4. A brief discussion of PEP, PDP and user
behaviour trust module are explained next.
Fig. 4: Overview of TBA2C Model
A. Policy Enforcement Point (PEP)
PEP provides an authentication service between users and
sensor nodes. Whenever PEP receives an access request, it
authenticates the user by checking the user information such
as user identity and cryptographic key before it forwards the
decision request to the PDP. The assumption is made that
Attribute-Based Encryption (ABE) [9] based authentication
service and key distribution are already provided in the PEP
of the proposed model.
B. Policy Decision Point (PDP)
PDP is a main module in the proposed model inside which
the access control module and a prevention and detection
module are implemented, and makes access decisions based
on the authorisation policy, the obligation policy and the
overriding policy in Ponder2. The PDP uses information such
as users’ role, action and context along with these policies for
the decision-making process. After the access control module
has made decisions regarding data access, PDP sends back
a response message to the user and forwards the decision
internally to the targeted object.
1) Access Control Module: The access control module
is the main module in the proposed TBA2C model. All
the defined access policies such as authorisation, obligation
and overriding are integrated with that module. An effective
access decision can be made in any circumstances based on
the defined access policies and user behaviour trust value.
• Authorisation Policy
An authorisation policy defines whether a subject is
authorised to execute an action on a targeted object.
In the authorisation policy, subject, target, condition
and action define an access role. Subject means a user,
who is trying to access the targeted object. Whenever
the access control module receives a decision request,
it will check conditions and make decisions based on
the authorisation policies. An example of authorisation
policy is shown below:
Def: Permit-Policy
subject nurse
action read
target ob2
condition department = Cancer
and time is between 9am to 17pm
if trust value is < 2.5
call obligation policy
The above permit-policy adds an extra condition (trust
criterion) to detect abnormal data access from authorised
users. It defines the nurse from the “Cancer” department
has the right to access the medical record of patient
from the same department (ob2). Unlike the previous
models, the trustworthiness value of the user is checked
as additional condition in the authorisation policy. The
nurse still has an data access even if his trust value is
lower than defined value but the system assumes an
abnormal data access and performs a course of action
by activating the obligation policy.
• Obligation policy
An obligating policy defines the actions to be performed
if certain conditions are met. One of the objectives
of using the obligation policy is to provide finer-
level access control than mere permitted and denied
decisions. After the access decision is made based on
authorisation and overriding policies, some obligation
policies are activated when the access is given to the user.
Def: Obligation-Policy
Target Emlog
if policy type is override
do write.audit < subject, Time, Target, Behaviour Trust Value,
Department, Decision Outcome >
and Trigger-alarm
and Notification Message
Based on the above policy, if there is an overriding
process, the obligation policy becomes active and keeps
the user information as an audit log and some actions
such as triggering an alarm and sending notification
message to administrator are performed.
• Overriding Policy
An overriding policy is introduced to provide flexible
access in TBA2C. The overriding policy uses the
behaviour trust value and the contextual information
to make decisions regarding access in unexpected and
emergency situations. The overriding policy checks
one or more conditions for access decisions and
makes the policy evaluation based on users’ behaviour
trust value to adjust decisions for unanticipated situations.
Def: Overriding-Policy
subject nurse
action read
target ob1
condition trust value is ≥ 2.5
and department = Heart
and time is between 9am to 17pm
call Obligation-Policy
Regarding the above policy, a nurse from “Heart” de-
partment may access the medical record of a patient
from “Cancer” department (ob1) but he needs to meet
conditions such as trust, department and time to override
the denied access. An important factor is that the user
behaviour trust value has to be equal or higher than
the defined value which is 2.5 to override it. Alongside
the authorisation decision, the obligation policy will be
activated whether the access has been granted or denied.
2) Prevention and Detection Module: The main idea of
introducing a prevention and detection mechanism [10], [8],
[46] is to protect the privacy and confidentiality of data by
storing users’ information, actions, etc. as an audit log for
the purpose of detecting security violations. For an audit log
to be usable, it should:
• Be available through a usable interface for the auditors
or the administrators.
• Contain sufficiently detailed information to get a picture
of what has happened.
Regarding the above facts, the audit log is to record the
event and specify 1) when it occurred, 2) the user information
associated with that event and 3) the results of the decision-
making process. An audit log can assist in detecting security
violations and flaws in the system by detecting any suspicious
access from users. In the audit log format, the subject is a user
who tries to access a medical record from the targeted object
with an authorisation decision. In the audit log, the contextual
information such as time and department are also recorded.
The format of the audit record is shown as follows:
Auditlog := [Subject + Time + Target + Department + Decision Outcomes]
There are two different audit logs in the proposed model.
These are:
• Access Log - every time a medical record is opened an
entry is created in the access log containing information
about the users, the patient and the document being
accessed.
• Emergency Log - an entry is created in this log
whenever a restricted access is permitted or denied using
the overriding process.
These two logs are stored as Comma Separated Value (CSV)
extension, so it can be easily checked and monitored by system
administrators. Therefore, the prevention and detection module
is used in the proposed model to keep a record of all the users’
access information as an audit log for detecting security policy
violations.
C. A User Behaviour Trust Module
A user behaviour trust model from the previous chapter
is used in the TBA2C model. This module uses current
user information and previous trust values to calculate the
user trustworthiness value from the system perspective. The
current trust value is obtained from the user’s current access
request to an object, such as user’s role, department, time and
targeted objects. The total trust value of the user is stored in
a log as the previous trust value for the user’s next attempt.
The trust value is not only used in the overriding process but
also in the normal authorisation process to detect abnormal
data access from authorised users.
D. Outcomes of the Decision-Making Process
In the proposed TBA2C model, the decision-making pro-
cesses regarding data access are based on the authorisation,
obligation and overriding policies. There are five possible deci-
sion outcomes based on existing policies. These are discussed
as follows.
• Permitted Access: A user access request has been granted,
if he or she has the right privileges to access data at the
sensor nodes. For example: A nurse has the right to access
medical records of patients from the same department.
• Denied Access: A user access request has been denied.
The user is not allowed to access the resources because
he does not have the right to access data. For example: A
nurse does not have the right to access medical records
of patients from other departments.
• Permitted Access with Obligation - A user access request
has been granted but the obligation policy is activated
automatically to take some actions when data access is
given to that user especially for important and confidential
information.
• Denied Access with Obligation - A user does not have
access privilege to the resources and his or her restricted
access has been denied. Additionally, the obligation pol-
icy is activated to take an action after the authorisation
decision is made.
• Permitted Access with Overriding and Obligation - A user
does not have access privilege to the resources but the
restricted access will be granted if he or she overrides
the access policy within some constraints, such as con-
textual information. Additionally, the obligation policy is
activated to detect unnecessary overriding processes by
authorised users when the overriding policy is used for
decision evaluation.
V. THREAT MODEL
The attacker-centric based threat model [36] is respected
and commonly used. Defence strategy is of course, improved
if there is a reasonable understanding of how attackers think.
By thinking like attackers and being aware of their likely
tactics, the system can be more effective when applying
countermeasures6. Several threats that can be faced in the
applications can be categorised based on the goals of the
attacks. Knowledge of these threats can help to organise a
security strategy and might be able to help plan responses to
these threats. In this section, the threat model is categorised
based on STRIDE [35]. We analysed the STRIDE model in
the medical scenario as follows:
• Spoofing: Spoofing is attempting to gain access to a
system by using a false identity. This can be accomplished
using stolen user credentials or false information. After
the attacker successfully gains access as a legitimate
user, elevation of privileges can begin. Example: A nurse
pretends to be a doctor.
• Tampering: Tampering is the unauthorised modification
of data but we did not address it explicitly in this
dissertation. Same considerations apply to write as to
read.
Example: A nurse or doctor edits the medical record of
a patient illegitimately.
• Repudiation: Repudiation is the ability of users to deny
that they performed specific actions. Without adequate
auditing, repudiation attacks are difficult to prove. The
issue of repudiation is concerned with a user denying
that he performed an action. The defence mechanism is
needed in place to ensure that all user activity can be
tracked and recorded. Lack of auditing and logging of
changes made to data threatens the ability to identify
when changes were made and who made those changes.
Example: A nurse denies that he has edited the medical
record.
• Information disclosure: Information disclosure is the
unwanted exposure of private data. Sensitive data need
to be stored securely to prevent a malicious user from
gaining access to and reading the data. The disclosure
of confidential data can occur when sensitive data can
be viewed by unauthorised users. Only authenticated and
authorised users should be able to access the data that is
specific to them. Access to data should be restricted to
users.
Example: Other staff members from the hospital try to
read the medical record.
• Denial of Service: Denial of service is the process of
making system resources unavailable.
Example: A common application layer DoS attack will
send multiple simultaneous requests for data access.
These requests will most likely put the access control
under DoS condition and the user will likely be unable
to access the medical record.
• Elevation of privileges: Elevation of privilege occurs
when a user with limited privileges assumes the identity
of a privileged user to gain access to a data resource.
Example: A nurse tries to access restricted data by using
the fault identity.
6A countermeasure is an action or technique that can reduce a threat and
an attack by eliminating or preventing it.
Threat Countermeasure
Spoofing Strong Authentication (Attribute Based Encryption (ABE))
Tampering Strong Authorisation (ABE and Access Control)
Repudiation Audit Trials (Audit Record or Log)
Information Disclosure ABE and Access Control
Denial of Service Access Control
Elevation of Privilege Access Control
TABLE IV: Possible Threats and Countermeasures
Based on the above discussion, these threats and attacks
are trying to violate the security services such as confiden-
tiality, integrity, authenticity, repudiation, etc. These threats
and attacks should be protected by using security mechanisms
or countermeasures. A countermeasure is a safeguard that
addresses a threat and mitigates risk. Table IV lists the security
threats that can violate the security services and the possible
countermeasures to defend against them in the proposed
TBA2C model.
VI. IMPLEMENTATION AND EVALUATION OF TBA2C
In this section, we explain how the proposed TBA2C model
is implemented in Java based Ponder2 policy language [53]
and evaluated with a medical scenario.
A. Implementation Tools and Environments
There are a variety of development tools for WSNs
available in the current WSN research community. Two policy
languages, Ponder2 and WSN Authorisation Specification
Language (WASL) [29], are designed specifically for resource
and memory limited devices like sensor nodes. Ponder2 is
a popular policy language to use in Body Sensor Networks
(BSNs) and much published literature on WSNs is based
on Ponder2. It comprises a self-contained, stand-alone,
general-purpose object management system with message
passing between objects, incorporates an awareness of events
and policies, and implements a policy execution framework.
Ponder2 has a high-level configuration and control language
called PonderTalk and user-extensible managed objects that
are programmed in Java. Ponder2 is implemented as Self-
Managed Cell (SMC) [27], which is a set of hardware and
software components forming an administrative domain. This
means that Ponder2 is capable of self management. Everything
in Ponder2 is a managed object loaded dynamically into the
SMC from a library, thereby producing the factory managed
object (Java class). The proposed model is implemented in
the Ponder2 policy language, which is suitable to use in small
devices such as sensor node.
B. Simulation Test Scenario
A medical application is developed to show how the
proposed model is fit and how the policy evaluation is done
for overriding access based on user behaviour trust value and
other information. In WMSNs, each patient has his or her own
Body Sensor Network (BSN) that consists of several sensors.
Sensor nodes implanted in the patient’s body continuously
monitor glucose level, oxygen, etc. They transmit collected
data to a local wireless PDA (data aggregator) or store it
locally. The assumption is made that sensed data are stored in
the data aggregator, as the medical record with other personal
information in BSN.
Users such as doctors and nurses try to access medical
records of patients via mobile, personal digital assistant or
personal computer. For example, sensors can interact with
each other via IEEE 802.15.4 wireless links and interactions
with other mobile phones and personal digital assistants from
users via Wi-Fi or Bluetooth. Each BSN manages its own
policies relating to what kind of actions such as read, write,
etc can be performed but for simplicity only read operation
is discussed throughout this paper. The department that where
the doctors or nurses are from, is used when the users try to
interact with other BSNs or request to join a patient’s BSN for
data access. Regarding users’ access privileges, data access to
a patient’s information and medical record will be different.
Therefore, access control policies are different based on the
users’ responsibility, role and department. Figure 5 expresses
the overview diagram of how to apply the TBA2C model
in healthcare applications for BSNs and WMSNs. Based on
Figure 5, the step-by-step process of user access to the targeted
object is explained as follows:
1) A user sends an access request to the targeted object in
the system.
2) PEP authenticates the user and forwards users’ attributes
to a user behaviour trust module. Simultaneously it sends
a decision request to PDP for decisions regarding data
access.
3) The user behaviour trust module calculates the trust
value of the user based on current trust and previous
trust. Thereafter, it sends the behaviour trust value to
PDP. We assume that the behaviour trust module is
deployed in another sensor node that is centrally located
to calculate the trustworthiness value of the users.
4) PDP calls the access control engine and passes through
the details (such as the requested operation, the targeted
object, the contextual information and the behaviour
trust value) to make decisions regarding data access.
5) The access control engine returns permitted access or
permitted access with obligation or permitted access
with overriding and obligation; (or denied access or
denied access with overriding and obligation, in which
case a denied message is sent from PDP to the user and
the request terminates here).
6) PDP forwards the decision response to the targeted
Fig. 5: Overview of TBA2C with Medical Application in Body Sensor Network
object.
7) The targeted object returns the results.
8) PDP returns the results to the user.
The following policies in Table V are identified and
developed to evaluate the proposed model. In Table V, “ob1”
represents the medical record of a patient from “Heart”
department and “ob2” is the medical of the patient from
“Cancer” department. “Oblg1” performs a course of action
(Sending Notification Message) but for “Oblg2”, courses
of actions (Sending Notification Message and Triggering
Alarm) are performed. “T” represents the trust value of
a user. In policy 1, the doctors from “Heart” department
have the right to access the medical record of patient (ob1),
which stores collected data from implanted sensors and
personal information, from the same department (“Heart”).
Policy 2 allows the doctors to access the medical record of
the patient (ob2) from “Cancer” department. Policy 1 and
2 for the doctors are needed regarding data access to the
medical records of patients from both “Cancer and Heart”
departments. The policies for nurses are slightly different. In
policy 3, the nurses from “Heart” departments can access the
medical record of a patient (ob1) who is in their department.
Unlike doctors, the nurses can only access the medical
record of the patient from the same department. Policy 3
and 4 are different. Policy 4 is for the nurses who work in
“Cancer” department to access their patients’ medical records.
In policy 5, 6, 7 and 8, an additional condition (trust
criterion) is added in policy 1 to 4 to detect abnormal data
access from authorised users. Simultaneously, the obligation
policy is activated when the user trust value is lower than
2.5 but the users can still access the medical record. In
policy 9, the nurse from “Heart” department is not allowed
to access the medical data (ob2) of patient from another
department (Cancer) unless the nurse overrides the access
policy for emergency data access. If his behaviour trust value
is higher than or equal to 2.5, the nurse’s overriding will be
successful and the restricted access will be granted to him.
Otherwise, his restricted access will be denied. In either case,
the obligation policy will be activated to take a course of
action. Policy 10 is for the nurse from “Cancer” department
Policy Role Department Time Condition Operation Oblg Object
1 Doctor Heart Any N.A. read N.A. ob1
2 Doctor Heart Any N.A. read N.A. ob2
3 Nurse Heart Any N.A. read N.A. ob1
4 Nurse Cancer Any N.A. read N.A. ob2
5 Doctor Heart Any (if T < 2.5) read Oblg1 ob1
6 Doctor Heart Any (if T < 2.5) read Oblg2 ob2
7 Nurse Heart Any (if T < 2.5) read Oblg1 ob1
8 Nurse Cancer Any (if T < 2.5) read Oblg1 ob2
9 Nurse Heart 9am <
and <
17pm
(if T ≥ 2.5) overrideread Oblg2 ob2
10 Nurse Cancer 9am <
and <
17pm
(if T ≥ 2.5) overrideread Oblg2 ob1
11 Admin Audit Any N.A. read N.A. Aclog
12 Admin Audit Any N.A. read N.A. Emlog
TABLE V: Example of Defined Policy
Fig. 6: User Interface and Decision Outcomes of A Nurse
for the overriding process. The administrator from “Audit”
department can easily check both access and emergency log
to detect security policy violations and abnormal data access
regarding policy 11 and 12.
To evaluate and address the conflict between availability
and privacy, the above medical scenario is considered because
it is a very security oriented application in the real world
environments. The idea of developing a framework for
the medical scenario is to identify any weaknesses and
security flaws of the proposed model. Figure 5 expresses
the overview diagram of how to apply TBA2C model in
medical application for BSNs and WMSNs. We developed
the medical application to show how the proposed model is
fitted and how the policy evaluation is done for overriding
access based on user’s behaviour trust value and contextual
information.
Fig. 7: Authentication Process for Overriding Process
C. Experimental Results and Discussion
Figure 6 shows the interface and decision outcomes
of a nurse “Aung”, who works as a day nurse in
“Cancer” department, as observed from his path
(/cancer/nurse/day/aung). Additionally, the location path
for the nurse is used as the current location of the users to
show that the trust value of the user can be varied based on
the location and time range.
In the first case, the nurse from “Cancer” department
tried to access the medical data of a patient (ob2) from
his department within time range. His access was approved
and his trust value was calculated and recorded (2.95)
because he satisfied a normal authorisation policy. In the
second case, he tried to access the same data (ob2) but
his physical location is different from where he works
and the time range. The total trust value of the user is
slightly decreased (2.53) from the previous case but he can
still access the data because of the normal authorisation policy.
In the third case, the nurse tried to access the medical
record of a patient (ob1) from another department (Heart) but
he needed to override the policy to access the data. For the
overriding process, his trust value needs to be higher than
2.5, which is the defined value in the system. Regardless of
these outcomes, the obligations such as the triggering of an
alarm and sending of a notifying message will be activated
and performed. If his trust value is not high enough, the
system message will appear in the interfaces as “The nurse
does not have the permission to access the medical record.
No overriding access is allowed to that user”. In this case, his
access request is denied but the courses of actions are still
performed regarding auditing purpose.
In the final case, the user satisfies the defined thresholds
from the overriding policy but here is an additional phase to
provide further security services in the proposed model. This
means that a user needs to re-authenticate to gain access to
confidential medical data. The authentication interface and the
confidential medical record interface can be seen in Figures
8 and 7. Overall, his access has been granted because of his
behaviour trust value and contextual information as well as
the authentication phase in the final case. Figure 6 not only
shows the interface of the nurse but also explains how the
access decisions are made based on authorisation, obligation
and overriding policies with the total behaviour trust value of
the users.
VII. CONCLUSION
This paper has designed and developed a dynamic trust-
based adaptive access control model to enhance the decision
making processes in WSNs and WMSNs. The main contribu-
tion to the WSN research community that this work makes
is the Trust-Based Adaptive Access Control model (TBA2C)
model itself. The introduction of overriding policy based on
a user behaviour trust value and contextual information is
the main novel element of the proposed TBA2C model. The
novel usage of the discretionary overriding concept with user
behaviour trust in adjusting decisions regarding data access
for emergency and unanticipated situations is a new concept.
The combination of the discretionary overriding concept and
the behaviour trust model is a possible solution that helps
to address the conflict between data availability and data
privacy by using the behaviour trust value as one of the
defined thresholds in the access policies. Only the trusted user,
who satisfies these thresholds including trust value, can get a
restricted access in emergency and unanticipated situations.
In future, ABE based encryption is considered to be applied
in TBA2C for user’s authentication process. Additionally,
the ABE approach will use to encrypt the collected and
sensed data at sensor nodes to provide data confidentiality.
Even the TBA2C model is capable of working with other
trust models in WSNs, the predicted user’s behaviour trust
value is considered as another possible factor to extend the
proposed user behaviour trust model. In future, Naive Bayes
classification algorithm [59], [58] is considered to apply in the
user behaviour trust model for the predicted behaviour trust. In
future, we plan to develop the proposed TBA2C model within
the actual sensor nodes for medical applications in WSNs.
Overall, the proposed TBA2C model is easy to adapt with
other concepts to provide further security services in WSNs.
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Appendix B
A Literature Review
B.1 Introduction
In this chapter, the published literatures for WSN area are reviewed based on following
criteria; security oriented applications, development tools, quantitative research method for
access control roles and policies, and trust-based security mechanisms.
B.2 Applications in WSNs
A WSN is envisioned to play an important role in a wide variety of areas ranging from
critical military surveillance applications to forest fire monitoring such as Great Duck (bird
observation on Great Duck island), earthquake monitoring, ocean water monitoring, wind
turbine, Grape monitoring, parts assembly, patients monitoring, traffic monitoring, tracking
military vehicles, etc [73]. Based on above current deployment of applications in WSNs,
these applications can be categorized into public sector, military, medical, environmental
monitoring, industrial, emergency rescue mission, automotive and agricultural. Among
these applications, the military, surveillance, border patrol and medical applications are
two most security-oriented fields of WSNs and they received most of the attention from
researchers.
• Military Application: WSNs can use in the military sector for a number of purposes
such as enemy tracking, monitoring military activities and battlefield surveillance.
The rapid deployment, self-organize and fault tolerance characteristics of sensor net-
works make them a very promising sensing technique for military Command, Con-
trol, Communications, Computing, Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance
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(C4ISR) [101]. In military applications, the sensor nodes are used to collect informa-
tion of enemies, tracking military vehicles, etc. Sensed and stored data at the sensor
nodes are highly confidential and kept secretly. So, data confidentiality is needed to
provide and control access to that data should be managed by using some security
and access control mechanisms. Privacy of source-location is another issue which
needs to consider for sensor nodes because they are not protected by tamper-proof
and tamper-evident. If the attackers know the location of sensor nodes in WSNs, they
can physically attack these sensor nodes by damaging and smashing them.
• Surveillance Application: In a surveillance scenario, the sensor nodes are used to
enhance and complement existing surveillance systems against crime and terrorist
attacks. Large scale networks of sensors can extend the ability of law-enforcement
agencies to monitor areas, public events, private properties and borders. Multime-
dia data will be useful when incidents such as accidents, theft, criminals, etc. are
happened in the real world environment. Multimedia content such as video streams
and images, along with advanced signal processing techniques, will be used to locate
missing persons or to identify criminals and terrorists. This means that the confi-
dentiality of collected and stored data in the sensor nodes must be maintained. The
access to that data recourse should be carefully considered to prevent unauthorised
usages from both illegitimate and legitimate users. Only authorised users can access
the data from those sensor nodes. Sometimes, the users might need to access data
for emergency situations, when the person who has an access privilege to access that
data, is not available. It is important to provide data availability service as well as data
confidentiality in emergency situations.
• Border Patrol Application: Border patrol systems [126] have recently gained atten-
tion to address the concerns that are related to national security. The major challenge
in protecting the borders of one country is the need of human involvement in patrolling
the premises. The traditional border control systems consist of security checkpoints
and border troops. This kinds of systems are suffered from intensive human involve-
ment if manual patrolling is considered. A WSN can be used in border patrol applica-
tion to reduce the human interactions. The border patrol application based on Hybrid
Wireless Sensor Network which consists of wireless multimedia sensor networks [4],
[3] and wireless underground sensor network [5], [6], can accurately detect and track
the borders intrusion with minimum human involvement. In border patrol application,
the collected data by the camera or video sensor nodes may need to keep secretly and
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access to that data might be prohibited to unauthorised users. Additionally, the com-
munication channels need to be secured to transfer collected data within the Hybrid
Wireless Sensor Network. Therefore, a light-weigh security mechanism is needed to
consider for this kind of application.
• Medical Application: Nowadays, WSNs are rapidly growing and overcoming new
application area in medical or healthcare domain. Wireless sensors for healthcare do-
main are becoming smaller and more powerful to use in a wide range of medical appli-
cations such as health monitoring, chronic disease management and measuring user
vital signs. Wireless Medical Sensor Network (WMSN) is another form of WSNs,
which used in medical and healthcare domain. In WMSN, sensors are attached with
human body to monitor healthcare information like ECG, blood pressure, etc. A medi-
cal staff can access, collect and record medical data directly from a patient’s sensor for
remote health care monitoring services. Garcia-Morchon [43] mentioned that user’s
medical data lead to security and privacy concerns. So, the security services such
as confidentiality, integrity, authenticity, non repudiation, are required to provide in
healthcare applications. In addition, control access to patient’s medical data becomes
serious issue in WMSN because there might be a number of medical staffs and family
members, who try to interact with medical data.
The above four applications area are more active than other applications. Among these
four applications area, the medical and military areas are most security-oriented applications
in the real world. Currently, we developed a medical application to show that how the
proposed access control model is fitted into these areas and how the policy overriding can be
done based on users’ behaviour trust value. On the other hand, we investigate the usability
and accountability of the proposed model based on the medical application.
B.3 Development Tools for WSNs
There are two different type of development tools in WSNs named as simulator and emu-
lator. Simulators are mostly used for modelling and developing of WSNs. For real world
implementation and testing, an emulator is used with simulator to get an accurate result for
WSN based applications. There are variety of development tools for WSNs in the current
WSN research community. Among them, a several popular simulation and emulation tools
for WSNs are discussed.
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B.3.1 Simulator for WSNs
Simulation is the most popular, feasible and effective approach to develop, design and test
network protocols in WSNs. A simulator is universally used to develop for network proto-
cols especially in the beginning phase of network designs. The cost for simulating hundreds
or even thousands of nodes is very low and also it can be done within the short amount of
executing time by using the simulator. Some simulators are designed for general wireless
networks and some are designed especially for WSNs. The simulator achieves to accurate
security protocols or network models, and to predict the behaviour of real world environ-
ment in different scenarios. A few network simulators for general wireless networks and
WSNs are discussed as follows.
• NS-2 [131]
NS-2 stands for Network Simulation Version 2 and it can be run on both Linux and
Window operating system but Cygwin is needed to run NS-2 in Window platform.
NS-2 simulator is a popular tool among others in wired and wireless networks. NS-2
supports a considerable amount of protocols in all layers. Ad-hoc and WSN based
security protocols are also supported by NS-2 tool which is easy to modify and im-
prove codes for simulation because it is an open source model as well as it save the
cost of simulation. NS-2 is especially aimed for general network simulation and it
does not consider the characteristics of WSNs and its hardware constraints. There is
a scalability problem for WSN in NS-2 because if the number of nodes are increased,
the tracing file will be too large and too big to manage and handle.
• OMNeT++ [134]
OMNeT++ supports module programming language and it can run on both Linux and
Window operating system. OMNeT++ is a popular general network simulation tool
for both wired and wireless networks. Most of the frameworks and simulation models
in OMNeT are open source code. The advantage of using OMNeT++ is that it pro-
vides a powerful graphic user interface that makes tracing and debugging more easier
than other simulation tools. OMNeT++ provides MAC layer protocols for both wired
and wireless networks but for WSNs, a limited number of protocols are considered
and developed. The disadvantage of this simulation tool is that the existing functions
and properties are not good enough to design the network protocols especially, when
there are lots of constraints and limitations in WSNs.
• SENS [127]
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The abbreviation of SENS is Sensor, Environment and Network Simulator that in-
volves four main interchangeable and extensible components for physical, environ-
mental, network and application layer. A physical component is used to read sensed
information. An application component simulates the software of sensor node. Addi-
tionally, it communicates with network component to manage incoming and outgoing
data packets. SENS provides the performance evaluation tools for development of the
applications but for routing protocol module, there is no manual or documentation for
the public usage.
• Ponder2 [129]
Ponder2 is a popular policy language to use in Body Sensor Network (BSN). Ponder2
comprises a self-contained, stand-alone, general-purpose object management system
with message passing between objects. It incorporates an awareness of events and
policies and implements a policy execution framework. It has a high-level configura-
tion and control language called PonderTalk and user-extensible managed objects that
are programmed in Java. Ponder2 is implemented as Self Managed Cell (SMC) [78]
that is a set of hardware and software components forming an administrative domain.
This means that, Ponder2 is capable of self management. Everything in Ponder2 is
a managed object that has to be loaded dynamically into the SMC from a library,
thereby producing the factory managed object (Java class).
B.3.2 Emulator for WSNs
Imran [57] mentioned that an emulator is a hybrid scheme which combines both software
and hardware where some components are implemented in the real sensor nodes and some
are developed in a simulation program or a simulator. The emulator is implemented in
real sensor nodes, thus it may provide better security services and performance than using
the simulation program only. Some of the emulators provide highly scalability. At the
same time, it can emulate the numerous number of sensor nodes. A summary of horizontal
and vertical analysis at diffreent phases based on current WSN simulators and emulators is
shown in Figure B.1. There are several emulators for WSNs which are explained with their
advantages and disadvantages.
• TOSSIM[69]
TOSSIM is an emulator that is based on TinyOS (Tiny Operating System) [68] es-
pecially designed for WSNs. TinyOS is an open source embedded operating system
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Fig. B.1 A Summary of Horizontal and Vertical Analysis at Different Phases
(Source: M. Imran, A. M. Said and H. Hasbullah
A Survey of Simulators, Emulators and Testbeds for Wireless Sesnor Network [57])
which targets to use with embedded devices or hardware. TOSSIM is a discrete event
network simulator based on Python and C++ programming platforms. TOSSIM pro-
vides on-line documents, open resources and graphic user interface namely; TinyViz
which is very convenient for a user to interact with electronic devices. TOSSIM is
a powerful network emulator for WSNs because it supports hundreds or even thou-
sands of sensor nodes simulation. Most of the WSN researchers used TinyOS and
TOSSIM for radio module and code execution because it can simulate an accurate
result for real world situations. There are some limitations of using TOSSIM. Every
sensor nodes need to run on NesC [46] - an embedded programming language - which
is event-driven, component-based and implemented based on TinyOS. TOSSIM can
only emulate the same type of homogeneous applications. This means that TOSSIM
is designed for WSNs simulation but it needs the same type of sensor node because
it does not support for cross platforms. In addition, the simulation results for energy
consumption cannot be true and accurate.
• ATEMU[105]
ATEMU is introduced to provide a fine-grained approach based network emulator that
developed and improved over TOSSIM. ATEMU achieves to balance between hard-
ware devices and network simulation. ATEMU is also compatible with both Mica
family motes and Telos family motes which are two popular powerful sensor nodes
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in WSNs. ATEMU can simulate over cross platform sensor nodes, hardware and ap-
plications. A graphic user interface is provided to debug and monitor code execution
processes. ATEMU can give an accurate simulation result for WSNs but the simula-
tion time is much longer than other tools. Unlike TOSSIM, the documentations are
not well noted and there is no latest version of network simulation tool and docu-
ments. Therefore, it is hard to follow the documentation that is not well noted and
presented.
• Avrora[17]
Avrora is designed for a WSN over java platform. Alike ATEMU, Avrora allows
to simulate cross platform of sensor nodes, application and hardware devices. This
means that it supports both Micas and Telos motes for simulation. Avrora was de-
veloped by University of California, Angles Compilers Group. Avrora was built on
the advantages over both TOSSIM and ATYMU tools to reduce the drawbacks. A
graphic user interface is not supported in Avrora but it provides the open source codes
and well-noted on-line documents. Avrora emulator is an instruction-level simulator
so, the code can be run instruction by instruction. Therefore, the execution time is
faster and better as well as it provides scalability. Avrora provides much flexible than
TOSSIM and ATEMU because it was implemented in Java. The disadvantages of
Avarora are there is no graphic user interface to trace and debug the executable code,
and the network management algorithms cannot be simulated because it doesn’t pro-
vide network communication tools.
B.4 Quantitative Research Method for Access Control
In this section, the quantitative research survey of access control roles and policies in the
medical industry which is carried out by Ferreira [37] is briefly discussed. The following
roles and policies are essential for medical scenario but in general, these roles and policies
can be easily applied in other application areas.
B.4.1 Legislative Access Control Rules
Legislative and regulation need to be put into practice. Based on Health Care Professionals’
(HCPs) responsibility and patient rights, and consent, the following legislative access con-
trol rules are extracted within the access control policies. Although some are very generic,
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these rules constitute some of the access control policies to adjusts according to the need of
real world requirements. The rules based on HCPs are extracted as follows:
• Patient’s consent must be sought where required.
• Medical data should only be collected and processed by HCPs or individuals or bodies
working on behalf of HCPs.
• Appropriate measures must be available to protect against unauthorised access.
• Providers of information, communication and health services should under all cir-
cumstances must be identifiable including final owner or provider.
The following rules are represented for the patients based on legislative recommenda-
tions:
• Access to medical data by patients may be refused, limited or delayed under some
circumstances (i.e, defined by the HCPs).
• Every person shall be enabled to have access to his/her medical data either directly or
through a HCP.
B.4.2 Access Control Rules
The general access control roles and policies for both HCPs and Patients are discussed as
follows:
Rules for HCPs
• Access in Emergency Situation
– Specific roles must be able to adjust decisions regarding data access (read only)
in emergency situations.
– Logging and audit should be provided at all time that integrated with above role.
• System Access (Authentication)
– Different types of authentication mechanism must be available to adapt accord-
ing to users’ need (Most common are login/password + biometrics).
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• Logging and Monitoring
– Audit must be available and secured at all times.
– Necessary to provide alert features to avoid problems with the authentication
mechanisms.
• Access Control Roles
– It must be possible to define alerts for the number of accesses based on specific
users or roles.
– The responsible person must be alerted if someone or some role reaches that
limit.
– The definition of access control roles must be fine-grained.
– The head of the department (responsible role) must be able to assign one or more
people to alter some access permission for some roles.
• Who Decide who accesses what
– There must be a representative for each role who can define or change the poli-
cies for that role.
• Problems with The Policies Alterations and adaptations
– Roles must be able to change and adapt accordingly.
– Permission to modify a role must be provided for specific circumstances.
– All the above rules must be logged and registered as same conditions that handle
in emergency situations (someone gets a message of changes and revises its
appropriateness).
• Security
– Necessary to provide alert features for the different services on a system (to
prevent and detect downtime in a faster way).
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Rules for Patient
• Access by Patient
– Patients must be able to access their record, either paper or electronically, with
the help of HCPs.
• Illiteracy and Ignorance
– Patients must be able to access their record, either paper or electronically, as a
summarised record.
• Legislation and Rights
– Patients must be able to access their record, either paper or electronically, with-
out any modifications.
• System Access (Authentication)
– Different types of authentication mechanisms must be available to be adapted
according to the users’ need (most common are login/password + biometrics.)
• Access Control Roles
– Access control roles must exist depending on the professional category or type
of information.
– The role must exist the option for patients to define access control roles in some
situations.
– There must exist the option of defining access control roles for several different
cases. For example, groups of people that could define these access control roles
could be: a doctor with a patient, a doctor with a family member (when a patient
cannot do it), only the family assisting doctor, etc.
• Security
– IT support roles must exist in order to deal with problems more rapidly and
efficiently (e.g., logged time response, alert to responsible people when time is
expired, etc)
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Overall, the above roles and policies are needed to consider when a new access control
model is designed and developed especially for medical or other complicated applications
but in general, these roles and policies should be able to apply in other application area in
WSNs.
B.5 Conclusion
Based on the above discussion, a WSN is very active in several application areas such as
medical, military, border patrol, health care, etc. Additionally, choosing a right tool is an
essential in WSNs based on the requirements of the application and time period. Finally, to
propose a new access control model for a WSN, the basis access control roles or policies
are needed to define in advance for a medical application.

Appendix C
An Overview of Implementation Phase
A detailed development process of an example medical scenario with the proposed access
control model is discussed in this appendix. The example medical scenario is already ex-
plained under applications for Wireless Sensor Network section. The proposed access con-
trol model is an extended version of Ponder2. The hierarchical structure of Ponder2 package
with the proposed model is shown in Figure C.1.
There are lots of different modules under main Ponder2 package. The main module is
SRC known as source file of Ponder2. In the SRC module, there are two different files: Pon-
der2 (Java Package) and Ponder2 (resource). In Ponder2 (Java package), all the Java source
codes are stored. All the Java codes of user interfaces for an example medical scenario are
stored under the “Hospital” folder and the main Java files for all the users such as doctor,
nurse, patient, patient family are located in “Managedobject” folder.
Everything in Ponder2 is a Managed Object. A Managed Object has to be loaded dy-
namically into the SMC from a library, thereby producing a factory managed object(Java
class). This is the same as any object oriented system where the class has to be loaded be-
fore instances can be created. All the policies definition are stored under the ”Policy” folder.
Under Ponder2 (Resource) folder, the “Pondertalk” source files are stored. A user interface
of nurse is called by Poundertalk file as follow.
//Setting for patient in the example/hospital/scenario
newauthpol := root/factory/authpolicy.
//load the managed object for a patient
factory := root load: "PatientMO1".
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Fig. C.1 A Hierarchical Structure of Ponder2
The following coding are part of coding from the “Patient-Setting.p2” file under Ponder2
(resource). In the following code, the patient interface is loaded by PonderTalk command
and created the interfaces for the patients. Two patient interfaces are created named as Bob
and Alice with certain information. Currently, the information for each patient is limited
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to name, age, symptom and location. We can add extra information regarding the patients
by editing codes in Java and Pondertalk file. We can also add more patients to test the ac-
countability of the application by putting extra code in “Patient-setting.p2” file. It will be
the same for doctors, nurses and patient families. All the interface of users will be called by
Pondertalk command “load” and created. “load” command is a factory command to load a
Java managed object file for SMC.
//instantiate a PatientMO object
bob := factory createname: "Bob" age:"18" symp:"Heart-Attack" path: "/patient/heart/bob".
root/patient/heart at: "bob" put: bob.
alice := factory createname: "Alice" age:"17" symp:"Lung-Cancer" path: "/patient/cancer/alice".
root/patient/cancer at: "alice" put: alice.
Ponder2 is combination of three different languages such as Extensible Markup Language
(XML), pondertalk syntax and Java. Ponder2 project is based on Apache Marven project.
“Pom.xml” is used to build the whole Ponder2 project but “build.xml” is used to compile
the SMC. To compile a medical example, the following code is added in “build.xml” file.
target: Medical-Scenario (scenario 3)
<target name="Medical-Scenario" depends="build" description="–> Runs the SMC with
access policy">
<antcall target="run">
<param name="autharg" value="-auth allow" />
<param name="bootarg" value="-boot boot.p2 -boot hospitaldomain.p2 -boot ex3/tut1.p2
-boot eca1.p2 -boot scenario3/nurse-settings.p2 -boot scenario3/patient-settings.p2 -boot
scenario3/doctor-settings.p2 -boot scenario3/audit.p2 -boot scenario3/patient-family-setting.p2"
/>
</antcall>
</target>

